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This dissertation examines the nature of arguments over the meaning of texts. 
People often disagree about the meaning of texts, with arguments ranging from 
disagreements over individual words to disagreements over the text’s overall sense. Over 
two thousand years ago, rhetoricians in ancient Greece and Rome classified recurring 
types of disagreement over the meaning of texts. This classification, known as the legal 
stases, served as a tool for inventing arguments in favor of the arguer’s preferred 
interpretation.  
My dissertation recovers and adapts the legal stases as a modern rhetorical 
method for generating and analyzing arguments over the meaning of texts.  
In the first chapter, I sketch the history of the legal stases from their origins in ancient 
Greco-Roman legal discourse to their slide into obscurity in the seventeenth century. I 
rename them the interpretive stases because scholars can use them to analyze debates revolving 
around texts from a variety of spheres, including not only law, but also politics, religion, 
literature, and history. I adopt six interpretive stases: letter versus spirit, contradictory 
passages, ambiguity, definition, assimilation, and jurisdiction. These six stases offer a 
 
reasonably grained slicing of disputes over textual meaning at their roots: from a single 
word to how a text is applied in novel ways.  
In the next six chapters, I examine each interpretive stasis in detail with case 
studies from debates over textual meaning in a variety of settings. Case studies range 
from a controversy in literary criticism over the racially subversive nature of Phillis Wheatley’s 
poetry in the stasis of ambiguity to a debate in historical scholarship over Lincoln’s 
sexuality as inferred from his correspondence with an alleged male lover in the stasis of 
assimilation. In my final chapter, I suggest ways that literature and composition teachers 
might use the interpretive stases to help students analyze and generate arguments about 
texts, and I discuss promising intersections between my research and contemporary 
language science. 
Thus, my dissertation advances the ability of scholars to analyze the rhetorical 
dynamics of interpreting texts, trace the evolution of textual meaning, and examine how 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Interpretive Stases 
In November 2009, over one thousand e-mails and two thousand documents were 
stolen from East Anglia University’s Climate Research Unit, located in the United 
Kingdom, and subsequently leaked online. The documents, dating from as early as 1996, 
were authored by dozens of leading climatologists who have argued that the average 
temperature of the earth has been rising at a potentially catastrophic rate as a result of 
human activity (Johnson). Critics argued that the leaked e-mails and documents revealed 
an effort by scientists to suppress evidence that the earth was indeed not warming. This 
scandal soon became known as “climategate” and several parties who had been active 
participants in the debate over global warming offered interpretations of the leaked texts 
in service of their own agendas.  
 One e-mail in particular received significant attention. Phil Jones, then head of 
the Climate Research Unit at East Anglia University, in a 1999 e-mail addressed to three 
of his colleagues, discusses how he treats data that would be published the following 
year. The following line from his e-mail received particular scrutiny: “I’ve just completed 
Mike’s Nature trick of adding in the real temps to each series for the last 20 years (ie 
from 1981 onwards) amd [sic] from 1961 for Keith’s to hide the decline.” According to 
one of the addressees, Michael Mann, Jones is explaining how he combined centuries of 
temperature-correlated data from tree rings, which are considered inaccurate after 1960, 
with more recent data from actual instruments (Grandia).1 After 1960, the tree-ring data 
diverges from the data from these instruments, the former indicating a decline in 
                                                 
1 Granted, Mann has a stake in this debate as well and is an interpreter like everyone else 
who reads these e-mails, however, it appears that his description of what Jones describes 




temperatures (Grandia). Jones replaced the divergent data with data from actual 
instruments, resulting in a graphical spike in global temperatures in the latter half of the 
20th century, which is sometimes called a “hockey-stick” diagram.2 Subsequently, 
controversy swirled around Jones’ technique of combining data from different sources. 
Some skeptics of global warming seized on this line of text as an indication that 
climate scientists were exaggerating or even fabricating evidence for rising global 
temperatures. In one representative instance, Bradley Fikes, author of the North County 
Times Brad’s Sci-Tech Blog, noted, “The plain wording of this Climategate email 
suggests deceit, but Professor Jones, now taking a leave of absence from the CRU 
[Climate Research Unit], says he was just speaking colloquially about how to solve a 
problem.” Fikes, like many other critics, zeroed in on the word “trick” as a certain 
indicator of duplicity:  
“The trick…was a deliberate deception to fool the science-ignorant. Had 
Jones not doctored the graph, that decline would have been on the front cover, 
where even science-illiterate reporters and policy makers (read: politicians) 
couldn’t miss it….  
“It’s the same trick used in ads where the supposed product benefits are 
boldly proclaimed, and the problems mentioned in the fine print. It’s the same 
trick used by scummy con artists. It has nothing to do with science.” 
For Fikes, the word “trick” was not a guileless colloquialism but a sign that Jones had 
purposefully fudged the data.   
                                                 




Jones, however, was not without defenders. A post on the blog Real Climate: 
Climate Science from Climate Scientists, appearing soon after the stolen e-mails and 
documents were leaked, defends Jones’ use of the word “trick,” arguing, “…the ‘trick’ is 
just to plot the instrumental records along with reconstruction so that the context of the 
recent warming is clear. Scientists often use the term ‘trick’ to refer to a ‘a [sic] good way 
to deal with a problem’, rather than something that is ‘secret’, and so there is nothing 
problematic in this at all” (Schmidt). 
One locus of the debate over the meaning of Jones’ e-mail, then, hinged on 
whether the word “trick” was insidious or innocuous. This kind of interpretive dispute 
over the intended sense of a word in a particular context can be classified according to the 
system that is the subject of this dissertation. Indeed, this incident, as an illustration of 
disputes that can arise over the interpretation of a text, leads us to ask several questions: 
How do such divergent views of a widely available, accessible, and circulated text arise? 
What is it about the nature of texts and their relationship to human minds and 
communities that can give rise to these disputes? Are there any discernible patterns in 
these conflicts over interpretation? And if so, can they be classified? In other words, can 
we predict how people disagree over the interpretation of a text? How do rhetors then 
persuade audiences to accept their interpretation of a text when there are other competing 
interpretations? What specific tactics are at the rhetor’s disposal in these conflicts or 
disputes? Do rhetoricians have any available methods to understand and analyze such 
disputes?  
The answer to the last question, which can then help us begin to explore the 




analyzing disputes over written texts and other kinds of recorded discourse, but this 
theoretical apparatus has been largely ignored by rhetorical scholarship in recent times. In 
antiquity, rhetoricians devised stasis theory as a way to help orators determine general, 
recurring points of disagreement that can arise in debates or disputes. These kinds of 
central points of disagreement are collectively called the stases (singular: stasis). As part 
of this doctrine, the ancients also outlined a series of general, recurring points of 
disagreement that can arise in disputes over the interpretation of a written document. This 
latter set of issues constitutes what have been traditionally called the legal stases. 
However, given the fact that they are not confined to legal documents, as originally 
conceived, I term them the interpretive stases or stases of interpretation. Giving them a 
robust, modern treatment, my dissertation presents the ancient and largely neglected 
interpretive stases as a theoretically rich, analytically viable, field-independent heuristic 
for the invention and analysis of interpretive arguments.3  
 
Intersections and Interventions in the Field 
Stasis Theory in the 20th Century (Revival) 
Stasis theory, a major mode of invention from ancient times through the Early 
Modern period, has since the mid-20th century been at least in part recovered, revived, 
and reconfigured. Important scholarly energy has been expended tracing its origins and 
                                                 
3 The phrase “field-independent heuristic of invention” is consciously taken from 
Fahnestock and Secor (“Toward a Modern Version of Stasis” 217). They use this phrase 




development,4 adapting the theory for modern rhetorical situations,5 and finding ways to 
make the theory relevant for the contemporary writing classroom.6 These efforts have 
been largely successful in partially resurrecting a once neglected theory for the purposes 
of historical insight, analysis, and pedagogy. Despite these gains, the recent project of 
rehabilitating stasis theory has been incomplete, for a significant part of the stasis system, 
the interpretive stases, has been largely neglected.  
Today rhetoricians are most likely familiar with the ancient stases of conjecture, 
definition, quality, and jurisdiction, and probably the modern additions of cause/effect 
and action.7  Few, however, are familiar with the stases of letter and spirit, conflicting 
laws, ambiguity, or assimilation. While many rhetoricians may have encountered these 
terms in other contexts, most would not associate them with the classical stasis system. 
Yet in ancient times, and as late as the 16th century, these were all considered stases. In 
Greek and Roman rhetorical theory, the stases were in fact divided into two classes: the 
better-known “rational” stases—conjecture (or fact), definition, quality, jurisdiction—and 
the “legal” or interpretive stases—letter and spirit, conflicting laws, ambiguity, definition, 
assimilation, and jurisdiction (Nadeau, “Classical Systems of Stases in Greek” 70-71). 
Developed for legal oratory, these two classes of stases corresponded to two kinds of 
questions that could arise in a courtroom setting: those over the facts of the case and 
those that could arise over the interpretation of legal documents, such as wills, contracts, 
                                                 
4 For example, Heath, Menander; Heath, “The Substructure of Stasis-Theory;” Nadeau, 
“Classical Systems of Stases in Greek;” Nadeau, “Hermogenes on ‘Stock Issues’ in 
Deliberative Speaking;” Dieter. 
5 For example, Fahnestock and Secor, “Toward a Modern Version of Stasis.” 
6 Fahnestock and Secor, A Rhetoric of Argument: Brief Edition.  
7 The stases of cause/effect and action were added by Fahnestock and Secor (“Toward a 




and laws. The former set of issues was classified as the rational stases, which I call the 
situational stases because they are concerned with the contingencies of the situation in 
question. The latter set of issues was classified as the legal stases, here referred to as the 
interpretive stases, because they concern the interpretation of texts.  
In surveying modern scholarship on stasis theory, the neglect of the stases of 
interpretation becomes glaringly apparent. Antoine Braet’s 1987 article, “The Classical 
Doctrine of status and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation,” for example, which 
attempts to explain what a theory of argumentation would look like with the concept of 
stasis at its core, only refers to the situational stases, making no mention of the legal 
stases. Wayne Thompson, in “Stasis in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” searches for evidence of the 
theory, albeit in nascent form, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but only looks for the situational 
stases, ignoring the appearance of the interpretive stases altogether.8 Michael Carter, 
looking to stasis theory as a rhetorical foundation for social constructionist views of 
discourse and knowledge, never refers to the interpretive stases, which would arguably 
greatly support his case. Only Kathy Eden studies the interpretive stases in any depth in 
recent scholarship, tracing their history and influence from ancient Roman law to 16th 
century Protestantism in Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: Chapters in the 
Ancient Legacy and Its Humanist Reception. She does not, however, study their place 
within the rhetorical stasis system in depth. Hence, the work of these theorists represents 
the general neglect of the interpretive stases, even in scholarship that is devoted to stasis 
theory. In rehabilitating the interpretive stases for modern usage, then, this dissertation 
continues a larger scholarly project that began over half a century ago. 
                                                 
8 To my knowledge, no scholarship exists which recognizes the appearance of the legal 





Rhetoric and Hermeneutics 
This dissertation also stands at the intersection of rhetoric and hermeneutics, 
where rhetorical scholars have attempted to address the problem of analyzing interpretive 
arguments. In the final two decades of the last century, Steven Mailloux and Michael Leff 
devised two complementary conceptual frameworks for understanding the relationship 
between interpretation and persuasion. Mailloux offers rhetorical hermeneutics as  “a 
rhetorical approach to specific historical acts of cultural interpretation” (Mailloux, 
“Rhetorical Hermeneutics Revisited” 233). In Mailloux’s rhetorical hermeneutics, 
“shared interpretive strategies…[are viewed] as historical sets of topics, arguments, 
tropes, ideologies, and so forth, that determine how texts are established as meaningful 
through rhetorical exchanges” (Mailloux, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics” 629). Leff, in 
response to Mailloux, presents hermeneutical rhetoric (196).9 Leff is especially 
concerned with rhetorical production, and thus hermeneutical rhetoric “focuses upon 
interpretation as a source of invention and suggests how traditions can be altered without 
destroying their identity” (203-204). Leff explains, “As the embodied utterances of the 
past are interpreted for current application, their ideas and modes of articulation are 
reembodied, and old voices are recovered for use in new circumstances” (203). Leff 
seeks to understand how rhetors manage to use traditional texts in the service of 
contemporary persuasion, without destroying the value of those texts.  
Both Mailloux and Leff illustrate how to work within their conceptual 
frameworks to analyze interpretive arguments, Mailloux with the reception of the novel 
                                                 





Huckleberry Finn10 and abolitionist versus pro-slavery interpretations of the Bible,11 Leff 
with Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address.”12  Neither, however, outlines a detailed 
method for carrying out such an analysis. While conceptually it is important to 
understand how they connect hermeneutics and rhetoric, replicating their approach with 
other samples of discourse remains difficult. Mailloux’s and Leff’s concepts, although 
they frame interpretive arguments in important ways, do not provide analysts with a 
means of labeling and categorizing arguments. In other words, their concepts offer no 
defined way to perform fine-grained rhetorical analysis, which would deepen our 
understanding of interpretive arguments.  
On the other hand, just as the situational stases have provided rhetoricians a 
standard, field-independent means of discussing and analyzing debates in general, the 
interpretive stases could likewise provide a standard, field-independent means of 
discussing and analyzing debates over textual interpretation. Equipped with the 
interpretive stases, scholars interested in debates over texts could recognize common 
rhetorical moves within and between particular debates, genres, media, communities, 
even individuals, enabling not only more in-depth analyses but also comparative studies 
that are more difficult to conduct without a standard set of terms.  
 
Meaning Construction 
 This dissertation is also situated within linguistic scholarship on meaning 
construction that has developed over the latter half of the last century, maturing with 
                                                 
10 Mailloux, Rhetorical Power 100-129. 
11 Mailloux, “Rhetorical Hermeneutics Revisited” 246. 




intense vigor into the twenty-first. A growing number of language theorists believe that 
meaning is a consequence of a number of factors, including language use, linguistic 
context, extra-linguistic context, the language user’s knowledge of the language, and the 
language user’s previous experience.13 Meaning is not simply a function of linguistic 
form, but depends on how language users employ linguistic forms in any given context. 
Meaning is the result of dynamic social and cognitive processes. 
 Researchers interested in the processes and properties of meaning construction 
have studied how language users construct meaning in a variety of settings and 
circumstances: storytelling (Turner); courtroom discourse (Coulson); riddles, billboard 
advertisements, computer-human interaction, and rituals (Fauconnier and Turner). One 
setting or situation that has received relatively less investigative attention from these 
researchers is the public interpretation of shared texts, the situation of multiple readers 
dialogically co-constructing the meaning of a single text. In literate societies especially, 
where there is a proliferation of written or printed texts, such situations are rather 
common, and, as I attempted to illustrate with the introductory anecdote, can have 
significant consequences. They are of further interest to scholars of meaning construction 
because they offer discrete instances of humans co-constructing the meaning of 
perceptually shared objects and could potentially illuminate such processes as they 
involve non-textual objects.  
 Because the co-construction of meaning involves at least an attempt at reconciling 
multiple perspectives, the process necessarily involves persuasion. In the situations under 
discussion here, i.e. interpretive disputes, parties try to persuade each other to accept or 
                                                 




reject certain interpretations. Because persuasion is involved in this process, a rhetorical 
approach that takes into account moves of persuasion is in order. The interpretive stasis 
system offers such an approach as it not only pinpoints the kinds of disagreements that 
arise in constructing the meaning of a text, but it also lists several possible means of 
persuasion, categorized according to the kind of interpretive dispute, that can be involved 
in the process.  
By bringing the interpretive stases to bear on this particular situation of meaning 
construction, I demonstrate that rhetoric has an important but neglected14 role to play in 
research on meaning construction. The co-construction of meaning, in particular, requires 
that the parties involved harmonize their unique, subjective visions of the world. This 
process of harmonizing has traditionally been the purview of rhetoric. Persuasion is after 
all the process by which individuals attempt to align their worldviews. But contemporary 
language scholarship can enrich the rhetorical approach by offering theoretically 
grounded approaches to the social and cognitive forces that shape how people argue over 
texts. With rhetoric we can pinpoint the argumentative and persuasive dimensions of 
those forces.  
To be sure, I am not delving into linguistic issues in detail in this dissertation, but 
am using contemporary language theory to help illuminate the cognitive and linguistic 
grounds for disagreements over texts and for the resolution of those disagreements. I thus 
put forward the interpretive stases and my elaboration of them as an extension of 
meaning construction in the context of textual interpretation. Contemporary language 
theorists whose work on meaning construction I build on include Herbert Clark, Gilles 
                                                 




Fauconnier, J. L. Austin, H. P. Grice, and John Searle. Still we must recognize that the 
interpretive stases developed within the humanist tradition of rhetoric. It is to that 
development and history that I now turn. 
 
A Brief History of the Interpretive Stases15 
Classical Development and Continuity 
The origins of the interpretive stases along with the interpretive topics, as they 
appear in their first attested form, are somewhat obscure. They are almost undoubtedly 
rooted in the classical judicial system. One possible and particularly striking source may 
be the 4th century B.C. Athenian trial-like procedure for revising the law code (Hansen 
168).16 Once the Assembly decided that a law needed revision, any citizen could make a 
proposal for changing the law (Hansen 168). He would then go as an accuser of the law 
before a legislative body called the nomothetai (literally the law setters) who would act as 
jury (Hansen 169). Five representatives of the people nominated by the Assembly would 
also appear before the nomothetai to defend the existing law (Hansen 168-169). After 
both parties had made their cases, the nomothetai would vote on whether to change the 
law or maintain the status quo (Hansen 169). This process would encourage the 
identification of problematic points of interpretation in the legal text. Another, perhaps 
more likely, source for the interpretive stases and their topics is the ancient Athenian 
court system, the dikasterion or the “People’s Court,” in which parties in a lawsuit 
                                                 
15 Currently there exists no detailed account of the development of the interpretive stases 
from their origins to their present state. A detailed account is not attempted here but 
rather a brief sketch. 
16 Walker suggests this procedure may have been the model for the law exercises found 
in later progymnasmata, and while I agree, I suggest this procedure may have had an 




incorporated written laws and other legal documents into their speeches as evidence 
(Hansen 178, 200-201).  
In any case, the formal interpretive stasis system probably began as a loose 
collection of generally recognized strategies for manipulating the written law and 
eventually other legal documents to suit one’s case. Sophists who were formerly 
logographers or courtroom speechwriters, like Antiphon, Isocrates, and Lysias, probably 
began teaching their students these strategies in order to prepare them for civic life.17 
Evidence of this kind of instruction can be found in later extant progymnasmata or 
preliminary exercises, in which we find law exercises.18 These law exercises contain 
strategies that are strikingly similar to those found in more systematic treatments of the 
interpretive stases. 
 As these strategies were written down and taught, patterns no doubt emerged, and 
more systematic approaches to manipulating legal documents were developed. Although 
in all likelihood the interpretive stases developed separately from the situational stases, at 
some point, probably in the 3rd or 2nd century B.C.,19 and certainly by the time of 
                                                 
17 Lawyers did not exist in the ancient Athenian legal system. Adult male citizens were 
expected to represent themselves, or their female relatives, in court before large juries of 
other Athenian male citizens (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 20). 
18 See Kennedy’s Progymnasmata which includes English translations of the preliminary 
exercises of Aelius Theon, pseudo-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus, all of which 
include law exercises. Although the earliest extant set of preliminary exercises, Aelius 
Theon’s, only dates to the 1st century A.D., it is generally accepted that some form of 
such exercises were taught as early as the 4th century B.C. (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 
26). Walker specifically argues that Isocrates may have assigned some kind of law 
exercise to his students (Chapter 3, 49). 
19 According to Walker’s reconstruction of his stasis system, Isocrates may have taught a 
sub-stasis of legality under the stasis of quality (Chapter 3, 69-70). If Walker were 
correct, the association and unification of the interpretive and situational stases would 




Hermagoras of Temnos (2nd century B.C.), the similarities between these two 
classifications of arguments were recognized and rhetoricians began to teach and write 
about these two classifications together. Eventually this association would develop into a 
theoretical under girding uniting both classifications. Earlier versions of stasis theory, 
however, even though they recognized the theoretical similarities between the two 
classifications, were in disagreement about the status of the interpretive stases as stases 
proper.  
 While there are certainly earlier examples of writers arguing in one interpretive 
stasis or another, which of course does not necessarily guarantee a theoretical 
understanding of interpretive disputes, the earliest plausible extant theoretical account of 
the interpretive stases, albeit in proto-form, can be found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. While 
previous scholarship has recognized the existence of the situational stases in Aristotle,20 
no scholarship exists, to my knowledge, which recognizes the existence of the 
interpretive stases in this text. To be sure, we do not have a coherent treatment of the 
interpretive stases in this text, but we do find evidence of a nascent form of a 
classification of interpretive disputes. 
 We find a proto-theory of the interpretive stases in two places in the Rhetoric: in 
Chapters 13 and 15 of Book I. Chapter 15 is probably the clearest articulation of a theory 
of the interpretive stases. Here Aristotle discusses the inartistic proofs, which include 
written laws. Aristotle frames his discussion of written laws by writing that he will 
explain “how they can be used in exhorting and dissuading and accusing and defending” 
                                                                                                                                                 
unsystematic nature of the proto-stasis theory found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in which the 
two sets of stases are not integrated, places doubt on an earlier date.  




(I.15.3).21 What follows is a list of topics, or rhetorical strategies, for doing just that 
(I.15.3-12). In his discussion of these topics, Aristotle mentions two situations that 
rhetors use to their advantage: when a law contradicts another law or contradicts itself 
and when a law is ambiguous (I.15.9-10). It would be a stretch to argue that Aristotle 
recognizes these two situations as general points of disagreements in disputes over legal 
documents, but it is important to note their appearance for the sake of understanding the 
development of the theory. 
 In chapter 13, we find instances of two other proto-interpretive stases. The first is 
definition. Previous scholarship has already recognized the appearance of the situational 
stasis by the same name (Thompson 136). Intertwined with questions of determining the 
criminal category of an action are also questions of the meaning of legal terms (I.13.9). It 
is these latter questions that will eventually emerge as the interpretive stasis of definition. 
Although the conflation of situational and interpretive stases of definition is not 
uncommon in antiquity, there is clearer separation in later treatments of stasis theory. 
  In this same chapter, Aristotle discusses one of the major limitations of written 
law: written law cannot adequately address particular cases (I.13.12-14). As a solution to 
this limitation, Aristotle prescribes fairness or “justice that goes beyond the written law” 
(I.13.13). According to Aristotle, fairness, or going beyond the law, demands that jurors 
“look not to the law but to the legislator and not to the word (logon) but to the intent 
(dianoian) of the legislator (I.13.17; emphasis). In championing fairness, Aristotle 
distinguishes between the words of the law and the lawmaker’s intent. While Aristotle 
shows no cognizance of this division as a possible issue of contention, this division, along 
                                                 
21 All English translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are taken from Kennedy’s 2007 




with contradictory passages, ultimately has the most consistent appearance as a stasis in 
treatments of in the interpretive stases throughout the centuries. 
 Thus, while we find the proto-interpretive stases of contradictory passages, 
ambiguity, definition, and letter versus spirit (or rather, intent), Aristotle cannot be 
credited with the first coherent system of the interpretive stases. That distinction should 
be given to Hermagoras of Temnos, who is also credited with one of the most highly 
influential systematic treatments of stasis theory.22 By identifying the type of issues at the 
center of debates, he added an important layer to how ancient and subsequent rhetoricians 
conceptualized and carried out the invention of arguments. However, little is known 
specifically about Hermagoras’ system, since his work has been lost, and his theory can 
only be reconstructed from later sources. It does appear that his system included four 
“legal questions” (nomika xētēmata), namely letter and spirit, or rather word and 
exception (kata rhēton kai hupexairesin), contrary laws (antinomia), ambiguity 
(amphibolia), and assimilation (syllogismos) (Nadeau 60-61). In Hermagoras, we have 
the earliest attested example of the close association of the situational and interpretive 
stases, although he did not, as far as we know, consider the latter stases proper (Nadeau, 
“Classical Systems of Stases in Greek” 60).  
 The earliest extant systematic treatment of the interpretive stases, then, is found in 
the later Rhetorica ad Herennium, an early 1st century B.C. handbook. The most inclusive 
of the ancient rhetorical treatises, it lists six perennial issues that can arise in disputes 
over the meaning of a text: written text and intent (scriptum et sententiam), conflicting 
laws (contrarias leges), ambiguity (ambiguum), definition (definitionem), jurisdiction 
                                                 
22 See Nadeau 53; Heath, “Prolegomena” 19; Heath, Menander 5; Kennedy, Classical 




(translationem), and assimilation (ratiocinationem) (I.XI.19).23 Here, the six interpretive 
stases are integrated into the larger stasis system as subtypes of the second of three stases: 
conjectural, legal, and juridical24 (I.XI.18). The author also includes a large list of topics, 
or strategies of persuasion, for each interpretive stasis (II.IX.13-II.XII.18). While the 
interpretive stases are still not fully systematized, the theory is at an advanced stage of 
development at this point.  
 The major rhetorical works of Cicero closely follow the Rhetorica ad Herennium, 
thus marking the beginning of three centuries of systematization of the theory. Cicero’s 
treatment of the interpretive stases is inconsistent. His inconsistency, while certainly 
representing the fluidity of his own thought throughout the course of his life, probably 
also indicates that the theory had not yet solidified. His most inclusive account of the 
interpretive stases is found in his earliest work, De Inventione, where he lists five stases 
of interpretation: written text and intent (de scripto et sententia), conflicting laws (ex 
contrariis legibus), ambiguity (ambiguum), reasoning by analogy (ratiocinativum), and 
definition (definitionavum nominamus) (I.XIII.17). ). In his later works, Topica and De 
Oratore, Cicero reduces the number to three: written word and intent, conflicting laws, 
and ambiguity (Topica XXV-XXVI.95-96 and De Oratore I.XXXI.140).25 In contrast to 
the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero throughout his works consistently 
maintains a distinction between the stases proper and documentary disputes (scrpiti 
                                                 
23 Although I am drawing from Caplan’s text, which includes an English translation, I 
have made some modifications, so that the English better reflects the nuances of the 
Latin, and therefore the development of the theory.  
24 The juridical stasis most closely accords with the stasis of quality in other systems. 
25 See Topica XXV-XXVI.95-96 and De Oratore I.XXXI.140. In Orator XXXIV.121, 
Cicero reduces the number of documentary disputes to two, subsuming word and intent 
under the category of ambiguity. Topica, it should be noted, was written after Orator, and 




controversia), although he closely associates the two (De Inventione X.XIII.17) or 
“disputes about a law” (legitimae disceptationes) (Topica XXV.95). Cicero asserts that 
they are separate from the situational stases (separata sunt a constitutionibus) (De 
Inventione X.XIII.17) and calls them quasi-stases (quasi status) (Topica XXV.95). While 
Cicero gives more condensed treatments of the interpretive stases in his later work, his 
treatment in De Inventione is rather elaborate and like the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
includes a large list of topics for each stasis.  
Notably, both Cicero and the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
present the earliest extant examples of expanding the scope of the legal issues beyond 
disputes over laws to not only other legal documents but to any written document 
(Rhetorica ad Herennium II.IX.13; Topica XXVI.96). This expansion meant that the 
interpretive stases could be applied to non-judicial discourse. The term “legal,” the 
traditional name for these stases, then becomes somewhat of a misnomer, which is why I 
insist on the term interpretive instead.  
In the next century, Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria represents an advancement in 
the theory and systematization of the interpretive stases. Incorporating the interpretive 
stases, as questions, 26 into the larger stasis system under the division of the legal stasis, 
Quintilian attempts to elucidate the relationship between the situational stases and the 
interpretive stases, along with how the interpretive stases themselves are interrelated 
amongst themselves (3.6.66-67; 3.6.88; 7.10.1-4). He officially lists five legal 
questions— letter and intent (scripti et voluntatis), conflict of laws (legum contrariarum), 
                                                 
26 Quintilian declares that the interpretive stases are actually not stases but questions 





inference/assimilation/”collection” (collectivum), ambiguity (ambiguitatis), and 
transference (tralationis)27 (3.6.67)—and later states that definition, which he includes as 
a logical (situational) stasis also belongs to the legal questions, bringing his list to six 
(3.6.68). Like Cicero and the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium before 
him, Quintilian provides a list of topics for each of the interpretive stases. Addtitionally, 
he includes a helpful survey of previous opinion on the subject, thus preserving what 
otherwise would have been lost. 
While Quintilian’s work certainly represents an advancement, the culmination of 
the theory’s development is found in the work of Hermogenes of Temnos. Hermogenes’ 
version of stasis theory, as presented in his work On Stases, remained canonical for 
centuries as a standard school textbook in both the West into the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance and the Byzantine East (Heath, Menander 10, 43; Nadeau, “Classical 
Systems of Stases in Greek” 66, 71). Hermogenes presents a thirteen-stasis system in 
which the legal stases are, with one exception, fully-fledged stases, completely integrated 
into the stasis system. In Hermogenes’ system, the stasis of quality is divided into two: 
logical and legal. The interpretive stases constitute the legal branch, which consists of 
four stases: letter and intent (rhēton kai dianoian), assimilation (syllogismos), ambiguity 
(amphibolia), and conflict of law (antinomia) (40-41).28  
Hermogenes’ system also represents a further progression in the systematization 
of the legal stases as they, along with all the stases, are each presented with an ordered, 
step-by-step, argumentative outline for effective courtroom strategy. When rhetors 
                                                 
27 Later, he uses the term praescriptione (7.5). 





recognize that a current debate is in one of the stases, they can turn to these particularized 
outlines for rhetorical guidance. While each stasis has its own unique outline consisting 
of heads or divisions, argumentative moves the rhetor should make in ideal cases, there 
are shared heads between the stases. Essentially, Hermogenes’ system represents a more 
structured version of the stases’ various topics.  
Subsequent tradition followed models constructed in the classical period with 
little additional innovation or deviation. Table 1 offers a chart denoting self-declared lists 
of interpretive stases as found in several major rhetorical treatises. After Hermogenes, 
many treatises offer a four or five interpretive stasis system. Jursidiction is the most 
frequently omitted interpretive stasis followed by definition, most likely because they are 
included among the situational stases. Many treatises often include the interpretive form 
of these stases within their situational designations. There are exceptions to these 
common systems, but they are not typical. We also see later rhetoricians applying the 
legal stases to realms outside of law, like religious discourse, but even in these cases they 
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Discontinuity and Obscurity 
Yet, after centuries of continuity in the rhetorical tradition, the interpretive stases 
appear to fall into obscurity sometime in the late seventeeth century. While a full 
investigation into the causes for this lapse in the tradition remains outside the scope of 
this dissertation, I suggest that this discontinuity is related to larger noted shifts in the 
rhetorical tradition at the time, a shift towards logic and what were believed to be sound 
methods of proof with a disregard for traditional methods of rhetoric which were believed 
to be untrustworthy (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 261).  
While the abandonment of the interpretive stases and their respective topics in the 
rhetorical tradition then is not surprising given this shift, we might expect their survival 
in the various branches of hermeneutics that had begun to develop over the centuries, 
which they undoubtedly influenced: philosophical, theological, and juridical.29 However, 
we do not find a wholesale survival of the interpretive stasis system in these intellectual 
areas either. In the cases of the first two, the absence of the interpretive stases is due, at 
least in part, to similar intellectual shifts during roughly the same period of time.  
We see in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, for example, who stood in the 
line of both philosophical and theological hermeneutics in the 19th century, a more 
general art of hermeneutics in contrast to what he saw as “various specialized 
hermeneutics” (1). Although he was steeped in the rhetorical tradition, and his theory is 
greatly influenced by it, the interpretive stases would no doubt be included as one of the 
“special methods” of the “specialized hermeneutics” that Schleiermacher was attempting 
to construct a theory in contrast to (15.2).  Their exclusion as a system to explain 
                                                 




interpretive disputes no doubt nailed the coffin shut on the interpretive stases as a feature 
of Western philosophical hermeneutics, as theorists from Schleiermacher forward 
attempted to theorize a more general theory of human interpretation that sought to 
explain how humans interact with the world, not just written texts. 
 In theological hermeneutics, in contrast to earlier works on preaching and biblical 
interpretation by figures like Erasmus and Melanchthon, we see that the interpretive 
stases are absent in major hermeneutic and homiletic treatises in the seventeenth centuries 
forward, such as François Fénelon’s Dialogues concerning Eloquence in General and 
Particularly that Kind which Is Fit for the Pulpit (1718), David Fordyce’s Theodorus: A 
Dialogue concerning the Art of Preaching (1752), George Campbell’s Lectures on Pulpit 
Eloquence (1807), and Austin Phelps’ The Theory of Preaching: Lectures on Homiletics 
(1895). At most we find a collection of topics for expounding on the meaning of the 
Scriptures or answering the objections of an imagined adversary regarding Scriptural 
interpretation (e.g. Campbell X), which bear little and at best incidental resemblance to 
the traditional topics of the interpretive stases. A theorized classification of interpretive 
disputes seems to have virtually disappeared, and thus the interpretive stases were no 
longer taught as part of hermeneutical or homiletic education in the Christian Church. 
Lastly, we might expect to find the interpretive stasis system in juridical 
hermeneutics, that is the realm of law. However, while rhetoric and law had at the very 
least a cross-pollinating relationship through the sixteenth century, that relationship 
began to fray in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in Britain, where 
developments in legal system procedures and rules of evidence diminished “opportunities 




has only been in recent years that a growing number of lawyers, judges, and legal 
academics have begun applying classical rhetorical principles to the analysis of legal 
discourse (Frost 14). However, while legal theorists are deeply interested in interpretation 
theory, to my knowledge the interpretive stases have neither survived nor been 
resurrected as part of any modern theory of statutory interpretation or courtroom strategy 
for argumentation. Certainly, particular words and phrases, like letter versus spirit, 
persist, but they only vaguely index the same conceptual system of interpretive disputes 
that can be traced back to the ancient Greco-Roman tradition. 
 So the question remains: how might this now dormant theory be resurrected for 
modern use? In the following section I introduce and outline a viable version of the 
interpretive stases for modern purposes, along with its theoretical underpinnings. The 
model is further elaborated throughout the rest of the dissertation.  
 
Toward a Modern Version of the Interpretive Stases 
The Six Stases of Interpretation 
What follows is my proposed model of the interpretive stases, six in all. These six stases 
offer a reasonably grained slicing of disputes over textual meaning at their roots: from a 
single word to how a text is applied in novel ways or situations. The definitions I give are 
informed by a wide view of the treatment they receive in rhetorical treatises over the 
centuries adapted for modern analytical purposes. 
1) Letter and spirit: disputes in which the exact verbal formulation of a text is construed 
as being opposed to the author’s likely intention or another source of meaning that 




2) Conflicting passages: when two parts of a text are construed as apparently 
contradictory 
3) Ambiguity: when the text is construed as evoking more than one possible meaning 
due to its form  
4) Definition: when there is disagreement over the limits of a term, that term being found 
either in a text or determined by a text 
5) Assimilation: when a text is applied to a situation apparently not envisioned by the 
author 
6) Jurisdiction: when there is disagreement over who can interpret the text in dispute or 
whether a text is applicable in the situation in question  
 
Disagreement 
The interpretive stases, as part of stasis theory, depend on a principle of 
disagreement. These stases locate recurring points of conflict that arise as hermeneut-
rhetors attempt to coordinate their interpretations of a text. Given this principle of 
disagreement, the interpretation of texts in these rhetorical situations can be viewed as a 
dialogic process. Furthermore, that dialogic process involves persuasion. The theory 
implies that participants act under the assumption of agreement, in regards to their 
interpretation of a text, until there is a dispute. These disputes, or public discrepancies in 
interpretation, become loci of interpretive and rhetorical energy. Stasis theory gives us a 
means of classifying those disputes.  
Usually, hermeneut-rhetors are not content to merely disagree. They attempt to 




the need adjudicate a court case). Many discussions of the system in the rhetorical 
tradition include a set of topics for each interpretive stasis. These topics identify specific 
persuasive strategies that rhetors can employ in each stasis to persuade other parties in the 
dispute that their interpretation is correct, to resolve interpretive discrepancies. Through 
this push and pull, hermeneut-rhetors may arrive at shared constructions of meaning, 
although success is not guaranteed.  
 
A Heuristic for Interpretive Arguments in General  
The interpretive stases classify arguments concerning texts, not mere claims about 
the meaning of texts. Claims about texts made in response to other claims or claims about 
texts that arguers justify (using strategies which in many instances were identified in the 
traditional treatises as topics) can be classified according to this scheme. But general 
statements about textual meaning without either of these conditions cannot be classified 
with the interpretive stases because they are not arguments, and therefore do not 
presuppose a point of disagreement, though they may certainly invite contention.30  
That said, the interpretive stases can be used as a heuristic not just for obvious 
interpretive disputes, where two parties clearly mark themselves as having opposed 
positions, but for interpretive arguments where the oppositional parties are either implied, 
imagined, anticipated, or otherwise unobvious.31 Useful here is Bakhtin’s concept of “the 
dialogic orientation of discourse,” in which all discourse is a response to what has already 
                                                 
30 For example, the situation of new texts can present an initial interpretive situation 
where arguers can make uncontested claims about textual meaning without justification. 
31 Fahnestock and Secor argue similarly that all arguments, even when there is no 
obvious opposition, can be analyzed within the framework of the (rational) stases 




been uttered or common opinion, and is itself directed toward a response (279-280).32 
Many interpretive arguments have a similar relationship with other interpretive 
arguments: they are made in response to and/or in anticipation of previous and/or future 
interpretations. However, sometimes arguers may erase or refuse to acknowledge 
opposing interpretations. Such erasures or refusals are themselves rhetorical moves, and, 
according to the heuristic of the interpretive stases, fall under the stasis of jurisdiction.  
   
In each of the following six chapters, I examine one stasis in detail. I survey a 
sample of the particular topics of each stasis, giving examples of each, usually one longer 
example with shorter ones, to demonstrate how the stases can be employed analytically as 
well as explore the unique characteristics of each stasis. The examples will be taken from 
real discourse from a variety of contexts—e.g. religious, legal, political, literary—
genres—e.g. sermons, pamphlets, essays, debates—and media—e.g. oral, written, 
televised, online—to demonstrate that the interpretive stases, a flexible and versatile 
apparatus, can be applied to any dispute over a text, broadly construed to include 
recordings of oral discourse, irrespective of context, genre, or medium. The interpretive 
stases were a part of a standard set of tools for rhetoricians for almost two millennia, and 




                                                 
32 More recently, Clark considers all language use joint action between participants, 




Chapter 2:  Letter versus Spirit 
In early 2008, Barack Obama was in a heated contest with Hillary Rodham 
Clinton for the Democratic nomination for U.S. president. A junior Illinois senator, 
Obama’s rise to household name status was nothing short of spectacular. With his noted 
eloquence and campaign slogans, “Change is now” and “Yes we can,” he energized a 
growing number of voters, who had become disillusioned with President George W. Bush 
and saw in Obama the promise of a new era of governance. Obama also came to embody 
the possibility of a post-racial society. He was the son of a white woman from Kansas 
and a black man from Kenya, and he self-identified as African American. Many hoped 
that his election to the oval office would signal a new and hopeful chapter in America’s 
bloody and tortured racial history. 
But in March of that same year a series of short videos were released that 
threatened to destroy Obama’s post-racial identity. That month ABC News showed video 
excerpts of sermons preached by Obama’s then pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright of 
Trinity United Church of Christ. These sound bites painted Wright as a radical, anti-
American, black separatist, and by association cast doubt on Obama’s own patriotism and 
his ability to lead a multi-racial society. One sound bite, from a sermon Wright had 
preached in April 2003, was particularly controversial because in it Wright appears to be 
asking God to damn America: 
The government gives them the drugs, builds bigger prisons, passes a three-strike 
law, and then wants us to sing God bless America? No, no, no. Not God bless 




damn America for treating her citizens as less than human! God damn America as 
long as she [?] tries to act like she is God and she is supreme! (Wright)33 
This sound bite, which lasted about thirty seconds, along with excerpts from other 
sermons Wright had preached, was played and re-played on major media outlets for 
weeks, posted on blogs, and viewed on YouTube. As it was circulated, it became the 
center of a heated interpretive dispute with potentially disastrous consequences for 
Obama’s candidacy.34 
Critics claimed that the clip was an example of “racial warfare” (Lopez), an “anti-
American attitude” (Sowell), and “reverse racism” (Feldhahn). Others, however, 
defended Wright, arguing that his words were taken out of context, and that they were not 
anti-American, but an expression of deeply-felt sentiments shared by many African 
Americans in the United States, born out of their experience as a marginalized group in 
American society.35  
Strikingly, Wright’s critics generally pointed to the exact wording of the sound 
bite as a clear indication of Wright’s racialist and anti-American beliefs, while Wright’s 
defenders generally went beyond the words of the sound bite in order to argue that his 
intentions were grossly misunderstood. Though they were unconscious of it, Wright’s 
                                                 
33 Transcription presented here adapted from the transcript provided of the sermon 
excerpt on the Bill Moyers Journal website. In the original broadcasted clip, the last 
sentence is faded out and the last dozen words cannot be heard (“Is Obama’s Pastor a 
Liability?”).   
34 Obama denounced Wright’s controversial statements and claimed he had not 
personally been in attendance when Wright had made the comments in question (Powell). 
Obama and his family revoked their membership from Trinity United Church of Christ 
and Wright was removed from Obama’s spiritual advisory committee (Johnson). It seems 
that critical interpretations of this sound clip (and others) were so pernicious to his 
campaign that Obama decided to sever all public ties with Wright rather than continue to 
provide his own defenses of them or his relationship with Wright. 




critics and defenders were arguing in the interpretive stasis of letter versus spirit: critics 
argued for an interpretation based on the letter of the sound bite, while defenders 
supported an interpretation oriented to the sound bite’s spirit.  
  What exactly marks a dispute in the stasis of letter versus spirit? What 
differentiates an argument for letter versus an argument for spirit? How can the meaning 
of a single text be divided in such oppositional ways? And finally, how do disputants try 
to persuade each other to cross this interpretive divide?  
 
The Rhetorical History of Letter versus Spirit 
 A division between the wording of the text and other appeals to textual meaning 
has a long history in the Western rhetorical tradition. Although his rhetoric predates the 
systematization of stasis theory, Aristotle’s thoughts on the subject, nonetheless, 
represent an early and influential view: “And [it is also fair] to look not to the law but to 
the legislator and not to the word (λόγον) but to the intent (διάνοιαν) of the legislator…” 
(1.13.17). Aristotle argues that fair jurors should consider the mind of the law’s author, 
rather than strictly follow what’s written. In separating what is written from what the 
author intended, Aristotle suggests that the words of a text may not necessarily reflect the 
intentions of the author, thus creating a potentially antithetical relationship between what 
the author has written and what the author meant. 
 Once stasis theory had been given a more systematic frame, the split was given a 
more theoretical articulation without valuing one term over the other and was broadened 
to include written texts in general. As Cicero writes, “A controversy over the letter and 




ipsis) that are written, and the other directs his whole pleading to what he says the writer 
meant (sensisse)” (De Inventione 2.42.121). Cicero’s definition is fairly representative of 
how this stasis was viewed throughout the legacy of the stasis system for the next sixteen 
hundred years. Importantly, the constructed nature of this split was not lost on the 
ancients or their successors. The anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
observes for example that, “A controversy from Letter and Spirit (scripto et sententia) 
arises when the framer’s intention appears (videtur) to be at variance with the letter of 
the text…” ([Cicero] 1.11.19; emphasis mine). An awareness of the constructed nature of 
the antithesis between the written formulation of a text and authorial intention also 
persisted through the centuries.     
 However, there is an important distinction to be noted between later formulations 
of this antithesis, letter versus spirit, which is the antithesis used in the system outlined in 
this dissertation, and the antitheses found in earlier rhetorical tradition. That distinction is 
found primarily in the second term of the antithesis, which in the present system denotes 
not simply authorial intent, as is the case in many of the traditional rhetorical treatises, 
but any source of meaning not grounded in the text itself.      
Indeed, the opposition between letter and spirit is not original to the Greco-
Roman stasis system and cannot be found therein. Instead we find, for example, λόγος 
versus διάνοια in Aristotle’s rhetoric, scriptus et sententia in the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
and Cicero’s De Inventione, scriptus et voluntas in Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria, and 
ῥητος καὶ διανοία in Hermoegenes’ On Issues. The antitheses expressed by these writers 





The first known instance of the slightly different antithesis letter versus spirit in 
Western culture is found in one of the biblical letters of Paul of Tarsus, the apostle of 
Jesus.36 
[Y]ou show that you are a letter of Christ, prepared by us [Paul and his 
spiritual son Timothy], written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, 
not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts. 
Such is the confidence that we have through Christ toward God. Not that 
we are competent of ourselves to claim anything is coming from us; our 
competence is from God, who has made us competent to be ministers of a new 
covenant, not of letter (γράμματος) but of spirit (πνεύματος); for the letter 
(γράμμα) kills, but the Spirit (πνεῦμα) gives life. (2 Corinthians 3:3-6; emphasis 
mine)37  
Paul constructs an antithesis between the written law that was a central part of Jewish 
religious tradition and the “new covenant” of Christ that is given to Christians by the 
Holy Spirit.38 As he does not expressly advocate a particular hermeneutic for approaching 
the Scriptures here, it remains unclear whether Paul was reformulating the rhetorical 
antithesis of written word and intent, with which he may have been familiar.39  
                                                 
36 For more information see Cohen, “Letter and Spirit in Jewish and Roman Law,” and 
Cohen, “Note on Letter and Spirit in the New Testament.”  
37 All English quotations from the Bible are taken from The New Oxford Annotated Bible. 
The Greek is taken from The Greek New Testament. 
38 Cf. Romans 7:6 “But now we have been delivered from the law, having died to what 
we were held by, so that we should serve in the newness of the Spirit (πνεύματος) and 
not in the oldness of the letter (γράμματος).” 
39 Boaz Cohen argues that Paul dressed the Greek rhetorical antithesis of word and intent 
(ῥητος καὶ διανοία) in Jewish terms to create his antithesis letter and spirit 




 While the line between Paul’s invention and antecedent stasis theory remains 
uncertain, we might expect Paul’s influence on conceptions of this stasis to be more 
traceable, especially since the antithesis letter versus spirit seems to have more cultural 
currency than word versus intent does today. One potential point of consolidation 
between Pauline thought and Greco-Roman rhetorical theory may have occurred in the 
work of Augustine of Hippo, who in the fourth and fifth centuries AD worked to 
incorporate classical rhetoric into early Christian hermeneutics and homiletics. Augustine 
in fact devoted an entire book to Paul’s antithesis: The Spirit and the Letter (De Spiritu et 
Littera). Augustine takes Paul’s words and extrapolates from them a hermeneutic for 
interpreting figurative language in the Bible: “That text—‘The letter killeth, but the spirit 
giveth life’—is naturally taken to mean that we are not to understand the figurative 
sayings of Scripture in their literal sense, which may be irrational, but to look for their 
deeper significance, and find nourishment for the inward man in a spiritual understanding 
of them…” (The Spirit and the Letter 6.4). Augustine goes on to demonstrate and apply 
this hermeneutic throughout the rest of the book, and indeed it represents his hermeneutic 
of choice in his other works.  
While Augustine’s work represents a further development of the antithesis letter 
versus spirit as a hermeneutic concept, it does not represent an incorporation of Paul’s 
antithesis into the stasis system. In De doctrina christiana, the work scholars generally 
hold up as Augustine’s major contribution to the rhetorical tradition, no coherent system 




treatise The Spirit and the Letter is made, and we see this hermeneutic at work in the text, 
but we do not find the integration of Pauline thought and stasis theory here.40 
Indeed, the antitheses naming this stasis found in the Latin rhetorical treatises that 
follow Augustine over the next eleven hundred years retain the terms found in the 
classical texts. After that time, stasis theory, and the interpretive stases in particular, 
begin to disappear from treatments of rhetoric. Thus, translations or readings of the Greek 
and Latin rhetorical texts that render the name of this stasis “letter versus spirit” are 
anachronistic, insofar as they enlarge the second term of the antitheses to suggest 
something beyond what the original languages generally denote as “authorial intent.” 
 At the same time, rhetoricians in the tradition did not define the stasis as narrowly 
as the terminology word versus intent would suggest and there were even some 
variations. From what we know of Hermagoras’ system, the homologous proto-stasis, a 
question in Hermagoras’ system, was named word and exception (κατὰ ῥητὸν καὶ 
ὑπεξαίρεσιν) (Nadeau, “Classical Systems of Stases” 60). Hermagoras’ formulation 
suggests that the interpreter may either choose to follow the text or make an exception for 
any number of reasons. We find this conceptualization of the stasis echoed in Gaius 
Julius Victor’s late antique rhetoric, when he writes that the rhetor in favor of intent 
“interprets the meaning or takes an exception (excipit) to some one thing” (3.14).41  
Victor goes on to enumerate intent in three ways:  
                                                 
40 This is not to say that Augustine was not influenced by stasis theory or the interpretive 
stases and that we cannot find evidence of such influence in DDC. Augustine knew 
Cicero’s rhetorical works, including De Inventione, quite well. It appears that the 
rhetorical tradition’s hermeneutics may have influenced Augustine, but this influence 
may have only worked in one direction. Subsequent rhetorical treatises do not pick up on 
Augustine’s terminology a la Paul or thought but continue with previous opposition.  




Now we interpret the [intent]42 (sententiam) of the written law itself in three 
ways: if it is plain by itself that it cannot always be observed…or when examples 
are drawn from other laws by which it is proven that laws cannot always be 
observed; or when from the very words of the law we prove that the lawmaker did 
not intend (voluisse) literally that which the law states… (3.14)  
Here we see that Victor does not limit intent to authorial intent. Rather, intent is a kind of 
interpretation that takes into account the congruity between the written law and the 
particulars of the situation in question.  
 A slightly narrower but still not exclusive view of intent appears in Hermogenes’ 
2nd century AD On Issues. While Hermogenes defines intent (διανοία) as that of the 
legislator’s in his introductory synopsis of the stases (2.14), in the section specifically 
dedicated to the stasis of word and intent, he expands the concept of intent to include not 
only the legislator’s intent but also the defendant’s intent in the situation being 
adjudicated (9.54-55). This expansion mirrors Aristotle’s advice to jurors regarding 
fairness: “And [it is also fair] to look not to the law but to the legislator and not to the 
word (λόγον) but to the intent (διάνοιαν) of the legislator and not to the action but to the 
deliberate purpose (προαίρεσιν)…” (1.13.17; emphasis mine). For both Aristotle and 
Hermogenes, a juror may take into account both the legislator’s and the defendant’s 
intent in interpreting and applying the law. 
While expansions of the term intent exist in the rhetorical tradition, they are still 
too limiting for modern analytical purposes. This fact does not necessitate a wholesale 
                                                 
42 Ostler translates the Latin word sententiam as “spirit,” but, as I argue, such a 





rejection of previous rhetorical theory in regards to this stasis. To the contrary, previous 
tradition was especially attuned to the many strategies used by disputants in this stasis, 
and knowledge of these is a crucial aid for the modern rhetorician. But for a more 
complete and deeper theoretical understanding of this long-standing category of 
interpretive of disputes, we can to turn to the insights of more recent theories in the fields 
of linguistics and rhetoric.  
  
From Letter versus Intent to Letter versus Spirit: A Modern Rhetorical 
Understanding 
 In essence, interpretive disputes in the stasis of what we will going forward call 
letter versus spirit are those disputes in which the primary means of constructing the 
meaning of a text are divided in a mutually exclusive way. The first basic way involves 
the letter of the text, which all parties to the dispute agree is the apparent meaning of the 
text. The second basic way involves the spirit of the text, which goes against the apparent 
meaning. The letter of a text is in part derived from a text’s signifiers—its words, 
phrases, sentences, punctuation, etc.—while the spirit of a text is derived from “facts 
relevant to making sense” of the text that fall outside of this linguistically encoded 
information (Bach 74).   
This split closely mirrors the contemporary linguistic division between semantics 
and pragmatics. However, a strict equivalence here is too facile as what constitutes the 
letter of a text versus its spirit is grounded in agreement among disputants. The letter of a 




granted in constructing the apparent meaning of the text.43 The spirit of a text is derived 
from pragmatic clues (including clues from surrounding or other texts), but these clues, 
rather than being taken for granted, are visible to participants and in dispute. One could 
say that letter versus spirit debates parallel the semantic/pragmatic divide with an 
important distinction—in the former a certain amount of assumed pragmatic information 
is joined with the text’s semantics.  
Regarding this divide between the letter and spirit, rhetoricians and linguists alike 
might consider: When is certain pragmatic information assumed in the construction of a 
text’s apparent meaning and when is it considered a means of construing other meanings 
of a text that go beyond this obvious meaning? Is there any consistency in what kind of 
pragmatic information is generally assumed on the side of the letter? What factors 
determine on which side of the divide certain pragmatic information falls? How do 
arguers move pragmatic information from one side of this divide to the other? In response 
to this last question, one way arguers can move pragmatic information from the side of 
letter to the side of spirit is to highlight it, to bring it from the background to the 
foreground. Once a piece of pragmatic information has been brought to the surface, any 
interpretation derived from it in the context of a letter/spirit split falls on the side of 
spirit. Less clear is how to argumentatively background pragmatic information, moving it 
from the side of spirit to the side of letter. 
                                                 
43 My discussion of letter as a combination of semantics and taken for granted or 
“background” pragmatic information on the part of disputants is based on Searle’s 
argument that “the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application 





While opposing interpretations are not at all unusual, letter versus spirit disputes 
involve opposing interpretations derived from different sets of clues. All parties agree on 
the “apparent” meaning of the text.44 If they do not agree on this point, then the dispute 
moves to either the stasis of ambiguity or definition.45 But disputants in favor of letter 
argue that the text’s “apparent” meaning is final, the text’s only meaning. For these 
disputants, their sufficient evidence for the text’s meaning rests in the text’s semantic, or 
linguistically encoded clues, with non-assumed pragmatic information playing a 
confirmatory role only. Disputants in favor of spirit argue that the text’s “apparent” 
meaning negates the true meaning of the text and that this true meaning is best discovered 
in necessary and relevant evidence found outside of the text. These disputants interpret 
what they see as insufficient semantic information in light these other pragmatic clues. 
By valuing one set of clues over the other, both types of disputants dissociate the 
means of constructing textual meaning. I consciously employ the term dissociation 
according to its sense as presented in Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
work The New Rhetoric. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
“Dissociation…assumes the original unity of elements comprised within a single 
                                                 
44 As cognitive linguist Michael Israel puts it, the literal meaning or interpretation “is 
always an idea about where meaning begins” (10). Or put another way, “the ‘literal 
meaning’ of an expression is…its interpretation prior to re-interpretation” (Israel 7). The 
difference between defenders of letter and defenders of spirit is that the former takes the 
literal meaning as the final meaning, while the latter does not. 
45 Such a disagreement can be a result of one of the parties refusing to accept the 
dissociation of semantic and pragmatic information. As with any dissociation, the 
invocation of a letter/spirit split can result in an opponent rejecting the perspective that 
permits such a dissociation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 436). Also note that when a 
letter versus spirit dispute resolves to an issue of ambiguity or definition, it resolves to a 
“lower-order” stasis. In other words, the dispute moves to one centered on the letter of 
the text, which serves as the basic point of agreement in a letter versus spirit dispute. See 
Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of the hierarchical relationship of the 




conception and designated by a single notion. The dissociation of notions brings about a 
more or less profound change in the conceptual data that are used as the basis of 
argument” (411-412). Furthermore, dissociation always involves a valuation of one 
concept, term, notion, etc., over the other (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 417). They 
label the less valued concept, that which represents the “apparent, the “actual,” the 
“immediate,” “what is known directly,” as term I (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 416). 
The more valued concept, that which “provides a criterion, a norm which allows us to 
distinguish those aspects of term I which are of value from those which are not,” is 
labeled term II (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 416). Terms I and II are represented 
visually like so: term I/term II (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 416).  
In the stasis of letter versus spirit, we obtain the following basic dissociations: 
interpretation/letter and letter/spirit (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 428). For our 
purposes, these dissociations represent the argumentative stances that disputants take up 
in this stasis.  The dissociation interpretation/letter represents the stance of the disputant 
in favor of letter who privileges the text’s semantics over less grounded interpretations, 
while the dissociation letter/spirit represents the stance of the disputant in favor of spirit 
who privileges a pragmatic construal of the text’s meaning over the dead (a la Paul) 
letter. Observe that the two dissociations are not perfect reversals of one another. As 
terms change their relative value in relation to one another, they often undergo a change 
in terminology (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 427). As we see in these two dissociation 
pairs, letter remains the same, reflecting the uncontested nature of the text’s semantics in 
a letter versus spirit dispute. But in the position of term I, spirit changes to interpretation. 




manipulation of the text in this approach to textual meaning. When in the position of term 
II, spirit becomes a criterion for evaluating the semantics of the text and for determining 
the text’s meaning. As such, it cannot be a loose collection of pragmatic clues, at least not 
persuasively, but must be organized around a central point. Traditionally, that point has 
been authorial intent, but other possible points include the original audience’s 
interpretation, or an overriding principle of textual construal or of the people or 
institutions that hold that text in esteem.  
After a dissociation has been effected between a text’s letter and spirit, further 
dissociations are possible on either side of the divide. These further dissociations can be 
framed within what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call fan-type dissociations in which 
term II undergoes subdivisions: term I/term II<term I (a)/term II (b) (431). For example: 
letter/spirit<authorial intent/divine intent or letter/spirit<authorial intent/overriding 
principle. The following passage from Augustine’s De doctrina christiana demonstrates 
such a further dissociation of spirit:  
Whoever, therefore, thinks that he understands the divine Scriptures or any part of 
them so that it does not build the double love of God and of our neighbor does not 
understand it at all. Whoever finds a lesson there useful to the building of charity, 
even though he has not said what the author may be shown to have intended in 
that place, has not been deceived, nor is he lying in any way. (1.36.40) 
Here Augustine articulates the ultimate end or overriding principle of the Christian 
Scriptures, love, which can then work as a guiding hermeneutic. If one interprets a 




authoritative, goes against love, then, according to Augustine, one must re-evaluate one’s 
interpretation.  
A fan-type dissociation with letter is even possible: 
interpretation/letter46<apparent letter/real letter (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 432). 
Consider the following example from a magazine article published in 1910 in The 
Outlook on the question of whether Jesus condemned the accumulation of wealth: 
…Jesus taught in Aramaic. All the other words of Jesus we have translated 
into the Greek and most of us have that Greek translated into English; that is to 
say, instead of having the very words of Jesus, we have the translation of a 
translation of his teaching. This of itself is a sufficient and conclusive reason why 
we should not literalize in our interpretation of the words of Jesus. But if we are 
going to literalize, let us literalize consistently and not inconsistently. My radical 
friend declares that the teachings of Jesus are not practicable, that we cannot carry 
them out, and that we do not pretend to do so. Jesus, he reminds us, said, “Lay not 
up for yourselves treasure upon earth;” and Christians do universally lay up for 
themselves treasures upon earth, every man that owns a house and lot, or a share 
of stock in a corporation, or a life insurance policy, or money in a savings bank, 
has laid up for himself treasure upon earth. But Jesus did not say, “Lay not up for 
yourselves treasures upon earth.” He said, “Lay not up for yourselves treasures 
upon earth where moth and rust doth corrupt and where thieves break through 
and steal.” And no sensible American does. Moth and rust do not get at Mr. 
                                                 
46 In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, where this example is taken, the terminology for 
the original term II is “text” (432). The difference between “text” and “letter” amounts to 




Rockefeller’s oil wells, nor at the Sugar Trust’s sugar, and thieves do not often 
break through and steal a railway or an insurance company or a savings bank. 
What Jesus condemned was hoarding; he never condemned possessing it 
or using it for the benefit of society. (Abbott 577; emphasis original) 
In this example, before giving his interpretation of Matthew 6:19, the author of the 
article, Lyman Abbott, argues that a literal approach (letter) to Jesus’ teachings is 
inappropriate, because his original words have been translated from Aramaic to Greek, 
and then from Greek to English, implicitly advocating a spirit approach to Jesus’ 
teachings. But Abbott concedes a literal (letter) approach only if we do so “consistently” 
(real letter). He follows with an example from a “radical friend” whose interpretation of 
Matthew 6:19 is presumably “inconsistent” (apparent letter). While the friend interprets 
Jesus’ words as an admonition to not accumulate wealth and possessions, Abbott 
demonstrates that this inconsistent literal interpretation (apparent letter) misses a crucial 
detail—Jesus’ critique is aimed at treasure that is vulnerable to moth, rust, and thieves, 
which Abbott highlights in italics. Therefore, according to Abbott’s consistent literal 
interpretation (real letter), Jesus was really warning his followers against inactive, unused 
wealth.   
As with any interpretive dispute, the impetus for the dissociation of a text’s letter 
and spirit always rests in an exigence: “The dissociation of concepts, as we understand it, 
involves a more profound change that is always prompted by the desire to remove an 
incompatibility arising out of the confrontation of one proposition with others, whether 
one is dealing with norms, facts, or truths” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 413). Martin 




“righteousness of God,” described in Romans 1:17, and his sense of his utter depravity 
(qtd. in Hillerbrand 29).  Luther explains that he had been taught to understand the term 
righteousness “philosophically” (spirit) such that God’s righteousness required an 
individual to obey God’s law to avoid eternal damnation (qtd. in Hillerbrand 29). 
Perceiving that such obedience was impossible, Luther “beat importunately upon Paul at 
that place [Romans 1:17], most ardently desiring to know what St. Paul wanted” until he 
“gave heed to context of the words” (the letter) (qtd. in Hillerbrand 29-30). Having 
dissociated the philosophical understanding from an understanding based on the 
semantics of the co-text surrounding the phrase, he realized that “the righteousness of 
God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by faith.” (qtd. in 
Hillerbrand 30). The dissociation of the text’s semantic and pragmatic information 
represented for Luther a “practical solution” to incompatibilities found in the rhetorical 
situation.47 
At this point one might ask why a disputant in favor of spirit would not reject, or 
argue for the rejection of, the text in question. This argumentative move, however, would 
place the dispute in the stasis of jurisdiction. While the advantages and disadvantages of 
arguments in the stasis of jurisdiction will be explored further in Chapter 7, a brief 
treatment will suffice here. The burden of proof for disqualifying a text is great and in 
                                                 
47 “There are practical solutions enabling the difficulty to be resolved exclusively on the 
plane of action; they can prevent the incompatibility from occurring, or dilute it in time, 
or sacrifice one or even both of the conflicting values. At this practical level, the 
dissociation of notions amounts to a compromise, but, on the theoretical level, it leads to 
a solution that will also be valid for the future, because, by remodeling our conception of 
reality, it prevents the reappearance of the same incompatibility. It preserves, at least 
partially, the incompatible elements. The operation, though bringing about the 
disappearance of the object, is nonetheless carried out at a minimum cost, because the 
thing that is valued is given its rightful place in thought, and the latter is given a 




many cases requires substantial suasory power. Disputants in favor of spirit may believe 
that the chances of persuading their audiences to their interpretations of a text are greater 
than the chances of successfully arguing for the disqualification of that text. Further, 
when disputants disqualify a text they duly circumscribe their authority48 to interpret that 
text. Meanwhile, other members of the disputant’s interpretive community, who have not 
made the interpretive move of disqualification, remain free to persuade others to 
interpretations of the text that the disputant may find unacceptable. It is therefore often to 
a disputant’s advantage to retain close interpretive proximity to the text by remaining in 
the stasis of letter versus spirit. We see then that the disputant defending spirit is under 
pressure from various factors in the interpretive-rhetorical situation to not reject the text 
but to instead appeal to non-granted pragmatic clues concerning the text’s meaning in 
contradistinction to its semantic or granted pragmatic information in support of his or her 
interpretation of the text. 
 
Persuasion within Letter versus Spirit 
 While modern rhetorical theory and linguistics provides a firm theoretical ground 
for understanding the basic structure of letter versus spirit disputes—how disputants 
align themselves to each other and the disputed text—pre-modern rhetorical theory aids 
us in cataloguing the strategies that are then at the disputant’s disposal for persuading the 
audience of a particular interpretation. Below is a sample of topics for the stasis of letter 
versus spirit from a range of rhetorical treatises from the pre-modern tradition. These 
                                                 
48 I use the word authority because it is not the case that disputants who disqualify a text 
may no longer interpret the text at all. But the reception of their interpretations by those 




topics represent options that rhetors could review to see what best fit the particulars of the 
situation. Since they are ultimately derived from observations of these situations, 
untrained rhetors inevitably use them, too.  
 
In favor of letter: 
 Eulogize the writer of the text ([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 Read the text aloud ([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 Compare the text with the admitted act of the opponent or the situation in question 
([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 Emphasize the distinction between the “carefully crafted” text and a “cunningly 
invented” interpretation ([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 Rhetorically question the writer’s motive for not including a more explicit 
rendition of the interpretation offered by the opposition ([Cicero] 2.9.13; Cf. 
Hermogenes 9.55) 
 “Ascertain the writer’s intention and present the reason why he had in mind what 
he wrote” ([Cicero] 2.913) 
 Show that the “text is clear, concise, apt, complete, and planned with precision”  
([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 “Cite examples of judgments rendered in favor of the text” ([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 “Show the danger of departing from the letter of the text” ([Cicero] 2.9.13) 
 Argue that the writer thought the text should be observed or followed in all 




 Argue that the text is clear and further distinctions (e.g. definitions) do not change 
the text’s meaning (Hermogenes 9.55) 
 Argue that the text does not need to be violated in order to accomplish good 
(Hermogenes 9.55) 
 
In favor of spirit: 
 Praise the framer for “conciseness having written only what was necessary,” not 
believing it was “necessary to write what could be understood without a text” 
([Cicero] 2.10.14; Cf. Hermogenes 83.5) 
 Argue that “to follow the words literally and neglect the intention is the method of 
a [bad interpreter]” ([Cicero] 2.10.14; Cf. Melanchthon 159) 
 Show that “the letter…cannot be carried out” ([Cicero] 2.10.14; Cf. Quintilian 
7.6.5)  
 Show that “the letter…cannot be carried out…at least not without violating 
Statute Law, Legal Custom, the Law of Nature, or Equity; all of these, no one will 
deny, the writer wished to be most strictly observed” ([Cicero] 2.10.14; Cf. 
Quintilian 7.6.7) 
 Argue that “the interpretation of [the opponent] is either no interpretation, or is 
unreasonable, unjust, impracticable, or inconsistent with past or subsequent 
interpretations; or disagrees with common law, other generally binding rules of 
law, or with previous decisions” ([Cicero] 2.10.14; Cf. Aristotle 1.15.4) 





 “Read and explain laws or contracts [or other texts] which had been written down 
in concise form yet the intention of the framer is understood” ([Cicero] 2.10.14) 
 “Sometimes show that the writer always had the same end in view and always 
desired the same result” regardless of how the text and the particulars of the 
situation align (Cicero, De Inventione 2.42.122) 
 “At other times…show that the writer’s purpose has to be modified to fit the 
occasion as a result of some act or event” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.42.122;49 Cf. 
Quintilian 7.6.6-7)  
 “Find something in the actual words of the text…which…can prove that the intent 
of [the writer] was different” from what is put forward by the opponent 
(Quintilian 7.6.8; Cf. Hermogenes 9.55; Cf. Melanchthon 159: “Definition reveals 
the hidden meaning; division clarifies the ambiguous”)50  
 
Strategies common to both: 
 Ask and answer “whether we should stand by the Letter or the Spirit, and what 
was the intention of the writer” (Quintilian 7.6.12)51 
 Weigh the benefits of following the letter/spirit against the benefits of the action 
in question crime (Hermogenes 9.55-56) 
 Use definition that “reveals the hidden meaning” (Melanchthon 159) 
 Use “division [to] clarif[y] the ambiguous” (Melanchthon 159) 
                                                 
49 Cicero points the reader to the topics of the assumptive branch under the issue of equity 
as further support for this line of argument. These topics are listed and explained in great 
detail in De Inventione 2.24.71-36.109. 
50 This strategy could lead to a dispute in the stases of ambiguity or definition. 
51 Quintilian explains that these questions are treated (i.e. supporting topics) under the 




 Use the commonplaces of cause, effect, circumstances, contraries (Melanchthon 
159) 
 If the text in question is part of a larger text, or part of a larger web of texts, draw 
on “clearer” passages that support your interpretation (Melanchthon 160)52  
 
Certain patterns or common features emerge from these strategies. The strategies used 
by disputants in favor of letter generally involve either elevating the status of the text, 
arguing for the text as a representation of the writer’s mind, citing the hazards of 
interpretation based on inference, or emphasizing the consequences of violating the text’s 
semantics. The strategies used by disputants in favor of spirit generally involve either 
stressing the necessity of inferential interpretation, calling attention to other binding 
principles that must be taken into account, considering the negative consequences of 
taking the text literally, or emphasizing the situation in question over the text. Both sides 
appeal to co-textual and contextual evidence to support their claims and refer to the 
consequences of going against the kind of interpretation they put forward. In short, these 
strategies amount to various means of constructing and maintaining, in the audience’s 
mind, the relationships between the text, situation, and various human participants in 
order to support the interpretation offered by the disputant. 
 
A Letter versus Spirit Dispute over a Politically Charged Sound Bite 
                                                 
52 Bringing in other texts introduces the possibility of a new dispute. To avoid this, 
disputants should draw on texts that already have agreed upon interpretations or that 




 We now return to the example that opened the chapter to illustrate in extended 
form a letter versus spirit dispute and the various persuasive techniques inevitably used 
by the participants. In the subsequent controversy surrounding Wright’s “God damn 
America” sound bite, multiple parties weighed in on how to interpret Wright’s words, but 
we will only focus on two interpretive responses: one from Wright himself, a defense, 
and one from online magazine Salon opinion writer Joan Walsh, written in response to 
Wright’s defense. 
 In April 2008, about a month and a half after the sound bite was first aired, 
Wright was interviewed on the television show Bill Moyers Journal. The show played the 
controversial sound bite but included about two minutes of the sermon before the 
inflammatory segment for context. After the excerpt was played, Bill Moyers asked 
Wright what he had meant. In his response, Wright interpreted his words using many of 
the strategies that previous rhetoricians have classified as topics for defending the spirit 
of a text against its letter. 
 In the first place, Wright argues that his sermon was addressing a larger socio-
political, historical context: 
When you start confusing God and government, your allegiances to 
government—a particular government and not to God—that you’re in serious 
trouble because governments fail people. And governments change. And 




in which I was illustrating how the governments biblically and the governments 
since biblical times, up to our time, change, how they fail, and how they lie.53 
Note that Wright makes no particular reference to the United States or the U.S. 
government, therefore avoiding the specifics of his words that initially elicited criticism. 
Instead his interpretation implicitly places the United States and its government within a 
genus of governments that have failed over time, a move that potentially de-emphasizes 
his particular condemnation of the United States, though it is also potentially offensive 
because it denies American exceptionalism. 
In the second place, Wright shifts the focus away from the particular words of his 
sermon and the controversial sound bite to the situation of government injustice, invoking 
God as the ultimate arbitrator of justice: “And when we start talking about my 
government right or wrong, I don’t think that goes, that is consistent with what the will of 
God says or the word of God says, that governments don’t say right or wrong. That 
governments that want to kill innocents are not consistent with the will of God.”  With 
this statement, Wright shifts attention to government action and how these actions are 
unaligned with God’s will. Wright’s controversial words by implication become less a 
direct attack or invocation to God to damn America than a description of a state that any 
government puts itself in through its own actions. Wright also underlines his ethos as a 
preacher, as someone who speaks the word of God. Therefore, anyone who attacks what 
he has argued is attacking God’s word. 
 Third, Wright uses an etymological argument to soften the blow of the word 
“damn” to give it a more palatable and agreeable connotation: “I also think people don’t 
                                                 





understand condemn, D-E-M-N, D-A-M-N. They don’t understand the root, the 
etymology of the word in terms of God condemning the practices that are against God’s 
people. But again, what is happening is I talk a truth.” By arguing that condemn and 
damn have the same etymological roots, Wright ties damnation to condemnation, 
specifically God’s condemnation of injustice. While his audience may easily criticize him 
for asking God to damn America, it is harder to criticize Wright for describing or 
invoking God’s condemnation against injustice. Through etymology, Wright reveals a 
non-obvious meaning in his words. 
 Two days after his appearance on the Bill Moyers Journal, Joan Walsh responded 
to Wright’s interpretation of his own words in an opinion piece in Salon. Unpersuaded by 
Wright’s defense, Walsh maintains a letter-interpretation of his “God damn America” 
sound bite.  
 To begin with, Walsh denies possible suggestions that the sound bite would be 
less inflammatory if it were given proper context. Oppositely, Walsh finds the verbal 
context of his words, specifically their co-text and other sermons Wright preached, more 
incriminating: “But the whole idea that Wright has been attacked over ‘sound bites,’ and 
if Americans saw his entire sermons, in context, they’d feel differently, now seems 
ludicrous. The long clips Moyers played only confirm what was broadcast in the snippets 
(and the longer excerpts out today are even more troubling).” 
 Walsh goes on to reference specific phrases from other sermons Wright preached 
to support her literal interpretation of his words, relying on the premise of consistency of 




My conclusion Friday night was bolstered by new tapes of Wright that came out 
this weekend, including one that captures him saying the Iraq war is the ‘the same 
thing al-Qaida is doing under a different color flag,’ and a much longer excerpt 
from the ‘God damn America’ sermon that denounces ‘Condoskeezer Rice’ 
[referring to George W. Bush’s Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice].  
The argument seems to be that if there was any uncertainty about the meaning of the 
“God damn America” sound bite, then these other quotes from Wright should make that 
meaning clearer. Walsh even uses Wright’s interview with Moyers as supporting 
evidence for a literal interpretation of his controversial words, disregarding Wright’s own 
interpretation of his words in the same interview:  
Note that, in his defense, Wright didn’t say: “Hey, I’m a guy who also talks a lot 
about the promise of American democracy, and the way Americans of every race 
have worked together to try to make the country live up to that promise. Here’s a 
sermon about the heroes of the civil rights movement! Even some who weren’t 
black!” … He used his hour with Moyers to argue that his thoroughgoing critique 
of American evil is, well, true.  
 Walsh then moves on to suggest alternative phrases that Wright might have said if 
indeed he was just condemning government actions and invoking God’s condemnation 
against government injustice, in order to beg the question of why he didn’t say those 
things if that was his intention. She writes,  
Wright could probably have gotten away with “God damn Bush” for the bloody 
Iraq war if he wanted to, or “God damn Truman” for bombing the Japanese at the 




many mistakes. But “God damn America”—that’s sweeping. It sounds like it’s 
the idea of America, its fundamental principles he’s rejecting. (Walsh)  
Her conclusion is that if Wright meant what he said he meant during his interview with 
Moyers, his words would have been different, and they would have been excusable, even 
justifiable. But what he actually said reflects a different intention that cannot easily be 
explained away. His words suggest a deeper indictment of the United States than simply 
its government’s injustices. 
 Further, unlike Wright, who in his interpretation stays away from the words of the 
sound bite, Walsh is sure to point to and reiterate them. In her 1,595-word article, she 
repeats the phrase “God damn America” four times, always in quotes. This tactic 
increases the presence of the most incriminating phrase from Wright’s sound bite in the 
audience’s mind. 
 Lastly, another tactic available for the defense of letter is a eulogy. The purpose of 
the eulogy in an interpretive argument is to construct the ethos of the text’s author such 
that the character of the author and the interpretation of the text put forward are 
congruent, so that the author’s constructed character supports the interpretation. 
(Sometimes, the goal is to construct a trustworthy or admirable ethos as well, although 
that is not the goal here.) Walsh’s eulogy is more of a dys-logy as it paints a negative 
picture of Wright:  
I felt like he was trying to make the point that organizations that preach black 
separatism and focus on the real (as well as imagined) evils of white America are 
uniquely successful in strengthening the black community—and further, that he’s 




Nation of Islam, but still seems to think it’s therapeutic to school its members in 
an extreme critique of American society and its thoroughgoing, ongoing racism. 
Walsh depicts Wright as a black separatist who has used his church to institutionalize his 
version of radicalism. Given this fact, the audience should not be surprised that he would 
reject American principles or even ask God to damn America as this has been known to 
be part of the doctrine of black separatist groups like the Nation of Islam. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 The dispute between Wright and Walsh offers an apt illustration of an interpretive 
dispute in the stasis of letter versus spirit. It also provokes important theoretical 
questions. First, why was there a letter and spirit split in this controversy? Most likely for 
many of Wright’s unintended national audience, the words “Not God bless America. God 
damn America!” were sacrilege against their civil religion. No doubt many interpreted 
these words as an unambiguous negation of a standard exhortation made popular in the 
song “God Bless America.” For Wright’s critics, this fact was an obvious advantage. 
Even Wright’s defenders who did not share this interpretation would recognize that there 
would be little room to argue against how most Americans understood the explicit 
meaning of the words. This reduces the efficacy of disputing in the stases of ambiguity 
and definition.54 The stasis of jurisdiction would require Wright to say he didn’t mean 
what he had said, thereby decoupling his intention from his words, but he never seemed 
willing to make this move. Assimilation also does not make sense in this case. While 
disputants have choices in how they construe the texts they argue over and interpret, 
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those choices are affected by factors in the rhetorical situation such as the audience’s 
understanding of the text in question. 
 Second, what is the role of authorial intention in letter and spirit disputes? As this 
example demonstrates, Wright’s explanations of the text in dispute were dismissed even 
though he was its author. Although he alone had access to the motives that produced the 
disputed words in the first place, Walsh did not grant him privileged status as an authority 
on the meaning of his words, but instead treated him more or less like any other 
interpreter. Of course, Wright may not have been telling the truth in his interview with 
Moyers. His reputation, as well as Obama’s, was on the line, so he had good reason to lie 
about his original intentions, if they were as Walsh and others made them out to be. 
 But such is the nature of interpretation and the construction of authorial intent. 
The author has never been dead or alive, but has always been constructed according to 
the purposes of the interpreter, even when the interpreter is the author him or herself. 
Hermeneut-rhetors include statements from the author regarding their intention and other 
facts about the author’s life when it supports their interpretation of the text in question, 
but exclude them when they do not. As we see in this example, hermeneut-rhetors may 
even adhere to the letter of the text when the author protests against their interpretation. 
This case is a lesson for rhetoricians, interpreters, and audiences alike that both letter- and 
spirit-interpretations are just that—interpretations. Our access to authorial intention is 
always limited and indirect. Neither hermeneutic approach, neither letter nor spirit, 
guarantees a sure grasp of a text’s meaning. Each approach subordinates or denies a 





Chapter 3: Contradictory Passages  
Frances Willard’s 1889 Woman in the Pulpit stands in a long line of Protestant 
Christian defenses of women’s preaching that stretches back to the seventeenth century 
and continues today (Donawerth 73). Motivated by her own experience of being barred 
from becoming a preacher in the Methodist church because of her gender, Willard 
compiles not only her own arguments in support of women’s preaching, but also 
supporting testimonies from various men and women on the subject  (Willard 62). The 
final two chapters include Henry J. Van Dyke’s attack on women’s preaching, originally 
published in the Homiletic Review in January 1888, in response to an article Willard had 
published in the same journal the previous month (now reprinted as chapter two in her 
book), as well as L. T. Townsend’s rebuttal of Van Dyke’s article.  
In his article, Van Dyke claims that the Bible “expressly excludes and prohibits 
women from the work of ministry” (qtd. in Willard 125). Van Dyke relies on two biblical 
passages for this conclusion: 1 Corinthians 14:34-35: “Let your women keep silence in 
the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be 
under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their 
husbands at home; for it is a shame for a woman to speak;” and 1 Tim 2:12-14: “I suffer 
not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam 
was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived 
was in the transgression” (qtd. in Willard 126-7).55 In response, Townsend admits, “that 
if the prohibition in these passages is infallible,” then the controversy is settled: women 
are not to preach (qtd. in Willard 153). But before a final conclusion is drawn, Townsend 
                                                 




argues that they must investigate “whether these passages refer to all women, and 
whether they embrace all time” (qtd. in Willard 153).  
While Van Dyke maintains that the above quoted passages refer to all women at 
all time, Townsend begs to differ: “For we have already proved, by the words of our 
Lord, by the Acts of the apostles, by the Epistles of Paul, and by the practices of the 
Apostolic Church, that women are authorized to enter the ministry. Of this proof there 
can be no question” (Townsend qtd. in Willard 154). Here Townsend refers to the 
previous section of his reply in which he surveyed the New Testament and history of the 
early church for examples of women in ministry, especially women who were authorized 
to preach. But if the Bible on the one hand prohibits all women from speaking as Van 
Dyke claims, while authorizing it on the other hand as Townsend claims, there is a 
problem: “If, therefore, our esteemed brother, by these same authorities, has proved that 
all women, in all times and everywhere, are prohibited from entering the ministry, then 
the Bible plainly has contradicted itself” (Townsend qtd. in Willard 154).  
For Christians, like Townsend, Van Dyke, and Willard, who were committed to 
the unity of the Bible, following from its status as the word of God, contradiction was 
intolerable. Townsend continues, “Now, if at this point the one who challenges the right 
of women to enter the ministry should say to us, What do you intend to do about this 
contradiction? we might reply, What do you intend to do about it? Either one of us can 
afford to rest with this charge hanging over the Bible as long as can the other. But can 
either afford to rest long?” (qtd. in Willard 154). Townsend, who imagines or anticipates 
a reply to his charge of contradiction from someone like Van Dyke, recognizes that once 




work to resolve the contradiction. That is, they must find solutions that demonstrate that 
the contradiction is a mere appearance, a matter of faulty interpretation. Rhetorical-
interpretive exchanges in which disputants allege that a text contradicts itself and work to 
resolve the apparent contradiction(s) represent disputes in the stasis of contradictory 
passages.  
 
The Problem of Contradiction 
Disagreements in the stasis of contradictory passages are concerned with a text’s 
logical consistency.  A text is said to be inconsistent or contradictory if it contains a 
proposition and its negation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 195). But we can only be 
certain that we have a logical inconsistency in the realm of formal logic (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 195). In natural language, my focus in this dissertation, consistency is a 
consequence of rhetorical and interpretive processes, tied to the world in which the text is 
introduced, and irreducible to predetermined relations between symbols.56 Although there 
may be clear signals that a text appears to contradict itself, no claim that a text in natural 
language contradicts itself can therefore be final. A charge of contradiction against a text 
can always be countered by an alternative interpretation in which the contradiction does 
not exist.  
Generally speaking humans do not tolerate contradictions in texts (although there 
are exceptions; see discussion of asystatic contradictions below). When we encounter 
discourse of any kind, we are inclined to interpret it as a unified, coherent whole, even 
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when it seems to present problems. Consistency is one part of coherence, which emerges 
from our interaction with discourse as we attempt to understand it (Fahnestock, 
Rhetorical Style 345). While a text that is perceived to be incoherent is not necessarily 
inconsistent—a reader, for instance, may find certain portions of a text to lack relevancy 
without finding them logically inconsistent—a contradictory text is incoherent, at least 
insofar as it concerns the passages in question.  
Often, however, the coherence of the whole text is brought into question if any of 
its parts are thought to be in conflict. An incoherent text can generally not perform its 
function. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe, “[B]ringing out a contradiction 
which the system contains[] makes the system inconsistent and thereby unusable” 
(195).57 Contradictions suggest that the author of the text is violating certain functional 
assumptions we usually take for granted in communication. H. P. Grice named and 
described these functional assumptions in his article “Logic and Conversation.”58 
Contradictions would seem in particular to violate the maxim of quality, by which one 
should, “Try to make your contribution one that is true” (46). A contradiction would 
signal that this maxim of quality is being violated because one of the conflicting passages 
must be false. Texts that contain falsities are hardly trustworthy communicative vehicles 
or sources of information. Other contradictions still undiscovered may abound. 
Furthermore, a violation of any maxim suggests a violation of the “cooperative 
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question is more properly classified under the stasis of jurisdiction. 
58 Granted, Grice was specifically concerned with “talk exchanges,” but his insights apply 
to discourse more generally to the extent that it functions to communicate (45). 
Moreover, he felt that these functional assumptions rested on principles that governed 





principle,” which calls on conversational participants to play by the agreed upon rules 
(Grice 45).59 A contradictory text raises difficult questions: is the author lying or arguing 
in bad faith? Does the author have ulterior or dubious motives? Is the author mistaken or 
misinformed? The author may not be intentionally uncooperative but is untrustworthy 
nonetheless.  
 There may, however, be even stronger reasons to resist apparent contradictions in 
a text. When a text is the means by which a community regulates its beliefs, values, and 
behaviors, that text’s internal consistency can be paramount. The clearest examples of 
this are laws and sacred texts. As Quintilian notes, “[O]ne law can never be contrary to 
another in juristic principles, because if there were distinct principles one law would be 
cancelled out by the other” (7.7.2). While individuals certainly must wrestle with 
apparent contradictions in the texts they read, communities also have large stakes in 
maintaining the coherence of their texts.60  
The appearance of a textual contradiction thus presents those interested in 
preserving the text’s coherence with a problem that demands a solution. True disputes in 
this stasis always involve at least one disputant offering a way of interpreting the text that 
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implicature, something the speaker or writer means to get across beyond or besides what 
is actually said by flouting the cooperative principle or one of its attendant maxims. In 
these cases, the contradiction would serve as a prompt for the interpreter to construct an 
alternative meaning. However, while there are certainly cases where speakers and writers 
use contradiction for the purposes of implicature (e.g. paradox), interpreters do not 
usually seem to view contradiction as a sign of implicature.  
60 I suspect that both individuals and communities approach textual contradictions in the 
same way (described in-depth below), but since individuals usually do such work in their 
heads it remains inaccessible. Like every stasis under discussion in this dissertation, I 
analyze how the arguments they classify occur in dialogic and therefore social and public 





resolves the problem so that the contradiction is only apparent not real. The solution itself 
must be interpretive because contradictions always arise as a result of a particular 
interpretation of the text. The solution reorders the logical relation(s) between the 
passages in question so that the contradiction no longer exists. But solutions offer new 
interpretations of the text that an audience may not find persuasive, even if they resolve 
the contradiction. Audiences therefore may reject the solution, or alternative way of 
interpreting the text, as unsatisfactory. Audiences can also object to a kind of solution in 
principle (e.g., a particular way of interpreting a text is unacceptable for x reason{s}).  
In the ancient Greco-Roman treatises of the rhetorical tradition, this stasis, like all 
of the others, was largely conceptualized within the judicial genre of rhetoric. The stasis’ 
original Greek and Latin titles indicate that history: antinomia61 in Greek and contrarias 
leges62 in Latin, meaning opposing or contrary laws. Because of this conceptualization, 
the ancients presented a somewhat limited view of the form that disputes in this stasis can 
take. In what we might call the legal or classical form, two or more disputants present 
opposing arguments with support from different passages from the same text. They then 
attempt to counter the other’s interpretation so that their argument stands. We can see 
how this form, which is the one that most treatises in the rhetorical tradition discuss, 
would have been at home in the adversarial context of the courtroom, in which two 
different and potentially contradictory laws are brought to bear on a case in a potentially 
contradictory fashion. The opening and closing example from Townsend takes this form. 
But when we examine disputes in the stasis of contradictory passages outside the 
realm of law, we observe that these disputes can take two additional forms, one of which 
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we might characterize as more scholarly in nature. Two or more disputants agree that an 
apparent contradiction exists in a text and they present opposing remedies of the 
contradiction’s resolution. We often see this kind of argument in the field of textual 
criticism. Scholars in the field will generally agree that a text contains an apparent 
contradiction and will offer various solutions to resolve said contradiction. Examples of 
this form can be found in the excerpted arguments taken from Bodde, Friedricksmeyer, 
Enns, and Waltke discussed below. 
There is yet a third form that disputes in this stasis can take, which we might call 
political. A disputant claims that two or more passages of a text contradict each other and 
another disputant attempts to resolve the apparent contradict. This form is perhaps best 
exemplified in the political sphere, when politicians, especially when they are running for 
office, attempt to find contradictions in their opponents’ discourse in order to damage 
their credibility, for instance, by labeling them as flip floppers. The charged politician, in 
order to save his or her credibility, will need to find ways to resolve the alleged 
contradictory statements. The author of the pseudo-Aristotelian text the Rhetoric to 
Alexander called this kind of discourse, where one finds self-contradictions in another’s 
words, investigation ([Aristotle] 5.1427b). This author’s emphasis was on comparing 
present and past speech, although finding contradictions in just one temporal instance of 
discourse would presumably also be acceptable ([Aristotle] 5.1427b). 
As we saw in Chapter 2, spoken discourse can be treated as if it were a written 
text especially in the age of sound recording where spoken discourse can be preserved 
and analyzed as well as the written word. Today, public figures, whose spoken words are 




careful as sophisticated video and sound technology gives savvy editors the ability to 
splice words from different times and places that can easily present the subject’s speech 
as self-contradictory. This tactic is especially common on news-entertainment shows like 
The Daily Show with John Stewart and The Colbert Report, where public figures are 
often lampooned with this technique. Because of the rhetorical force of video, even when 
it is clear that the footage has been heavily edited, it can be difficult to resolve apparent 
contradictions presented in this manner. 
 Apparent contradictions in personal discourse are especially threatening to a 
person’s credibility. Those who have a stake in the person’s credibility will usually go to 
great lengths to resolve the contradiction in order to maintain the person’s credibility. A 
person may be considered untrustworthy, unreliable, unknowledgeable, perhaps even 
insane, if their speech is inconsistent. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe, “…for 
many people, speech is the most characteristic manifestation of the person…” (317). A 
person’s words become one of the major sources of evidence by which an audience 
constructs their notions of that person (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 319).  
 Thus, in arguing over textual contradictions, disputants can assume that a 
selection of texts written by multiple authors constitutes a text, that various pieces of 
discourse of different genres either spoken or written by one person over a course of time 
constitute a text, that separate collections of texts functioning within the same sphere 
constitute a text, etc. Quintilian writes that his advice about how to argue in this stasis 
applies not only when two or more laws conflict, but when a law conflicts with a 
senatorial decree (7.7.10). Wherever a boundary or line is drawn around discourses or 




are always arguable, but arguments about what texts constitute a totality fall under the 




Double Letter versus Spirit 
 Ancient rhetoricians, like Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes, considered 
conflicts in this stasis to generally consist of a double or multiple letter versus intent 
dispute. That is, one side argues that its law be applied according to its exact verbal 
formulation, while an interpretation not tied to the verbal formulation be followed with 
the opposing law. The other side argues the converse.  As Quintilian explains, “This is a 
justifiable view, because, when one law stands in the way of another, both parties speak 
against the Letter, and the Question between them is about the Spirit: the doubt with 
regard to both laws is whether this is the law that must be applied” (7.7.1). The same 
dissociation made in the stasis of letter versus spirit, between the agreed upon apparent 
meaning of the text based on textual clues and other meanings that negate this apparent 
meaning grounded in (visible) pragmatic clues,63 is made here. Traditionally, rhetoricians 
believed that contradictions occurred when two or more passages conflicted at the level 
of letter, when disputants attempted to follow the passages to the letter. Often times this 
is the case. However, contradiction can also occur between passages at the level of spirit, 
as spirit-interpretations can still represent legitimate, accepted readings of a passage that 
can conflict letter-interpretations or other spirit-interpretations. 
                                                 




To resolve apparent textual contradictions of any kind (letter-letter, spirit-letter, 
spirit-spirit), disputants may manipulate pragmatic clues of textual meaning, thereby 
adjusting the spirit-interpretation of one or more of the passages in question, so that the 
passages do not conflict with each other. I call these strategies pragmatic solutions. But 
there are other means of resolving contradictions that also allow disputants to maintain 
the unity and integrity of the text. Disputants can manipulate linguistically encoded clues 
of textual meaning, thereby adjusting the letter-interpretation of one or more of the 
passages in question. These strategies come in two kinds: grammatical and semantic 
solutions, depending on whether the manipulation is morphosyntactic or semantic in 
nature, respectively. Even though these solutions change the letter of the text, they are 
not necessarily more persuasive than pragmatic solutions. They can still be denied and 
refuted.64  
 Regardless of the way a disputant resolves a contradiction, all solutions reorder 
the logical relations of the passages in question. While these solutions can be divided and 
classified according to the categories of grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic, disputants 
can and do use multiple tactics from different categories. Several, though not all, of the 
strategies detailed below were catalogued over the millennia in various rhetorical 
treatises. Although these solutions were originally drawn from judicial rhetoric, I 
demonstrate that they have broader application. Not only can analysts discover the 
following solutions in interpretive disputes in this stasis, but they can also be deployed by 
disputants who find themselves in disputes where they must reconcile apparently 
conflicting passages. 
                                                 







 Grammatical solutions to apparent contradictions involve any attempt to resolve a 
contradiction through the morphosyntactic features—punctuation, gender, sentence 
division, lexical class, etc.—of the passages in question. In general, these solutions take 
advantage of the multiple meanings that can arise from the ambiguities of linguistic form. 
Arguers select a different possible sense afforded by the ambiguity of a morphosyntactic 
feature, which in turn affects the larger meaning of the passage in question thereby 
resolving the contradiction. The grammatical feature used to support the solution can 
always become the focus of rhetorical attention, resulting in an embedded dispute in the 
stasis of ambiguity.  
 In his 1933 article, “A Perplexing Passage in the Confucian Analects,” textual 
critic Derk Bodde offers a grammatical solution for a contradiction found in “[o]ne of the 
most baffling passages in the Confucian Analects,” a work comprising the sayings and 
thoughts of the influential ancient Chinese philosopher written and compiled by his 
disciples, and their disciples, reaching its present form by the second century BC 
(Riegel). The passage, found in Analects 9.1, in English reads, “‘The subjects of which 
the Master seldom spoke were—profitableness, and also the appointments (of Heaven), 
and perfect virtue’” (Confucius qtd. in Bodde 347). As Bodde explains, “The difficulty 
here is not primarily a grammatical one, for such a translation may be read from the text 
without trouble, but rather lies in the fact that the statement made runs counter to 
everything that the rest of the Analects tells us concerning Confucius” (347; italics 




Heaven)” and “perfect virtue” occur repeatedly throughout the Analects, the latter 
especially being a “keystone of Confucian ethics” (374). This contradiction is not a 
product of the text’s grammar, as Bodde points out, but arises from what the passage 
explicitly states and what appears to be true concerning the content of the rest of the 
Analects.  
 Yet his solution is a reinterpretation of the grammar of the single outlying 
passage. Bodde’s solution is not original but is taken from the thirteenth century classical 
and textual critic Shih Sheng-tsu. While “orthodox interpretation” treats the passage as a 
single sentence, Shih Sheng-tsu divides the passage into two sentences. He also interprets 
the Chinese word yü, traditionally interpreted and translated as a conjunction in this 
passage, as a verb. His interpretation in English reads: “‘The Master rarely spoke of 
profit. (but) he gave forth (his ideas concerning) the appointments (of Heaven), (and also) 
gave forth (his ideas concerning) perfect virtue’” (Bodde 349). By dividing the passage 
into two sentences and taking the word yü as a verb instead of a conjunction, this 
interpretation produces a “reading” which “harmonize[s] itself with what the remainder 
of the Analects tells us” (Bodde 348).  
 Other interpretive solutions have been offered for this widely recognized 
contradiction (at least among Confucian scholars), including one suggestion that because 
perfect virtue is difficult to attain, Confucius rarely spoke of it (Bodde 348). But Bodde 
rejects them all arguing that, “Translation of the character yü according to the formula 
laid down by Shih Sheng-tsu would seem, then, to be the only possible alternative to 
falling into a glaring inconsistency” (Bodde 351). This example demonstrates that the 




solution appeals to grammar, an “intrinsic” property of the text, rather than appealing to 
“extrinsic factors” as disputants do with pragmatic solutions, those persuaded by 
Bodde/Shih Sheng-tsu’s interpretation would imaginably have a stronger restored sense 
of the text’s internal consistency.  
 
Semantic Solutions 
 While grammatical solutions manipulate the more structural aspects of language 
as found in a text, semantic solutions manipulate conventionalized meaning relations. I 
closely examine two related kinds of relations that disputants can manipulate in order to 
resolve apparent contradictions—definitions and frames—and I mention another 




 One semantic solution involves definition (Cf. Hermogenes 87; De Inventione 
2.49.147).65 When faced with two or more apparently conflicting passages, a disputant 
may attempt to redefine a term, a word or a phrase, in at least one of the passages that 
shifts that passage’s meaning so that it no longer conflicts with the other passage(s) in 
question. Since disputants probably want to define as few words as possible in most 
cases, so as to minimize the charge of sophistry for instance, we would generally expect 
them to define linchpin terms (see Chapter 5), terms that determine the meaning of the 
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other terms in the passage. Cicero suggests that the disputant should show that the 
favored law is interpreted according to the precise language of the text, while the less 
favored law is interpreted through definition, “since what is plainly stated seems to be 
stronger and more binding” (De Inventione 2.49.147). While this may be good advice, the 
circumstances of the dispute and the relative definitional flexibility of the possible terms 
play a large role in what terms are defined and therefore what passages are used. 
 
Frames 
Another semantic strategy for resolving contradictions consists of manipulating 
the relevant, organized conceptual units of knowledge and experience, or frames,66 which 
are applied to texts in order to interpret them and create coherence (Fillmore, “Frames 
and the Semantics of Understanding” 223; Bednarek 693). In interpreting passages 
(versus words, see Chapter 5), these frames consist of certain assumptions about a text’s 
function, structure, style, genre, themes, content etc., assumptions that are usually taken 
for granted (Bednarek 693-698). Disputants, however, can call these frames into question 
and argue that different assumptions are required in order to properly understand the text. 
In the stasis of contradictory passages, disputants may charge that apparently conflicting 
passages are a result of inappropriate framing, and that if the proper frame is applied the 
contradiction is resolved.  
 Classicist Hardy C. Fredricksmeyer uses this strategy of reframing to resolve an 
apparent contradiction in the Homeric epic the Odyssey in his 1989 article “Penelope 
Polutropos: The Crux at Odyssey 23.218-24.” In the epic’s twenty third book, Penelope, 
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Odysseus’ wife, who has for years faithfully waited for her husband’s return to Ithaca, 
compares herself to the infamous Helen of Troy whose infidelity is blamed for the Trojan 
War. According to Fredricksmeyer, “Scholars have objected to these lines [that contain 
the comparison] above all because Helen was not deceived into betraying her husband, as 
Penelope feared that she herself would be” (489). The apparently conflicting texts then 
are these seven lines from Penelope and the story of Helen recounted elsewhere in the 
Homeric epics. Scholars who, “since Aristarchus,” have considered these lines “illogical 
and inappropriate,” have either “rejected these lines, or emended them, or explained them 
in terms of psychological realism” as means of resolving the contradiction 
(Fredricksmeyer 487).  
But Fredricksmeyer offers his own solution: “I believe that a better understanding 
can be gained by focusing on the unifying theme of knowledge throughout Penelope’s 
speech, rather than on adultery” (487; emphasis mine). In other words, Fredricksmeyer 
suggests that the critics frame the speech in terms of the theme of knowledge rather than 
the usually assumed theme of adultery. Fredricksmeyer argues that this change in theme 
resolves the contradiction:  
But insofar as knowledge is central to the first and third sections of this speech, 
the contrast between Penelope and Helen becomes the very point of her 
illustration rather than an inconsistency. The point of comparison is that the 
fidelity or infidelity of both women depends on their possession of an essential 
knowledge, that of Odysseus’ true identity in the case of Penelope, and in Helen’s 




Fredricksmeyer’s new thematic frame points to common ground between Penelope and 
Helen, a ground that is lacking, at least at the thematic level, in other interpretations. 
 
Other Semantic Solutions   
 Other semantic solutions are imaginable as well. For example, one could break 
the cohesion of a text, a la Halliday and Hasan, by, for example, denying certain 
referential links. What originally had the same referent in two conflicting passages now 
has two separate ones. Contradiction requires perfect semantic overlap, therefore 




 While grammatical and semantic solutions involve clues to textual construction 
that are linguistically encoded or conventionalized, pragmatic solutions involve 
manipulating elements extrinsic to the text itself. Here is the dividing line between 
solutions at the level of letter (grammatical and semantic) and solutions at the level of 
spirit (pragmatic). As with semantic solutions, I do not claim to offer a definitive or 
exhaustive list of pragmatic solutions, but the following kinds of solutions can be found 
in interpretive disputes in the stasis of contradiction. Because they are so numerous, I 
classify and treat them under a few heads: circumstances, relative illocutionary force, 






Any circumstantial element surrounding the situations of production or 
application of a text can be used to resolve a contradiction (Cf. Melanchthon 156). The 
elements across the situations of production and application remain more or less the same 
and can be classified according to the ancient peristasis or circumstances, i.e. who, what, 
where, when, why, how, and by what means ([Augustine] 7; Boethius 4.1205D). Burke 
offers a similar and likewise useful classification system with his pentad: act, scene, 
agent, agency, and purpose (Grammar xv). While these elements may be used in 
isolation, they can also be used together. It would be too tedious to given an example of 
disputants manipulating each element, but we will look at a few.  
For instance, the circumstances surrounding the production of passages in 
apparent conflict may be compared using a value or principle to determine their relation 
to one another in support of an interpretation. In the context of law, Cicero claims that the 
most recent law is “always the most important” (De Inventione, 2.49.145; Cf. 
Melanchthon 156). But Quintilian suggests that the older passage is superior (7.7.8). Such 
arguments manipulate the element of time (when, scene) with respect to the situation of 
production.  
With respect to the situation of application, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note 
that two or more passages may appear to contradict one another if they seem to apply to 
the same portion of reality at the same time (201). The apparent contradiction can be 
resolved, however, if the disputant makes “a division in time or a division in object” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 202). The general principle is that any element can be 
divided and matched with an apparently conflicting passage in a mutually exclusive way 




Melanchthon offers an example of how the element of person (who or agent) with 
respect to the situation of application, can be manipulated, effecting a division of 
“object,” as he explains the topic of genus and species for this stasis (158). A strategy that 
was recognized in antiquity, the tactic of genus and species makes a distinction between a 
class and a particular member of that class. In this way distinctions or exceptions can be 
made for the species that do not apply to the class more generally. This strategy, of 
course, is not limited to persons. Melanchthon uses this relation to resolve the apparent 
contradiction between the biblical passages “Do not return evil for evil”67 and “The 
magistrate is a minister for God, and his avenger for wrath”68 (Melanchthon 157). The 
first passage may be taken as a general command for all people, or at least all Christians. 
If interpreted as a general command, this passage would seem to generally “prohibit 
vengeance” (Mealnchthon 157). Having cited the topic of genus and species, 
Melanchthon writes, “Besides, Scripture exempts the magistrate from the general law in 
which vengeance is forbidden, and thus it is certain that the magistrate is allowed to 
exercise vengeance, to punish the guilty, to wage war” (158). The second passage then 
does not contradict the first because it applies to a special group of people within the 
general, larger class. Magistrates are a special species excepted from the rule applied to 
the larger class of people more generally. Through this exception, the portions of reality 
these two passages refer to presumably do not overlap, therefore they do not contradict 
one another. 
Sometimes a single element is not isolated at all, but the entire situation is 
appealed to. This approach is essentially the one Peter Enns takes when he attempts to 
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resolve the apparent contradiction between Proverbs 26:4 and 5: “‘Do not answer a fool 
according to his folly, or you will be like him yourself;’” and “‘Answer a fool according 
to his folly, or he will be wise in his own eyes’” (qtd. in Enns 74). Enns, who presumes 
that both proverbs are wise, argues that, “…the reader is expected to invest energy in 
discerning whether a certain proverb is relevant for a certain situation” (Enns 74; 
emphasis original). For Enns, these proverbs, and others, that seem to conflict, actually 
do not contradict one another, because they are not universally applicable but apply to 
mutually exclusive situations in which any number of elements may come into play. He 
interprets the “do’s” and “don’t’s” of these passages as “sometimes it’s best to do” and 
“sometimes it’s best not to do.” 
 
Relative Illocutionary Forces 
Another pragmatic solution involves considering the relative illocutionary force 
of the passages in apparent conflict. Although their theory of language may not be 
especially developed or self-consciously employed, disputants can and often do consider 
passages as kinds of speech acts. Concerning illocutionary force, the originator of speech 
act theory, J. L. Austin, explains,  
It makes a great difference whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or 
actually ordering, whether we were strictly promising, or only announcing a 
vague intention, and so forth. …[W]e constantly do debate them [these issues], in 
such terms as whether certain words (a certain locution) had the force of a 





As it pertains to conflicting passages in a text, a contradiction can be resolved based on 
the presumably intended illocutionary force of the passages in question, because these 
forces are a determinant of the passage’s relation to the situation.  
We see ancient rhetoricians accounting for illocutionary force when they advise 
their students to examine if a law enjoins, permits, or prohibits ([Cicero] 2.10.15; Cicero, 
De Inventione 2.49.145; Quintilian 7.7.7). Cicero tells us that enjoinment has the most 
weight in comparison with the other two; a passage of permission is optional; and a 
passage of prohibition is an exception to a conflicting enjoinment (De Inventione 
2.49.145; Cf. [Cicero] 2.10.15). But there is no reason why these relations must always 
hold unless there is a governing hermeneutic principle that mandates such relations. In 
any case, disputants can make a case for resolving a contradiction based on the forces of 
the passages in apparent conflict, even if the forces are at first perceived to be the same. 
A rhetor can always argue that a passage should be understood to have a different force 
(as we see later in a closer examination of Townsend’s defense of women’s preaching).  
 
Effects 
Another technique involves comparing the consequences or effects of resolving 
the apparently contradictory passages in one direction versus another. Cicero mentions 
three possible qualities of comparison: expediency, honorability, and necessity (De 
Inventione 49.144-145). In comparing passages, one might ask, which is more expedient, 
honorable, or necessary in this particular situation? Of course, the possible qualities of 
comparison are not limited to these three. Quintilian suggests considering the affected 




“the fairer and better outcome” (7.7.7-8). Any kind of effect, or aspect of an effect, can 
be compared between apparently contradictory passages. The anonymous author of the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium advises that disputants should show which passage best upholds 
the departments of Law, namely “Statute Law, Legal Custom, the Law of Nature, [and] 
Equity” ([Cicero] 2.10.14-15).69 As Cicero observes, “The conclusion from this is that if 
two laws (or whatever number there may be if more than two) cannot be kept because 
they are at variance [i.e. contradictory], the one is thought to have the greatest claim to be 
upheld which has reference to the greatest matters” (De Inventione 2.49.143). Whichever 
passage has the farthest-reaching consequences with respect to the “greatest matters” is 
the passage that takes precedence. And there are a number of ways to qualify what counts 
as “the greatest matters.” 
 
Interclausal Relations 
Another pragmatic solution to contradiction involves manipulating the meaning 
relations between sentences and clauses. While there are multiple classifications of 
interclausal semantic relations that could be useful in analyzing interpretive disputes in 
the stasis of contradictory passages, I follow the scheme proposed by Fahnestock because 
it “emphasize[s] the rhetorical dimension of these devices [relations]” (Rhetorical Style 
356). In her book Rhetorical Style, Fahnestock lists seven pairs of “‘Positive and 
Negative Interclausal Relations,’” “a taxonomy of the potential meaning relations that are 
part of the English speaker’s discourse knowledge…organized into pairs combining a 
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more expected ‘positive’ relation with a less expected opposite or ‘negative’ relation” 
(Rhetorical Style 360). They are sequence and anomalous sequence; restatement and 
replacement; exemplification and exception; premise and concession; conclusion and 
nonconclusion; similarity and contrast; addition and alternation (Fahnestock, Rhetorical 
Style 363-371). Each relation is epitomized by transition words, but they are usually 
understood or inferred without them. Because these relations are often unmarked in 
discourse, they are arguable and subject to rhetorical construction. While Fahnestock 
primarily focuses on relations between sentences that occur in tandem, these relations 
may be inferred even between non-sequential sentences in the same passage where higher 
orders of meaning are constructed.  
   
Assimilation 
 Finally, disputants can also make a move of assimilation (see Chapter 6) or 
analogy to persuade their audiences that the passages in question are not in conflict 
(Cicero, De Inventione 2.49.147). Assimilation involves extrapolating a meaning from 
the text that is not explicit by means of analogy. Waltke makes a move of assimilation as 
part of a larger argument to resolve a contradiction between Deuteronomy 23:3 and the 
story and legacy of Ruth. Deuteronomy 23:3 prohibits any Moabite, a biblical people 
group, from ever entering the “assembly of the Lord.”70 Yet Ruth, a Moabite, not only 
married an Israelite, but became an ancestor of David, and is even listed in the genealogy 
of Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew. Waltke, after suggesting a grammatical solution based 
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on the gender of the Hebrew word for Moabite in the text,71 argues that, “Similarly, in the 
case of holy war, the Law mandated the execution of males but not females” (88). Waltke 
draws a parallel between the prohibition in Deuteronomy and the rules of holy war. Since 
females were spared death in holy wars, he reasons that they must also be excluded from 
this prohibition, thus the contradiction in Ruth’s case is resolved.  Should disputants offer 
counter-analogies to resolve a contradiction, an embedded dispute in the stasis of 
assimilation would arise. 
 
Special Cases 
Internal Contradictions: Paradoxes and Oxymorons 
 So far, almost all of the apparent contradictions examined in this chapter have 
involved passages, plural. By passages, I mean separate, distinct discourse units.72 But an 
apparent contradiction can also occur within a discrete discourse unit. As Aristotle 
observed with respect to the legal realm, a law may either contain an internal 
contradiction or it may contradict another passage within the same text (1.15.9). One 
problem with the notion of internal versus external contradiction is that the unit of the 
passage is nebulous. In the judicial realm, one can easily define a passage as a law. But 
what constitutes a passage in non-legal discourse? A passage, at least in modern written 
English and probably other languages, would appear to comprise a single syntactic unit or 
closely related clauses, and an internal contradiction is one that occurs within this range.  
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In English, and many other languages as well, there is a special category of 
internal contradiction called the paradox. William Harmon in A Handbook to Literature 
defines paradox as, “A statement that although seemingly contradictory or absurd may 
actually be well founded or true. As we approach the conceptual limits of discourse—as 
commonly happens in philosophy and theology—language seems to rely increasingly on 
paradox” (364; emphasis original). Paradoxes, then, are grammatically connected 
discursive units that apparently contradict themselves and usually express some profound 
truth, or at least that is the usual expectation. One example would be Jesus’ exhortation to 
his disciples (one of his many paradoxical sayings): “Those who find their life will lose 
it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it” (Matthew 10:39).   
A species of paradox is the oxymoron. Rather than a statement of one or a few 
sentences, an oxymoron usually comprises immediately juxtaposed words or phrases. In 
Romeo and Juliet, Romeo produces a series of oxymorons in a speech depicting his 
infatuation with one of the women, not yet Juliet, from the rival Capulet family:  
Why, then, O brawling love, O loving hate, 
O anything of nothing first create, 
O heavy lightness, serious vanity, 
Misshapen chaos of well-seeming forms, 
Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health, 
Still-waking sleep, that is not what it is! (Shakespeare 1.1) 
This series of oxymorons helps evoke the powerful, conflicting emotions that Romeo 
feels in the first scene, foreshadowing the tragic clashes that occur throughout the rest of 




There do not appear to be any important differences in the interpretive strategies 
that disputants use when resolving internal versus external contradictions. Both kinds can 
be resolved with solutions at the grammatical, semantic, and pragmatic levels. Brooks 
used a semantic solution to solve the paradox in Donne, and other examples could be 
found where disputants resolve paradoxes and oxymorons at the other levels. 
 
Asystatic Contradictions 
 Sometimes disputants acknowledge that a text contradicts itself, but no dispute or 
attempt to resolve the contradiction follows. In many of these instances we can say the 
case is asystatic (Cf. Hermogenes 32; [Augustine] 15). An asystatic issue is a case in 
which there are no defensible contrary positions. 
 In some instances, disputants admit that a contradiction is insoluble (one of the 
classifications of asystatic questions recognized by Hermogenes 33), but do not concede 
that this destroys the integrity or the function of the text. Absolute non-contradiction is 
not a necessity or value for every person or community. Some persons and communities 
have a higher threshold for contradiction in their texts, although acceptance of total 
incoherence after interpretation is not acceptable for most communities. One notable 
exception might be the school of literary critics known as the deconstructionists. 
Deconstruction approaches all discourse as self-contradictory and revels in this state of 
contradiction “as a never-ending free play of language” (Guerin et al. 377). 
Contradictions are discovered not resolved (Guerin et al. 377). When these efforts are 
aimed primarily or solely at literary texts, the motivation would seem to be part of a 




In certain cases, disputants may not admit that an apparent contradiction is 
insoluble, but will argue that the contradiction must be solved at a later time when there 
is more information. There is no limit to how often this approach can be taken, especially 
if a person or community holds a text in high regard and/or past contradictions have been 
satisfactorily resolved, but some audiences may not find this reasoning particularly 
persuasive.  
In either situation of accepting a contradiction or delaying its resolution, 
disputants may attempt to minimize the contradiction’s significance as a strategy to 
preserve the integrity of the text. Various tactics can be employed here to shrink the 
impact of a self-contradiction. The degree to which disputants work to resolve an 
apparent contradiction is always influenced by the relationship the disputant has to the 
text. Some rhetors will see any apparent contradiction in a particular text as a reason to 
reject it (a move of jurisdiction). Others will feel compelled to resolve every apparent 
contradiction in a text in an attempt to defend against any possible jurisdiction attacks. 
And there is plenty of non-neutral space in between. 
 
Defending Women’s Right to Preach by Solving Textual Contradictions 
 We now turn back to the example that opened the chapter in order to examine a 
more complex argument in the stasis of contradictory passages. In this dispute, L. T. 
Townsend presents an argument in defense of women’s preaching using different 
passages from the Bible than those used by Henry J. Van Dyke to argue against women’s 
preaching (in the legal or classical form of this kind of dispute). Townsend recognizes 




biblical text and he therefore proceeds to resolve the contradiction with “ a compromise” 
(qtd. in Willard 155). Namely, Townsend proposes to amend Van Dyke’s conclusion 
about women’s preaching to read, “…The Word of God expressly excludes and prohibits 
some women from the work of the ministry” (Townsend qtd. in Willard 155; emphasis 
original). To support his emendation, Townsend solves the contradiction at the pragmatic 
level employing a number of solutions, including manipulating circumstantial elements, 
making moves of assimilation, and comparing the relative illocutionary force of the 
conflicting passages. In effect, Townsend follows the kind of advice offered in classical 
manuals for resolving conflicts in the interpretive stasis of contradictory passages.  
 Townsend first attempts to weaken the force of the Pauline prohibitions by putting 
them in the category of opinion, thereby placing the two sets of contradictory passages on 
two planes of authority (Willard 155). To accomplish this feat, Townsend manipulates 
the circumstantial element of person with respect to the situation of production. 
Townsend cites disagreements between Peter and Jesus, Peter and Paul, and Paul and 
Barnabas, to show that the apostles, some of whom were biblical authors, were not 
always in agreement with each other or even with Christ (Willard 156). He also cites a 
time when Peter changed his opinion along with a biblical passage where Paul states his 
own uncertainty about the divine authority of his views (Willard 156). Both of these 
citations directly attack the notion that the biblical authors, both Paul and Peter having 
biblical epistles attributed to them, were infallible. Townsend thus concludes that, “These 
apostolic opinions [just cited] certainly do not have the characteristics of infallibility, 




Having cited evidence of the apostles’ fallibility, Townsend then firmly declares 
Paul’s prohibition in 2 Timothy 2:12 as opinion: “…only an individual opinion is 
expressed. ‘I do not permit a woman to teach’ is not even to Timothy a command, much 
less is it a command to the church of the nineteenth century” (qtd. in Willard 157). Here 
Townsend notes the illocutionary force of the passage: what is usually considered a 
command actually appears to be an expression of an opinion. Thus, according to 
Townsend, “We must adopt, therefore, this [2 Timothy 2:12] as a law of interpretation, 
that as to some of the accidentals belonging to the administrative economy of the church 
the individual opinions of the writers of the Bible need not be regarded as infallible” (qtd. 
in Willard 157). Because 2 Timothy 2:12 is only Paul’s fallible opinion, lacking the true 
illocutionary force of command, it does not contradict those passages which seem to 
authorize women’s preaching.  
Townsend also uses assimilation to support his argument. In one move of 
assimilation, he draws a parallel between Eve’s curse, which is referred to in the passage 
from 1 Timothy that Van Dyke cites, and Adam’s curse. Van Dyke argues the Paul’s 
prohibition against women speaking in church is “rooted in the history of creation and in 
the divinely appointed relation of the sexes” (qtd. in Willard 127). He is presumably 
referring to the Genesis narrative that recounts that man was made first, then woman,73 
and recounts that as part of the curse proclaimed by God after Adam and Eve’s 
disobedience that men “shall rule over” women.74 The reasoning of 1 Timothy, which 
Van Dyke cites, reads, “‘For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not 
deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression’” (qtd. in Willard 127). 
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The logic is that women’s subordination to men is ordained by God, not only as part of 
women’s natural state, their first ancestor being formed second as a helpmeet to Adam, 
but as part of Eve’s punishment for disobeying God, especially since she was the one 
who listened to the serpent.  
To refute this conclusion, Townsend draws a parallel between the subordination 
of women to men and “the struggle with ‘thorns and thistles,’ and ‘the sweat of the 
brow’” that men are cursed with for Adam’s disobedience in the same Genesis narrative75 
(qtd. in Willard 160-1). He then asks,  
But is there to be not restoration?.... Or, practically, what shall Christians do?... 
Shall we increase the toil, the sickness, the pain, and the deaths of mankind, or try 
to diminish them? Does not the intelligent Christian spirit of the age bid us root 
out the thorns and thistles, visit and minister to the sick, build hospitals, and make 
the woes of the world less?  (Townsend qtd. in Willard 161) 
Knowing that most of his audience will agree that the hardships faced by men and other 
effects of sin should be alleviated, Townsend draws the following necessary conclusion: 
“If these human mitigations of the consequences of sin are in harmony with God’s will, 
then it cannot be God’s will for men any longer to keep their oppressive heels upon the 
necks of Christian women. If Christianity bids us lift the curse from man, in the same 
breath it must bid us lift the curse from woman….” (qtd. in Willard 161-2). Through an 
analogy to the curse on men and other effects of the Fall, Townsend attempts to persuade 
his audience that the subordination of women, as part of the curse of the Fall, is to be 
                                                 




abolished not perpetuated. Thus, Townsend’s argument subordinates the Pauline 
prohibition (letter) to a more universal principle (spirit). 
As he nears the end of his response, Townsend employs a series of what Cicero 
terms the dilemma76 (complexio), “a form of argument in which you are refuted, 
whichever alternative you grant” (De Inventione 1.29.45). In one of these dilemmas, 
Townsend notes the illocutionary force of biblical prohibitions against women’s public 
ecclesiastical speaking cited by Van Dyke and biblical regulations of women’s public 
ecclesiastical speaking preaching in 1 Corinthians 11:577 “and elsewhere” (qtd. in Willard 
166). He then considers three temporal relations for these prohibitions and regulations in 
terms of when they were written (circumstantial element of time {when, scene} with 
respect to the situation of production): the prohibition could either have been written 
before the regulation, at the same time as the regulation, or after the regulation (Willard 
166). In each case, Townsend concludes that the prohibition belongs to the “variables of 
Christianity” (qtd. in Willard 166). It is not clear what the underlying principle for 
judging illocutionary forces is here. Perhaps Townsend inverts the Ciceronian scheme 
and presumes that permission (as the “legal” illocutionary force of 1 Corinthians 11:5) 
precedes prohibition. It is also possible that Townsend sees an implicit command in 1 
Corinthians 11:5 (and other passages), which would fall in line with the Ciceronian vision 
of enjoinment trumping prohibition. In either case, regulation takes precedence over 
prohibition and the biblical passages used to exclude women from the office of preaching 
are relegated to the “variables of Christianity” (Townsend qtd. in 166).  
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although it is not clear that he has in mind the rhetorical sense.  
77 1 Corinthians 11:5: “But any woman who prays or prophesies with her head unveiled 




Thus, we see how Townsend uses the charge of potential contradiction, and the 
exigence of preserving the integrity of the text, to put the biblical prohibitions against 
women speaking in church in relationship with other passages of the Bible that permit 
and authorize this activity. The relationship that Townsend constructs (unsurprisingly) 
supports his position that women have the right to preach. And as one would expect in a 
stasis structured according to the antithesis letter versus spirit, Townsend ultimately 
appeals to the spirit of the text, arguing that Van Dyke’s argument is “antagonistic…to 
the entire spirit of the Gospel of our blessed Lord and Master” (qtd. in Willard 169).  
 
What Can We Learn from Solutions to Textual Contradictions? 
 Disputes in the stasis of contradictory passages demonstrate that the logical 
relations of text depend on multiple levels of its construction—grammatical, semantic, 
and pragmatic. In turn, the interpretation of the significance of a text is highly dependent 
on these often invisible logical relations. When these relations conform to or do not 
greatly upset our expectations about the text, they fly under the radar. But when they do 
fall outside of our expectations, a result which can be provoked through rhetorical 
construction as much as through accident, then we, if we are invested in the text’s 
integrity, must repair the broken logical relations. 
We can consider these apparently broken logical relations or contradictions as 
problems and the interpretations people use to solve them as solutions. But over time 
these solutions can become separated from their problems if an audience finds the 
interpretations of the passages originally in conflict persuasive and accepts them. Over 




the audience that accepts the proposed solution, as the new ways of interpreting the 
passage(s) originally in conflict become habituated, normalized and unquestioned. The 
passages that were once in conflict may no longer even be considered in the context of 
one another anymore.  
It seems more than likely that interpretive solutions are learnable and that 
disputants can pick them up and use them in other and future controversies of the same or 
similar nature. As historian of women’s rhetoric Jane Donawerth notes, the same 
“biblical arguments” were used for centuries in defenses of women’s right to preach, 
some of which appear in the excerpts from Townsend’s writing analyzed above 
(Donawerth 77). In some cases disputants were probably recycling old arguments. In 
other cases the disputants were probably simply responding to the particulars of similar 
(enough) rhetorical situations and coming up with similar strategies. In some cases, it 
may have been a mix of both.  
Of course, whenever a solution is applied and accepted, the other logical relations 
in the text are likewise affected even if not perceptibly. The passages of a text are 
interconnected and a change in the logical relations in one or two places affects the rest of 
the structure. Even the most loosely written text may be tightly woven together by the 
interpretive practices of the community that uses it.  
The method laid out in this dissertation gives analysts the tools to examine how 
individuals and communities yield interpretations through larger to minute rhetorical 
manipulations of the text. Another approach involves examining an individual or 
community’s hermeneutical orientation. These two approaches can actually be 




in the kinds of solutions disputants tend to choose when faced with an apparent 
contradiction. For instance, as stated earlier, the letter/spirit divide occurs between 
semantic and pragmatic solutions. Those with hermeneutical orientations that gravitate to 
letter-interpretations in the letter versus spirit stasis would probably adopt grammatical 
and semantic solutions when faced with an apparent contradiction, and those with 
hermeneutical orientations titled toward a spirit-interpretation in a letter versus spirit 
stasis would probably adopt pragmatic solutions. Of course, in rhetoric, where the 
situation largely determines the hermeneut-rhetor’s available means of persuasion, we 
cannot expect there to be a hard and fast rule about such a thing. Sometimes practical 

















Chapter 4: Ambiguity 
 The late-eighteenth century poet Phillis Wheatley, brought to colonial America 
from Africa as a child, was the first African American to publish a book in America 
(Carretta ix). Her 1773 collection of poetry, Poems on Various Subjects, Religious and 
Moral, won the young enslaved poet almost instant fame, albeit for some twisted reasons: 
her trans-Atlantic audience marveled at her work in part because the prevailing view 
among whites at the time was that black people were not capable of the same intellectual 
feats as their white counterparts.  
 Despite her achievement in breaching the literary color line of her time, twentieth 
century criticism of both the poet and her work has been especially harsh and 
unforgiving. In his landmark book on African American literature, To Make a Poet Black, 
originally published in 1939 and reprinted in 1968, J. Saunders Redding describes 
Wheatley’s work as having a “negative, bloodless, unracial quality…that makes her seem 
superficial, especially to members of her own race” (11). He essentially denies her the 
status of “slave poet,” and barely grants her the status of “Negro poet,” writing that, “As 
a Negro poet she stands out remarkably, for her work lacks the characteristics of thought 
one would expect to find,” and that she “failed to show…racial kinship” (Redding 9, 12, 
13).  Redding’s critique is not unique but rather represents the overwhelming critical 
response to Wheatley’s work in the twentieth century.  
One poem of Wheatley’s that has received especially negative criticism is “On 
Being Brought from Africa to America.” As Henry Louis Gates, Jr., observes, “This, it 
can be safely said, has been the most reviled poem in African-American literature” (71). 




 ’Twas mercy brought me from my Pagan land, 
 Taught my benighted soul to understand 
 That there’s a God, that there’s a Saviour too: 
 Once I redemption neither sought nor knew.  
 Some view our sable race with scornful eye, 
 “Their colour is a diabolic die.” 
 Remember, Christians, Negros, black as Cain, 
 May be refin’d, and join th’ angelic train. (Wheatley 53) 
Critics have lambasted the poem for “show[ing] her [Wheatley’s] gratitude for having 
been taken from what she perceived as a pagan land, brought to America and taught 
Christianity” and “its gratuitous alignment of blackness and evil” (Jamison 412; Collins 
83).  
The last couplet of this poem has received particular scrutiny from critics. The 
sentence begins with the imperative “Remember,” but the referent of its subject, the 
individuals being implored to remember, is ambiguous. In one reading of the sentence, 
“Christians” functions as a vocative, thereby specifying the referent of the subject of 
“Remember.” This reading thus separates “Christians” from “Negros,” who are linked 
with Cain, the first murderer in the Bible, but who may still gain salvation. In another 
reading, “Christians” and “Negros” are grouped together as a compound subject in the 
sentence’s embedded noun clause, with an elided that, such that both “Christians” and 




may join the “angelic train.”78 The ambiguity arising from the question of the syntactic 
relation of “Christians” to other elements in the sentence is, as we will learn later in this 
chapter, a grammatical ambiguity.  
In response to this ambiguity, critic Angelene Jamison in 1974 wrote, 
And in the last two lines of the poem, “Remember, Christians, Negros, black as 
Cain,/ May be refined, and join th’ angelic train,” she articulates that Blacks too 
have the opportunity to be saved. However, “Remember, Christians, Negros, 
black as Cain” does not clarify whether she perceives Christians and/or Blacks 
can be black as Cain. The ambiguity indicates that possibly before Blacks can be 
equal to Christians, if ever, they must be refined. The lines also indicate Phillis 
Wheatley’s acceptance of the curse of Cain and its racist implication. (412; 
emphasis in italics original; emphasis in bold mine) 
Jamison notes the ambiguity pointed out above but finds it unsatisfactory as it “does not 
clarify” Wheatley’s thoughts about blacks. Jamison concludes that Wheatley accepts the 
white racist ideology that linked blacks to Cain as part of a biblical argument for 
considering blacks inferior to whites and enslaving them. At most, Jamison believes the 
ambiguity suggests that black equality with Christians is possible only if blacks convert 
to Christianity. Jamison’s interpretation leads her to the ultimate conclusion that 
Wheatley was not really a “Black poet,” but that “her poetry is a product of a white 
mind” (415). 
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 Yet her admission that the poem includes ambiguities in key lines opens the door 
for opposing interpretations that place Wheatley in a much different light. In 1981, James 
Levernier, in a defense of the poem, argued, 
On the surface, Phillis Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa to America” 
suggests that Wheatley, as scholars have claimed, accepted the colonial view that 
slavery, because it brought Christianity to thousands of Africans whose pagan 
lifestyle otherwise would have condemned them to an eternity in hell, was at 
worst a necessary evil and at best an absolute good. Ambiguities, however, 
especially in the final couplet of the poem, indicate that Wheatley was far from 
comfortable with the racist attitudes of her white contemporaries…. (25; emphasis 
mine)  
Levernier acknowledges that from one perspective the poem seems to conform to the pro-
slavery attitudes of the time. But he argues that the poem contains intentional 
ambiguities, which point to a different message altogether that refutes those attitudes. The 
rest of his analysis, which we examine in detail near the end of the chapter, seeks to 
rescue Wheatley from the charge of racial self-hatred by demonstrating that these 
ambiguities actually subvert the racialist ideology of her time.  
 The controversy over the ambiguities in the final couplet of Wheatley’s poem “On 
Being Brought from Africa” is an example of a dispute in the stasis of ambiguity. While 
ambiguity is often seen as a hindrance to interpretation, it can in fact be a powerful 
resource of argumentation and persuasion for the savvy interpreter-rhetor. In this chapter 
we will explore the nature of standard cases of ambiguity, types of ambiguity, specific 




standard case.  I end with a brief analysis of two extended arguments in the stasis of 
ambiguity and a few concluding thoughts. 
 
Arguing over Ambiguity 
Disputes or arguments in the stasis of ambiguity concern the multiple possible 
readings that can be elicited from a single linguistic form in a text, with the standard 
arguments in this stasis advancing one of those readings over the others. Ambiguity in 
these standard cases is believed to be unintentional and interpreters generally select the 
sense79 that seems to best fit the author’s intention. Most linguistic forms have more than 
one possible sense, perhaps with the exception of certain specially coined technical terms, 
given that we use a finite number of symbols for an indefinite number of purposes in an 
indefinite number of contexts.  
Yet we are not constantly involved in disputes over ambiguous language in 
everyday linguistic exchanges. Communication, at least in this respect, generally 
works—well enough to send people to the moon. There are “powerful stable constraints” 
that influence how we interpret language, most notably convention and context (including 
co-text) (Croft and Cruse 109). But convention and context are not enough for 
interpreting an utterance. Interpreters use information from convention and context in 
conjunction with related knowledge and assumptions about the world and cultural 
                                                 
79 In using the term sense, I follow Croft and Cruse’s determination of senses as pre-
meanings (103). There are several steps of meaning construction involved in interpreting 
any text from deciphering the broader range of meaning elicited by a linguistic form to 
determining the meaning of the linguistic form in a particular instance of use. Issues of 
ambiguity, strictly speaking, concern earlier stages in the process of meaning 
construction, although these earlier stages have direct implications for the final stages of 
the process. See Croft and Cruse’s discussion in “The Dynamic Construal of Meaning” 




practices, what Searle called “background,” in order to understand the meaning of an 
utterance (“The Background” 227).80 Convention and context provide clues as to what set 
of assumptions or part of our background knowledge should be brought to bear in a 
particular instance of interpretation. But sometimes interpreters do not feel or believe 
they have enough conventional or contextual clues to decide which part of their 
background knowledge to bring into play and therefore which meaning to choose for a 
particular linguistic form. When this happens with an individual encountering a text, 
ambiguity arises.    
When multiple individuals are co-constructing the meaning of a text, all 
participants must agree, at least tacitly, and assume they all agree (tracking), on the 
relevant conventional, contextual, and background information needed to make decisions 
about associations of linguistic form and meaning. This shared and tracked information 
between multiple interpreters is a part of what philosophers of language and cognitive 
psychologists call common ground, “the sum of [the participating individuals’] mutual, 
common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions”, which is necessary for 
individuals to conduct any joint or coordinated action (Clark 92-93).81  
Thus, disputes over ambiguous language between multiple individuals can arise 
for one of two reasons. First, all participants believe or perceive that there is a lack of 
necessary conventional or contextual clues needed to help determine the sense of a 
                                                 
80 Croft and Cruse include background, or what they call “stored knowledge,” as part of 
context, and consider assumptions about the world (“nature of reality”) as a separate 
constraint on meaning construction (101-103). I am trying to emphasize the distinction 
between the environment that surrounds the discourse event and what the interpreter 
brings to the act of interpretation.  
81 Of course, common ground is an important part of individual encounters with a text as 
well. But in these cases, the author cannot adjust his or her understanding of the common 




linguistic form. They all agree that there is a lack and they all recognize their agreement. 
The opening example represents a disagreement of this kind. Both Jamison and Levernier 
agree that there are ambiguities in the final two lines of Wheatley’s poem, although they 
disagree about the significance of these ambiguities. 
Second, at least one participant, or some number fewer than all of the parties 
involved, perceives a lack of necessary conventional and contextual clues and attempts in 
the first place to persuade the other participants that the passage is ambiguous. We might 
imagine a case where most Wheatley critics initially did not perceive any ambiguities in 
“On Being Brought from Africa,” but other critics attempted to persuade them that 
ambiguities did indeed exist in the poem. Persuading other parties that an ambiguity 
exists in the text would be the first step in persuading them to accept a different 
interpretation of that text. 
In both cases, the perceived lack of necessary conventional and contextual clues 
creates an exigence, which, in the words of Melanchthon, “engenders argument” (163). 
However, when a rhetor must persuade the other participants that an ambiguity exists, 
more initial persuasive effort is required. Therefore, rhetors seeking to exploit the 
polysemous nature of language do best to choose those linguistic forms which the 
audience already accepts as ambiguous.  
 
The Four Types of Ambiguity and Their Subtypes82   
                                                 
82 The classic classification of ambiguity comes from Empson, who lists seven types of 
ambiguity. Empson defines ambiguity with respect to readers’ potential “alternative 
reactions to the same piece of language” (1). His classification scheme, a scale of “stages 
of advancing logical disorder,” ranges from any verbal form which is “effective in several 




Even though linguistic forms are just one ingredient in the process of meaning 
construction, unlike the other ingredients, like context, they visibly “prompt” us to start 
the process (Fauconnier, Mental Spaces xvii). But different kinds of linguistic forms 
prompt us to construct different kinds of meaning relations. Therefore, different kinds of 
linguistic forms give rise to different kinds of ambiguity if other relevant information for 
interpreting the text is lacking. We can thus classify four types of ambiguity according to 
the linguistic form that prompts them in the first place: phonetic, lexical, grammatical, 
and higher-order.83 We must keep in mind, however, that interpreters use multiple clues 
to construct the meaning of a text, which can be used to support one reading of an 
ambiguity over another as we will see when we turn to the strategies of persuasion that 
can be used in this stasis. 
 
Phonetic Ambiguity 
 In phonetic ambiguity, the linguistic forms in question generally fall within the 
rhetorical canon of delivery: pronunciation, pauses, inflection, etc. Thus, with phonetic 
ambiguity we are largely concerned with oral texts, but some ambiguity that occurs in 
written, printed, and digital texts could also be classified as phonetic: word spacing, font 
size, italicization, etc. Attempted oral sarcasm provides an example of oral phonetic 
                                                                                                                                                 
grounded not in the effects that an ambiguity has on a reader, but in the ways that 
language with respect to its forms and the processes involved in interpretation can give 
rise to or be construed to produce multiple senses. This approach, in my opinion, lends 
the approach presented in this chapter more predictive power, insofar as the analyst may 
guess at where questions or disputes of ambiguity are likely to occur, depending on the 
particulars of the situation.    
83 The first three categories are taken from Ullman (156). The last is taken from 




ambiguity. Sarcasm can often be lost on an audience when the inflection too closely 
mimics another expected intonation form.  
For an example of textual phonetic ambiguity, we may look to Quintilian, who 
gives the following standard ancient rhetorical example (which he himself classifies as 
lexical): “A man orders that his body be buried [incultoloco]”—which could mean either 
in a cultivated (in culto) place or an uncultivated (inculto) place, because ancient Latin 
writers generally did not put spaces between words (7.9.5). While ambiguity due to word 
spacing may have been somewhat common in Latin, it is less likely in English, which 
reminds us that instances of ambiguity are always a matter of the particulars of the 
language (here, its orthography). 
 
Lexical Ambiguity 
At the next level, we have lexical ambiguity, where the linguistic form in question 
is a word. There are at least a couple of ways in which words can be ambiguous. In the 
case of homonymy, one word can have multiple senses with respect to the conceptual 
categories it signifies (Quintilian 7.9.2; cf. Julius Victor 3.12). In “Vagueness and 
Ambiguity in Hemingway’s ‘Soldier’s Home:’ Two Puzzling Passages,” Milton Cohen 
points out a lexical ambiguity resulting from homonymy in one of Ernest Hemmingway’s 
short stories. As he explains, one passage in the story contains “a phrase that can 
genuinely be read in two opposing ways” (M. Cohen 161). The phrase is, “…and when 
he occasionally met another man who had really been a soldier and they talked a few 




among other soldiers: that he had been badly, sickeningly frightened all the time” (qtd. in 
M. Cohen 162; emphasis mine). As Cohen points out,  
The problematic word here is “pose.” If it means “stance” or “attitude,” it 
suggests that Krebs, relaxing, can now tell the truth to the fellow-soldier. But if 
“pose” means a false appearance, then Krebs is simply falsifying his experience 
once again by pretending he was badly frightened in combat—the common 
denominator—when in fact he actually performed “easily and naturally.” (162) 
“Pose” has two senses: “stance” or “attitude” and “false appearance.” Cohen construes 
these senses as distinct, relatively unrelated, mutually exclusive meanings that happen to 
share the same verbal form. In the next chapter, we will examine definitional disputes, in 
which similarly there are competing senses for the same verbal form. But in the case of 
definition, interpreters feel that the senses are related to one another by an encompassing 
sense and the question is the limits or extent of that encompassing sense.84  
In another kind of lexical ambiguity, the meaning of a word’s parts does not equal 
the meaning of the whole: “the word has one meaning as a whole and another when 
broken up” (Quintilian 7.9.4). Cicero referred to the technique of breaking up a word into 
smaller meaningful parts, what linguists today would call morphemes, as etymology 
(Topica 8.35-37). We therefore might call this kind of lexical ambiguity etymological. 
The childhood musing, “Why do we drive on parkways and park on driveways?” 
illustrates how a word as a whole can have a different meaning when split up into its 
meaningful parts.  
                                                 




Perhaps the most recognizable kind of lexical ambiguity is the pun. A pun 
involves a single term, either phonologically or orthographically, that invokes two or 
more senses as intended by the author, or so assumed. Hence, people utter the phrase, “no 
pun intended,” when they notice that they have produced a pun unintentionally. The term 
may occur once or more than once, although repetition of a word with multiple senses has 
been traditionally classified as antanaclasis, a close relative of the pun (Fahnestock, 
Rhetorical Style 134). Unlike other kinds of ambiguity that are unintentional, for puns to 
work, the interpreter must hold both or all senses in mind, rather than choose one, in 
order to experience the intended effect. Here is a series of puns attributed to the 
nineteenth century rhetorician, Richard Whately: “Why can a man never starve in the 
Great Desert? Because he can eat the sand which is there. But what brought the 
sandwiches there? Why Noah sent Ham, and his descendants mustered and bred” (qtd. in 
Tartakovsky; emphasis mine). Here we have puns on the three words sand which is and 
the word sandwiches; the biblical figure Ham, son of Noah, and ham being meat; 
mustered meaning to gather and mustard, the brown-yellow condiment; and bred as in 
procreation and bread, the flour-based staple used to hold together the sandwich. 
While it seems quite obvious in this example that Whately is punning these terms, 
especially given their comedic flavor, whether an author is indeed punning is not always 
clear and therefore may be disputed. For example, literary critics dispute whether such 
words as die and Cain in Wheatley’s poem “On Being Brought from Africa” are 




(its more obvious meaning), and cane as in sugar cane.85 We will discuss the issue of 
intentionality more fully in the final sections of the chapter. 
 
Grammatical Ambiguity 
When the linguistic form in question is syntactic in nature, then we classify the 
ambiguity as grammatical. There are a few subtypes. One subtype includes ambiguity of 
syntactic relations.86 In these instances, the syntactic relations of a particular grammatical 
constituent are unclear. Quintilian provides a useful example reportedly from the ancient 
Delphic oracle87 to Pyrrhus, the 4th to 3rd century BCE king of Epirus who executed 
multiple successful military campaigns against Rome,88 that holds even in its English 
translation: “I say that you, O child of Aeacus, the Romans can defeat” (7.9.6; emphasis 
mine).89  Who can defeat whom? Can the Romans defeat the addressee or can the 
addressee defeat the Romans? Which noun phrase is the subject and which is the object? 
In English, we ordinarily determine case by word order. The subject occurs before the 
verb and the object after the verb. But when both the subject and object occur before the 
verb, as may happen in poetry, the language itself gives no indication as to which noun 
                                                 
85 Levernier makes the argument for these puns (26). 
86 Cf. Quintilian’s observation that grammatical cases can be ambiguous (7.9.6). But in 
languages like English, where word order matters more than inflectional endings if they 
exist at all, we ought to talk about ambiguity with respect to syntactic relations in order to 
include both synthetic (inflectional) and analytic (word order) languages. 
87 The Delphic oracle was notoriously obscure, and ambiguity helped to ensure that the 
oracle’s predictions, no matter the actual outcome of events, were correct. 
88 “Pyrrhus.” 




phrase should be assigned which role (except in cases when the verb and subject display 
number agreement).90  
Ambiguity can also arise from questions of phrase boundaries or constituency. 
Quintilian explains that these instances arise “when it is doubtful what refers to what, 
especially when there is a word in the middle of a sentence which may be taken either 
with what precedes or with what follows” (7.9.7). Sentences, and utterances more 
generally, consist of phrases, single words or groups of words that function as units. 
Sometimes, however, it may not be clear, or it may be argued that it is not clear, whether 
certain words belong to one phrase or another within a larger sentence or utterance. 
We find an example of a controversy over ambiguous phrase boundaries in 
Augustine of Hippo’s De doctrina christiana. The dispute is over the first two verses of 
the Gospel of John. In English the ambiguity is best displayed by the following: “In the 
beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and God was the Word this was in 
the beginning with God” (John 1:1-2; translation and emphasis mine). In the Latin 
translation used by Augustine and many others at the time, as well as in the original 
Greek, the word translated as “this” can function as the subject of its own sentence, 
separate from “Word,” producing the following division: …and the Word was with God 
and God was the Word. This (one) was in the beginning with God. “This” can also be 
taken as a demonstrative modifying “the Word,” thus producing this division: …and the 
                                                 
90 The ambiguity in the English translation, of course, is an attempt to mirror the original 
ambiguity in the Latin. In the Latin text, both “te” (you) and “Romanos” (Romans) are in 
the accusative case, which ordinarily would signal them as the objects of the verb, but 
here they are part of an indirect statement, a noun clause introduced by a verb of thinking, 
saying, or feeling, and, according to Latin grammatical conventions, subjects and objects 
in these constructions are in the accusative case. Thus, as in the English translation, the 
original Latin grammar gives no indication as to whether “te” (you) or “Romanos” 




Word was with God and God was. This Word was in the beginning with God. The first 
construction reflects the mainstream or “orthodox” division of the passage in Augustine’s 
time and the division that Augustine himself championed (Augustine 3.2.3). But 
apparently there was a “heretical” division at this time as well that divided the passage in 
the second way (Augustine 3.2.3). Antique Latin writers generally did not separate 
sentences with punctuation marks as we do today in English; therefore, ambiguities of 
sentence division in written script, an issue of phrase boundaries, would have been more 
common.91 This particular ambiguity had serious theological implications. As Augustine 
explains, “This heretical punctuation does not allow that the Word [Christ] is God…” 
(3.2.3). The mainstream division, on the other hand, championed by Augustine, affirms 
the full divinity of Christ. 
Another kind of grammatical ambiguity involves a question of reference. In 
homonymy, there is a question of competing senses of a word, but even when the sense is 
clear, there may still be a question of reference.92 By reference, I mean that the word or 
phrase in question presupposes something else somewhere else for its specific 
identification (Halliday and Hasan 31, 32, 37). While campaigning for re-election in 
2012, Barack Obama uttered a widely acknowledged ambiguity of this kind that caused 
him much political grief. In a speech he gave at a fire station in Roanoke, Virginia, 
Obama argued that wealthy Americans should not receive tax breaks, a major point of 
contention in the 2012 presidential election cycle. As part of this argument he stated,  
                                                 
91 Interpreters must rely on inflections, pauses, convention, past instances, and intuition in 
order to sort out these kinds of ambiguities in oral texts. In this respect, unpunctuated 
written texts are very similar to oral texts. 





If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help.  There was 
a great teacher somewhere in your life.  Somebody helped to create this 
unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive.  
Somebody invested in roads and bridges.  If you’ve got a business—you didn’t 
build that.  Somebody else made that happen.93 (Obama; emphasis mine) 
The ambiguity here that caused Obama subsequent trouble involved the demonstrative 
pronoun “that.” Does “that” refer to “business” or “this unbelievable American 
system?”94 If the antecedent is “business,” Obama is making an anti-free enterprise claim 
that government is responsible for businesses and their success, a statement that would 
raise the ire of business owners and further alienate him from voters on the right side of 
the political spectrum. But if the antecedent is “this unbelievable American system,” then 
Obama is making the claim that the government is responsible for the infrastructure that 
has helped foster the success of businesses, a much less controversial statement. As one 
might imagine, Obama’s political foes interpreted this ambiguity in the former manner, 
while Obama insisted on the latter interpretation. 
 
Higher-order 
                                                 
93 While this excerpt is taken from the official transcript posted on the White House 
website, it does not precisely record what Obama said. Obama actually said, “If you’ve 
got a business, that—you didn’t build that” (“President Obama Campaign Rally;” 
emphasis mine). The official transcript omits the first “that.”  
94 Another reading that circulated at the time construed the ambiguity as a choice between 
“business” versus “roads and bridges” for the antecedent of “that.” This construal of the 
ambiguity tended to favor the “business” reading because ordinarily demonstrative 
pronouns agree with their antecedents in number. Therefore, “business” would be the 
more likely referent. But “roads and bridges” is not an implausible reading: in speech 
someone might use that to refer to a plural antecedent, as they would when that is used as 




 Sometimes the ambiguity of a linguistic form is not specifically linked to its 
phonetic, lexical, or grammatical properties, but to what Gilles Fauconnier calls its 
“space-building potential” (Mappings 65). According to Fauconnier, “Mental spaces are 
the domains that discourse builds up to provide a cognitive substrate for reasoning and 
for interfacing with the world” (Mappings 34). These spaces represent the cognitive 
structures we use to think and talk about real and possible worlds (Mental Spaces xxxvi). 
According to this theory, situations, depending on their status relative to the current real 
world as experienced and acknowledged by interlocutors, are organized into separate but 
interconnected mental spaces (Croft and Cruse 33; Fauconnier, Mappings 38-39, Mental 
Spaces 16-22). To the extent that language prompts us to construct these mental spaces, it 
can prompt us to make multiple competing and even mutually exclusive space 
constructions. Linguistic forms, thus, can also be ambiguous in this way. As Fauconnier 
explains, “The language form contains underspecified instructions for space building” 
(Mappings 65; emphasis original). Because these ambiguities more directly involve 
higher cognitive processes, I call them higher-order ambiguities.  
 Fauconnier supplies a helpful example: “In that movie, a former quarterback 
adopts needy children” (Mental Spaces 23). In this sentence, the prepositional phrase in 
that movie prompts the interpreter to construct a mental space that represents a movie. 
But the relationship between this space and the person identified as a former quarterback 
is ambiguous. Do we have a person who used to be a quarterback in reality, who now as 
an actor plays a character who adopts needy children in a movie? Or do we have an actor 
who plays a former quarterback who adopts needy children in a movie? The sentence in 




interpreters can use context and background assumptions to persuade audiences to accept 
one reading over another. 
 
Marshalling Evidence from Convention, Context, and Background 
Ambiguity, like contradiction, presents an interpretive problem for rhetors to 
solve given an exigence requiring one reading, and there are several persuasive 
techniques at the rhetor’s disposal for defending the preferred reading. These techniques 
involve marshalling evidence from linguistic convention, context, and the language user’s 
background assumptions. More specifically, rhetors can appeal to standards of usage, co-
text, context, and/or the author’s motives, make arguments regarding how easily one can 
comply with competing readings, and rewrite ambiguous passages to fit possible 
readings. In the standard case, the rhetor’s ultimate goal is to convince the audience that 
in fact no ambiguity exists, so that the audience only sees the rhetor’s preferred reading.  
 
Standards of Usage 
Perhaps the most powerful argument available to a rhetor in support of a 
particular reading among multiple possibilities is that the favored reading is in line with 
the standards of usage for a certain discourse community. Many times it will be the 
ordinary usage of the discourse community that the audience is a member of. Indeed, the 
most powerful line of argument in this stasis may be that the favored interpretation 
matches how the verbal form would be used in an ordinary conversation among audience 
members. As Cicero relates, “In the first place it should be shown, if possible, that there 




accustomed to use this single word or phrase in the sense in which the speaker will prove 
that it should be taken” (De Inventione 2.40.116).95 The more distant the discourse 
community to which the audience belongs is from the discourse community to which 
author of the text in question belongs, the more difficult this line of argument is to 
sustain.  
But it is not necessary that the standard of usage be ordinary conversation or that 
the audience be a member of the discourse community in question. After all, the point, 
usually, is to get after what the author intended, and that means understanding the 
standards of usage as the author would have understood them. When the text is 
sufficiently distanced from the audience, either culturally, temporally, or even 
linguistically, the standards of usage in ordinary conversation as the audience understands 
them will not do. Questions of standards of usage, for example, are often key in U.S. 
Constitutional interpretation and judges have been known to consult dictionaries 
contemporaneous with the Constitution’s drafting to determine how words were used at 
the time in order to resolve textual ambiguities. All of this, of course, depends on how the 
audience understands its relationship to the text. An audience that does not see itself as 
distanced from the text or believes that meaning in language is acontextual will see no 
need to make distinctions between current standards of usage and the standards adhered 
to by the author.  
 
Co-text 
                                                 
95 Cf. the Rhetorica ad Herennium’s advice to argue that “the text is not ambiguous since 




Another element at the rhetor’s disposal is the co-text or the text surrounding the 
ambiguous linguistic form in question. As Cicero explains,  
It must be shown that from what precedes or follows in the document the doubtful 
point becomes plain. Therefore, if words are to be considered separately by 
themselves, every word, or at least many words, would seem ambiguous; but it is 
not right to regard as ambiguous what becomes plain on consideration of the 
whole context (omni…scriptura) [co-text]. (De Inventione 2.40.117; emphasis 
mine)  
Of course, if an ambiguity is acknowledged to exist, then the co-text was not enough to 
ensure clarity in the first place. Therefore, the rhetor’s task is one of emphasis and de-
emphasis: to emphasize those parts of the co-text that support the favored 
interpretation(s) and undermine the disfavored interpretation(s), while de-emphasizing 
those parts that do the opposite. Again, Cicero here is instructive: “One ought…to 
examine the whole document which contains the ambiguity in question in all its parts, to 
see if anything is apposite to our interpretation or opposed to the sense in which our 
opponent understands it” (De Inventione 2.40.117).96 This dual process of emphasis/de-
emphasis can take the form of structuring the relationship between parts of the co-text so 
that the disfavored portions are subordinated to the favored portions. Indeed, the process 
of emphasizing/de-emphasizing the co-text amounts to reconfiguring the co-text in the 
audience’s mind. 
                                                 
96 Cf. Cicero’s more specific advice regarding laws: “Then if the controversy arises over 
an ambiguity in a law, we must try to make it appear that the interpretation which our 




A rhetor can also make a related move of jurisdiction and argue that certain parts 
of the co-text are simply not relevant to resolving the ambiguity. (This of course opens up 
the possibility for an embedded debate in the stasis of jurisdiction over the part of the co-
text in question.) What counts as relevant co-text is always up for debate.97 For the 
analyst, the available co-text is any text that exists with the ambiguity in the same larger 
text or document. Textual boundaries are always arguable, so analysts must be sensitive 
to the boundaries as defined by the individuals and communities whose interpretive-
rhetorical practices they are studying and be clear about how they as analysts have 
determined the boundaries of the text in question for the purposes of analysis. 
In the subsequent controversy over Obama’s ambiguous “that,” co-text played a 
significant role in how politicians and pundits persuaded audiences of the word’s correct 
interpretation. The Romney Republican campaign for president, for example, posted a 
video on its website that replays a three second-video clip from Obama’s speech five 
times in which Obama says, “If you’ve got a business, that—you didn’t build that” 
(“Hard-Working Americans”).98 Video editing techniques allow modern rhetors to 
modify circulated copies of video-recorded oral texts (the same is true for “simpler” 
audio recordings), and in this case the Romney campaign de-emphasizes or rather erases 
most of the ambiguity’s co-text by eliminating it.99  
                                                 
97 Cicero seems to have a limited textual range in mind regarding the surrounding text 
(“the whole context”). His advice regarding the “the whole document (ipsam 
scripturam),” literally “the text itself,” is actually given in connection with considering 
extra-textual context (De Inventione 2.40.117). 
98 Although the first “that” is heard in the video, it is removed in the quoted text 
accompanying the video on the Romney campaign website, as it is in the official 
transcript on the White House website. 
99 Replaying the clip five times is a technique of amplification and, besides underlining 




On the other hand, one political commentator, David Weigel of Slate, emphasizes 
Obama’s gestures as a crucial part of the co-text for interpreting the ambiguity, arguing 
that “that” refers to all of the things that have helped business owners succeed:    
Watch (again, can't believe I'm saying this) the body language. Obama is 
gesticulating to count off the various ways people have been helped—great 
teacher, American system. At 0:44, he says “somebody invested in roads and 
bridges,” and gyrates his arms as if mapping out said roads and bridges. “If you've 
got a business,” he says, making one more gyration, “that—you didn't build that.” 
The extra “that,” a false start, is not captured in transcripts. It really looks like 
“that” refers to the stuff that business-builders utilized on the way up, not the 
businesses themselves. Obama switched up, mid-sentence. These things happen. 
What really convinces me, here, is that the Fox News and Romney 
campaign versions of the clip start RIGHT AFTER the gyrations. (Emphasis 
represented by capital letters original) 
Weigel’s observations about Obama’s gestures and the Fox News and Romney campaign 
versions of the clip demonstrate not only the role of gesture as co-text but also the 
disputational nature of interpretation even when it comes to video recordings. His 
comments illustrate that the modification of video clips through editing is not necessarily 
taken for granted, but can be identified as a means of interpretation subject to dispute and 






Rhetors, to support their readings of ambiguous linguistic forms, can also go 
outside of the text for available contextual evidence in the author’s “other writings, acts, 
words, disposition and in fact his whole life” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.40.117). Cohen, 
for example, in determining the meaning of the word “pose” in Hemingway’s “Soldier’s 
Home,” looks to a previous draft of the story, in which Hemingway wrote, “that easy 
pose,” with “that” being replaced by “the” in the final version (qtd. in M. Cohen 162). 
Cohen argues that, “The rejected version seems to emphasize ‘pose’ as a false front—
‘that one’ we know so well—not Krebs’s relaxed stance” (M. Cohen 162). Cohen sees 
this fact as further evidence that Hemingway meant “pose” as “false appearance” rather 
than “stance” or “attitude.” 
   As Cicero explains, “For it is easy to estimate what it is likely that the writer 
intended from the complete context and from the character of the writer, and from the 
qualities which are associated with certain characters” (De Inventione 2.40.117). Such 
contextual considerations may also take time into account, that is when the text 
containing the ambiguity in question was written (Cicero, De Inventione 2.41.121). 
Narrowing the temporal scope of the considered context could arguably give one a more 
precise reading of the ambiguity by circumscribing the range of relevant contextual clues. 
Of course, any strategy that makes use of contextual clues rests on the assumption that 
the author’s character, actions, and linguistic acts, including the one in question, are, at 






Another strategy involves making claims about the assumed motives of the author 
of the text in question. These motives could be general motives that those interpreting the 
text assume guide most people or they can be more specific to the individual author. 
Cicero’s suggested strategy to consider “whether it will not appear if we accept the 
interpretation proposed by our opponent, that the writer neglected something more 
expedient, more honourable or more necessary” relies on the assumed general 
motivations of expedience, honor, and necessity (Cicero, De Inventione 2.41.119). Other 
motives work as well. Further, this strategy can easily go hand-in-hand with marshalling 
evidence from the larger context.100    
We see an example of an appeal to motive in Hanna Roose’s interpretation of a 
widely recognized ambiguity in the original Greek in 2 Thessalonians 2:2: “not to be 
quickly shaken in mind or alarmed, either by spirit or by word or by letter, as…from us, 
to the effect that the day of the Lord is already here” (emphasis mine).101 A lexical 
ambiguity, the Greek conjunction in this verse, hōs, can be read two ways: either as 
“supposedly” or “as,” yielding two different readings: “a letter supposedly (hōs) [but not 
truly] from us” or “a letter as (hōs) [truly] by us” (qtd. in Roose 108; alternate readings 
original; Greek interpolations mine). Although most scholars, according to Roose, 
believe that this ambiguity is unintended and therefore attempt to argue for one meaning 
or the other, Roose believes the ambiguity is deliberate and therefore she affirms both 
meanings (108). Her belief in the intentionality of the ambiguity rests on her view that the 
                                                 
100 This link between motives and context matches Burke’s claim that “any complete 
statement about motives will offer some kind of answer to these five question: what was 
done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), 
and why (purpose)” (Grammar xv; emphasis original).  
101 The ellipses represent the word though whose inclusion reflects which side of the 




letter, which the Christian church has traditionally attributed to the Apostle Paul, is 
inauthentic. Convinced that the letter is inauthentic, she argues that the author was 
motivated by “a clash of interests between…the author’s struggle for relevance and…his 
struggle for (alleged) authenticity” (Roose 117). By this assertion, Roose means that the 
author of 2 Thessalonians wants to, on the one hand, signify that he (or she) was the 
author of 1 Thessalonians, the referenced “letter” that was “[truly] by us,” and in doing so 
influence subsequent interpretations of 1 Thessalonians; and, on the other hand, suggest 
that the letter referenced in this verse was not 1 Thessalonians but perhaps “some forged 
letter” unknown to the readers of 2 Thessalonians (Roose 118, 119). According to Roose, 
the latter suggestion, in conjunction with the fact that 2 Thessalonians makes no other 
specific reference to 1 Thessalonians, implies that 2 Thessalonians is the older of the two 
letters, which therefore argues for 2 Thessalonians’ authenticity (Roose 116). Thus, 
Roose appeals to the general motives—relevance and authenticity—of authors attempting 
to write texts under the name of other well-known authors, a practice known as 
pseudepigraphia that was rather prevalent in antiquity. 
 
Ease of Compliance 
Another consideration that rhetors may use to persuade their audiences in this 
stasis is the comparative ease of complying with competing interpretations. (This strategy 
is not particularly useful when the text in question has little bearing on the beliefs or 
behaviors of the audience.)  Cicero writes, “In the next place it should be pointed out, if 
opportunity presents, that the interpretation which our opponent favours can be followed 




carrying out or complying with his interpretation, whereas what we propose can be easily 
managed” (2.40.118). Similarly, the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium 
advises that the rhetor argue “that [his or her] interpretation is practicable, and practicable 
in conformity with the Honourable and the Right, with Statute Law, Legal Custom, the 
Law of Nature, or Equity; of our adversaries’ interpretation the opposite is true” 
(2.11.16). For both Cicero and the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, rhetors can 
appeal to how easily audiences can follow a reading in their actions (or beliefs) in 
arguing for a particular interpretation of an ambiguity. When employing this strategy, the 
rhetor acknowledges, even if implicitly, that there are constraints on the audience’s 
ability to comply with an interpretation and those constraints must be taken into account. 
Cicero provides the following imaginary case as an example. An ambiguous law 
states: “A prostitute shall not wear a crown of gold; if she does, the penalty shall be 
confiscation as public property” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.40.118).102 As the English 
attempts to capture, the ambiguity here—in the English, a grammatical ambiguity as a 
result of the elision of the object of confiscation—raises the question of whether the 
prostitute or the crown is to be confiscated when a prostitute violates this law. A few of 
the arguments that Cicero suggests can be used against a litigant who argues that the 
prostitute should be confiscated include “that there is no way to manage a prostitute as 
state property,” “that it is easier to administer and comply with the law by seizing the 
gold,” and “that it causes no inconvenience” (De Inventione 2.40.118). The thrust of all 
                                                 
102 “Meretrix coronam auream ne habeto; si habuerit, publica esto” (Cicero, De 
Inventione 2.40.118). The ambiguity in the Latin comes from the gender of the adjective 
publica (“public property”) which is feminine and therefore can modify either meretrix 
(“prostitute”) or coronam (“crown”). Thus, it is grammatically ambiguous as to which, 
the prostitute or the crown, the law states shall become public property should a prostitute 




of these arguments is that the reading of the law in which the gold is confiscated is the 
more practical interpretation from a law enforcement standpoint and therefore is to be 
preferred. 
 
Rewriting the Ambiguity 
Another strategy is to rewrite the passage containing the ambiguous linguistic 
form so that the ambiguity disappears and the rewritten passage explicitly conforms to 
the proposed reading(s). By rewriting the passage, the rhetor attempts to vividly show 
what the author did or did not intend. As Cicero explains, “Therefore in such cases it will 
be necessary to make use of this kind of argument: ‘He would have written it in this 
way,’ ‘He would not have used that word,’ ‘He would not have put that word in that 
place.’ For these considerations particularly reveal the intention of the writer” (De 
Inventione 2.41.121). Both Cicero and the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium only advise rewriting the passage according to a disfavored interpretation 
(Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.11.16; Cicero, De Inventione 2.41.120). Neither author 
explains their reasons for this one-sidedness, but the reason is probably that rhetors 
should want to show that their interpretation is expressed in the text as-is, while the 
opponent’s interpretation can only be found in a re-worded version of the text. In other 
words, if the author had intended the opponent’s interpretation, he or she would have 
written it in another way. Thus, rewriting a passage to more clearly express one’s own 
interpretation can potentially weaken one’s argument if the audience feels that there is 
too great of a difference between the interpretation you propose as represented by the 




interpretations). Regardless, rhetors can rewrite passages to conform to their own 
interpretations, wisely or not.103  
Vincent Carretta uses this technique, even rewriting the passage in question 
according to his preferred interpretation, in arguing for a more positive reading of the 
notorious lines from Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa” discussed at the outset 
of the chapter: 
Wheatley may be subverting conventional equations of blackness with evil and 
whiteness with good. The imperative “Remember” may not be addressed solely to 
Christians. Perhaps we should not read the final couplet as “Remember, 
Christians, [that] Negros, black as Cain, / May be refin’d, and join th’ angelic 
train.” It may also be read very differently as “Remember, [that] Christians, 
Negros, black as Cain, / May be refin’d, and join th’ angelic train.” In the second 
reading blackness would still be associated with sin, but it would more clearly be 
used metaphorically rather than physically. (64) 
By interpolating the word “that” (in both cases, a complementizer), Carretta more vividly 
represents two of the possible readings of these lines.104 The first reading, with “that” 
before “Negros,” places everything to the right of “that” in a noun clause, functioning as 
an object of the verb “remember,” so that only “Negros” are “black as Cain,” the first 
murderer in the Bible. But in the second reading, Carretta places “that” before 
“Christians” so that both “Christians” and “Negros” are included in the noun clause as 
                                                 
103 Quintilian gives a few examples of remedying ambiguous language that could be 
useful for this particular strategy (7.9.9-12). 
104 Carretta identifies two overlapping grammatical ambiguities here: one of syntactic 
relation (is “Christians” a vocative?) and one of phrase boundary (does “Christians” 




the nouns modified by the adjective phrase “black as Cain.” Even though Carretta does 
not definitively throw his critical weight behind the second interpretation, his literal 
spelling out of the alternative readings is highly suggestive.   
 
Erasing the Ambiguity from the Audience’s Mind 
 Of course, the ultimate strategy and goal is to convince audience members that 
there is no ambiguity, while persuading them that the favored interpretation is correct. 
The rhetor attempts to get the audience to skip future processes of choosing between 
senses involved in interpreting the ambiguity in question. As Cicero urges, “In the first 
place it should be shown, if possible, that there is no ambiguity in the statement…” 
(2.40.116). It is to the rhetor’s advantage to ultimately eliminate the appearance of an 
ambiguity from the audience’s mind so that when they read or think of the portion of the 
text in question only the reading put forward by the rhetor comes to mind.  
 
Special Cases 
Arguing for Multiple Senses  
While in the standard case interpreters assume that the ambiguity in question was 
unintentional, in certain cases interpreters assume that the author of the text in question 
intended to be ambiguous to make the text “pregnant” with meaning. (Levernier’s 
argument concerning the final couplet in Wheatley’s poem, examined in greater detail in 
the penultimate section of the chapter, provides a good illustration.) Generally, it is easier 
to judge when an ambiguity is unintentional than intentional. There are certain 




have non-ambiguous meanings for the purposes of adjudication. But even when 
ambiguity is valued, in literary criticism for example, it is not always clear that the 
identified ambiguity was intended by the author.  
We might call the more complex meaning that can be evoked by presumed 
deliberate ambiguity significance to distinguish it from the multiple senses evoked at the 
linguistic level by an ambiguity. The multiple senses evoked by a deliberate ambiguity 
are thus instrumental for construing a text’s significance. The ambiguity, then, becomes 
something like a riddle to solve, as in the case of paradoxes in the stasis of contradictory 
passages. Therefore, the goal in these instances is not to get rid of the ambiguity by 
choosing one of the possible senses over the others, but to exploit the ambiguity by 
discovering its multiple senses and thus enrich the text’s overall significance. This fact 
does not mean that the multiple senses evoked by the ambiguity necessarily have equal 
standing. The functions and relationships between the multiple senses of a single 
linguistic form can be complex. For instance, one sense might act as a kind of cover for 
another more covert sense, perhaps so that the author could communicate two different 
arguments to two different audiences, one of which might be hostile to the more covert 
argument. We see this argument deployed by Levernier and another defender of 
Wheatley and her poetry in the penultimate section of this chapter.   
Sometimes interpreters do not necessarily assume authorial intention with respect 
to an ambiguity but instead elevate a text to such a level that they expect it to yield 




multiple contexts, cultural, temporal, and geographical.105 Sacred texts are often elevated 
in this way. As in the case of intentional ambiguity, interpreters do not necessarily 
attempt to whittle down the ambiguity’s multiple senses to one, but use the ambiguity’s 
multiple senses to enrich the text’s significance according to their particular ideological 
frames.  
In either the case of assumed authorial intention or textual elevation (and the two 
can feed off one another), rhetors use the same strategies or topics as we find in cases of 
presumed unintentional ambiguity to defend and attack possible readings. The major 
difference is that in these two cases—intentional ambiguity and ambiguity from 
elevation—there is not the same pressure to resolve the ambiguity. Only when the 
ambiguity is presumed to be unintentional does the ambiguity present an exigence that 
calls for interpreter to choose one reading over others. Still, it is necessary to defend 
one’s interpretation even when the ambiguity is presumed to be deliberate because 
interpretations must be grounded in the available evidence from convention, context, and 
background. Otherwise the rhetor is liable of being accused of pulling an interpretation 
out of thin air or advancing an interpretation that is disconnected from the text. There 
may not be pressure to resolve an ambiguity, but an interpretation is always open to 
attack. 
 
Asystatic Cases of Ambiguity 
                                                 
105 Such elevation can also have the opposite effect and lead interpreters to have a 
relatively low tolerance for ambiguity. These individuals or communities may feel that 




 Just like with contradictory passages, disputes over ambiguities can also be 
asystatic. An asystatic issue is a case in which there are no defensible contrary positions. 
Sometimes interpreters believe they are faced with an ambiguity for which the lack of 
conventional, contextual, and background information is so great that it cannot be 
resolved. A choice between possible readings cannot be made. In these instances, when 
an interpreter or a group of interpreters resigns itself to this conclusion, implicitly or 
explicitly, we may say that we have an asystatic case of ambiguity. Quintilian, who 
seems to believe all disputes in the stasis of ambiguity are in a sense asystatic without 
sufficient exigence (although he does not use this term in his discussion of this stasis), 
offers a description that is apt for such cases: “Nor does it really matter how an 
Ambiguity is produced or resolved. It is obvious that two things are signified, and, so far 
as the written or spoken word is concerned, the two sides are equally balanced” 
(7.9.14).106 In other words, without sufficient conventional, contextual, and background 
information, all of the possible interpretations are equally plausible. The possible 
interpretations have equal claim to being correct and no evidence apparently exists that 
tips the scale in favor of one over the other. Of course, whether a linguistic form is 
ambiguous even to the point of being unsolvable is determined by the involved 
interpreter-rhetors.  
Augustine appears to recognize such cases in the context of biblical interpretation 
when he writes, “When neither principles of faith nor the context is sufficient to explain 
                                                 
106 Quintilian goes on to say, “It is therefore futile to recommend that, in this Issue, we 
should try to turn the expression itself to our advantage, because if that can be done, there 
is no Ambiguity. The whole question in any Ambiguity rests sometimes on which is the 
more natural interpretation, but always on which is the more equitable and which the 




an ambiguity, there is nothing to prevent our punctuating the passage in any of the 
various possible ways…. Distinctions in interpretation of this kind may be made at the 
will of the reader” (3.2.5). Thus, Augustine gives interpreters of the Bible some freedom 
in their interpretation of ambiguities in certain asystatic cases. In these cases, interpreters 
may choose the reading they wish, as long as it does not contradict church doctrine, and 
presumably differing interpretations of an asystatically ambiguous passage do not cancel 
each other out, as there is no way to choose between them. 
 
Rescuing a Poet’s Reputation with an Appeal to Intentional Ambiguity 
 Like the other two stases we have examined so far, strategies of persuasion in the 
stasis of ambiguity are rarely used in isolation. The debate over Phillis Wheatley’s poem 
“On Being Brought from Africa” that opened this chapter nicely illustrates a dispute in 
this stasis with literary critics employing a variety of tactics to defend their stances and 
attack the stances of others. Specifically, we shall examine the arguments of two literary 
critics, James Levernier and Mary McAleer Balkun, who attempt to shift the general 
critical opinion of Wheatley and her work from the prevailing view that as a poet she was 
disconnected from the plight of other enslaved blacks to the view that she in fact used her 
poetry to subversively influence the oppressive racist structures that enslaved her people. 
Both Levernier and Balkun support their more positive appraisal of Wheatley and her 
work by arguing that Wheatley was deliberately ambiguous in works like “On Being 
Brought from Africa.” Appealing to Wheatley’s motives and drawing on contextual 
evidence to support their readings of this poem, specifically its last two lines, Levernier 




constraints on what she could write. Thus, she had to write ambiguously to escape 
censure.  
 In his article “Wheatley’s ‘On Being Brought From Africa to America,’” 
Levernier argues that the final couplet of the poem contains a “deliberate ambiguity” in 
order to “drive home” the point “that Christians should practice what they preach” (26). 
The ambiguity, according to Levernier, involves “who is being addressed by the verb 
‘Remember’” (the grammatical ambiguity noted in the beginning of the chapter). 
Levernier concedes that Wheatley “seems” to be addressing “Christians,” but he argues 
that, by italicizing the three nouns, “Christians,” Negroes,” and “Cain” (an instance of 
textual phonetic ambiguity), “she links the three terms rhetorically, thereby creating a 
level of ambiguity in line with the deeper message of the poem” (Levernier 26). 
According to Levernier, the “deeper message,” which he also refers to as the “context,” is 
that Christians, black or white, are sons of Adam and therefore equal inheritors of “the 
fruits of original sin” including “slavery and economic greed” (26). More generally, the 
state of the soul is not marked by the color of one’s skin but by one’s motives and actions 
(Levernier 26). Thus, Levernier justifies his reading of this passage as deliberately 
ambiguous by connecting it to the poem’s “deeper” argument, which is in line with 
Cicero’s advice to rhetorically consider ambiguities in light of the “whole [textual] 
context” (De Inventione 2.40.117).  
 But Levernier’s claim that the ambiguities in Wheatley’s poem are intentional 
ultimately rests on an appeal to her motives as an author. In the beginning of his article he 
asserts, “…while propriety kept a black female slave from openly criticizing an 




poem, at a very sophisticated level, a far different message than that which the poem 
superficially conveys” (Levernier 25; emphasis mine). Levernier argues that Wheatley, 
for reasons of “propriety,” intentionally made her poetry ambiguous, to avoid directly 
denouncing chattel slavery. He interprets her poem’s ambiguities as evidence of her 
discomfort with contemporaneous white racist attitudes rather than ambivalence about the 
condition of her people (Levernier 25).  
 In her 2002 article, “Phillis Wheatley’s Construction of Otherness and the 
Rhetoric of Performed Ideology,” Mary McAleer Balkun pushes back against critics who 
would argue that Wheatley’s poetry is “devoid of racial awareness” (121).107 To combat 
such criticism, she offers a rhetorical analysis of two of Wheatley’s poems, including 
“On Being Brought from Africa,” assuming that, “The results can only be a deeper and 
more critical appreciation of this founding mother of African American literature” (132; 
emphasis mine).108 Balkun takes for granted that rhetorical analysis of Wheatley’s works, 
including importantly an assessment of her audience, will only yield the poet critical 
appraisal.  
 Balkun claims that Wheatley’s poems, including “On Being Brought from Africa 
to America,” “were designed to manipulate [her] audience [of elite, white, powerful men] 
in very specific ways,” an argument from motive (122). She argues that Wheatley 
specifically employed intentionally ambiguous language, like puns and double entendres, 
to accomplish this goal (Balkun 132). Noting that the ambiguities of the line, 
“Remember, Christians, Negroes black as Cain,” have “become a commonplace in 
                                                 
107 For examples, see Redding and Jamison discussed briefly in the beginning of the 
chapter. 
108 In many ways, the critical divide over Wheatley’s work reflects the divide between a 




analyses of the poem,” she lists three ways that the line has been read: “It has been 
variously read as a direct address to Christians, Wheatley’s declaration that both the 
supposed Christians in her audience and the Negroes are as ‘black as Cain,’ and her way 
of indicating that the terms Christians and Negroes are synonymous” (Balkun 131). But 
rather than defending one reading over the others, as other critics, Balkun, presuming that 
the ambiguities in this line are intentional, advances that “all three readings operate 
simultaneously to support Wheatley’s argument,” her argument being that “…the only 
ones who can accept the title of ‘Christian’ are those who have made the decision not to 
be part of the ‘some’109 and to admit that ‘Negroes…/May be refin’d and join th’ angelic 
train’ (7-8). They must also accede to the equality of black Christians and their own 
sinful nature” (Balkun 131).  
 Balkun’s argument from motive, which supports her assertion that these 
ambiguities are intentional, is further supported by her appeals to the socio-cultural 
context of the poem. Most of her contextual arguments rely on a reconstruction of one of 
Wheatley’s intended audiences, elite white men, “whose members had influence and 
power and were thus in a position to effect social change as well as personal change for 
Wheatley herself” (Balkun 132). Furthermore, Balkun argues that this audience was 
“familiar with particular language and rhetorical devices,” “increasingly exposed to the 
idea of black equality and liberation,” “used to active participation in rhetorical acts,” and 
“more accustomed to a popularized democratized relationship between speaker and 
audience” (122, 132). Balkun sees the particular composition and nature of this audience 
as a motivating factor for the ambiguities employed in Wheatley’s poetry (122). As she 
                                                 
109 I.e., the “some” in the fifth line of the poem: “Some view our sable race with scornful 




explains, “Her strategy takes the audience from a position of initial confidence and 
agreement, to confusion and uncertainty, to a new ideological position at the conclusion 
of each poem [including ‘On Being Brought from Africa’]” (Balkun 122). Thus, Balkun 
justifies her position that all three readings of the ambiguities in the disputed line should 
stand by arguing that Wheatley was motivated to write ambiguously in order to persuade 
a particular audience. We should observe that Wheatley’s putative intentions are nowhere 
stated in the poem. But Balkun uses cultural and historical evidence to construct 
Wheatley’s intentions and uses these constructed intentions to argue for Wheatley’s 
intended ambiguities.  
 
Ambiguity: An Opportunity for Openings and Shifts in Meaning  
 Most arguments in this stasis are concerned with resolving ambiguities. Under the 
assumption that the ambiguity is unintentional, interpreters generally attempt to discover 
the intended sense through conventional and contextual clues as well as their own 
background assumptions. The presence of an ambiguity in a text, like a contradiction, is a 
problem that must be solved, and presumably there is only one solution. But ambiguities 
are not objective entities. They arise when interpreters perceive that they have 
insufficient conventional, contextual, and background clues to choose the correct sense of 
a linguistic form, and perceptions between interpreters can vary. But a rhetorical 
approach to ambiguity, as I have detailed in this chapter, can help analysts predict where 





  In some cases an ambiguity may be interpreted as intentional. In standard cases 
where ambiguity is presumed to be unintentional, interpreters choose one possible sense 
and reject all others. But in cases where it is presumed that the author intended to be 
ambiguous, interpreters choose multiple senses, though not necessarily all of them, and 
decide how these multiple senses relate to each other. Because the significance of a text 
with deliberate ambiguities arises out of the complex relationship between the multiple 
evoked senses, there is a sense that the meaning in these cases is to varying degrees 
encoded. There is no doubt that authors sometimes do “encode” their texts, and the 
history of interpretation of the world’s major sacred texts provides plenty of examples of 
interpreters reading for encoded messages within textual ambiguities.  
 The polysemous nature of language in general presents a real interpretive 
opportunity for the rhetor (or a rhetorical opportunity for the interpreter). Because 
discursive meaning always relies on extra-textual clues for its interpretation, what should 
be taken into account in constructing that meaning and how that extra-textual evidence 
should itself be construed is always arguable. Construing a passage of a text as 
ambiguous can be an important first step in dislodging a given interpretation of that 
passage. Of course, the particulars of the rhetorical situation—exigence, constraints, and 
audience—heavily influence how much latitude a rhetor has in arguing an ambiguity into 
existence or advancing a particular reading, and more research needs to be done to 
examine the influence of the rhetorical situation on interpretive arguments. 
Textual ambiguities, therefore, represent not only problems for interpreters to 
solve, but also opportunities for opening up and shifting the meaning of texts. Disputes in 




evidence supporting different readings of the same passage. In this process of evaluation, 
people can be persuaded to adopt new interpretations of a text. These new interpretations 
can become calcified for both individuals and communities as if there were never an 
ambiguity in the first place. Doubtless, this process of evaluating and adjudicating 
ambiguities plays a significant role in the ability of certain texts to remain impactful 





















Chapter 5: Definition 
 The 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case McDonald v. City of Chicago marked a 
historic climax in this country’s debate over gun rights. Just two years prior in District of 
Columbia v. Heller the Court struck down a ban on handguns in Washington, D.C., ruling 
that the Second Amendment guarantees U.S. citizens individual gun ownership rights for 
the purpose of self-defense. This decision resolved, in the negative, the question of 
whether the Second Amendment only protects the right to bear arms in relation to 
military service (Kaufman 704). But the ruling only applied to the federal government 
and districts under federal jurisdiction, like Washington, D.C. At the time, the Second 
Amendment was not taken to restrict state and local governments from implementing 
their own laws regarding gun ownership, even if those laws limited a citizen’s federal 
gun ownership rights.  
Just hours after the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Heller, four Chicago 
gun owners sued their city over a handgun ban similar to the one the Court had just struck 
down in D.C. (Bellandi). When their case finally made its way to the Supreme Court in 
2010, the question before the Justices was whether the Second Amendment’s right to bear 
arms, freshly interpreted as an individual right apart from military service, applied to gun 
legislation passed by state and local governments.  
If the Court decided in the affirmative, it would continue a process known as 
“incorporation,” which consists of applying the Bill of Rights, originally applied only to 
the federal government, to state and local governments as well (Amar 7).110 The gradual 
process of incorporation has rested on the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth 
                                                 
110 This process of incorporation offers examples of arguments in the stasis of 




Amendment, the post-Civil War amendment that constitutionally guaranteed African 
Americans citizenship after it had been denied them in the Dred Scott decision (Amar 7). 
Very few rights were incorporated in the first half-century after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (Curtis 1). But by the end of the 1960s, the Court had 
incorporated most of the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution (Curtis 203).111  
The textual justification for incorporation is found in just two connected clauses 
in the very first section of the Fourteenth Amendment: “No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law” (U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1-2; Curtis 2).  These two clauses are known as 
the privileges or immunities and due process clauses, respectively. But historically the 
due process clause has been the only real textual means of incorporating portions of the 
Bill of Rights at the state and local levels. In the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court, 
in its opinion written by Justice Samuel F. Miller, separated the privileges and 
immunities of state citizenship from the privileges and immunities of national citizenship 
(74). The former, according to the Court, were more fundamental in nature with a wide 
range of rights in view, while the latter were few in number, excluding many of the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights (Slaughterhouse 76). This distinction resulted in a rather 
circumscribed definition of the term privileges or immunities as it appeared in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, limiting the number of rights that the federal government could 
                                                 
111 Those rights not incorporated by this time included the right to bear arms (Second 
Amendment), the right not to quarter troops in private homes (Third Amendment), the 
right to a grand jury (Fifth Amendment), and the right to a civil jury trial (Seventh 




protect at the state and local levels to those of national citizenship (Slaughterhouse 75). 
The more numerous and fundamental rights of state citizenship were left under state 
control (Slaughterhouse 75). In this way, the Court’s definition of privileges or 
immunities in 1873 set a precedent that effectively voided the clause’s potential as a 
means of incorporation (Curtis 175). 
Despite this precedent, lead counsel for the plaintiffs in McDonald, Alan Gura, 
who had also argued on the side of the defense in Heller, used the privileges or 
immunities clause as the primary textual support in his argument for the incorporation of 
the right to bear arms, which would effectively strike down the handgun ban in Chicago 
(Tanaka). Gura’s argument thus required the Justices to answer a question in the 
situational stasis of definition: is the right to bear arms a privilege or immunity of U.S. 
citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? But before he could address that 
question, Gura, who was the first lawyer to speak during oral arguments, had to first 
address a prior question: 
  In 1868, our nation made a promise to the McDonald family;112 they and 
their descendants would henceforth be American citizens, and with American 
citizenship came the guarantee enshrined in our Constitution that no State could 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
American citizenship. 
The rights so guaranteed were not trivial. The Civil War was not fought 
because States were attacking people on the high seas or blocking access to the 
                                                 
112 The choice of Otis McDonald, an elderly, African American Democrat, as lead 
plaintiff was no doubt a shrewd rhetorical move on the part of gun rights groups, given 
the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment and the public image of gun rights as 




Bureau of Engraving and Printing.113 The rights secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment were understood to include the fundamental rights honored by any 
free government and the personal guarantees of the— (McDonald, Oral argument 
3; emphasis added) 
In this excerpt, Gura, who is cut off by Chief Justice Roberts at the end, answers the 
following question before the court: how should we understand the terms privileges or 
immunities or rights114 as found in the Fourteenth Amendment? His answer is that our 
understanding should rest on those basic rights recognized by free governments 
anywhere.  
The Justices are more than aware of Gura’s redefinition of privileges or 
immunities as those rights recognized by free governments everywhere, and his definition 
is soon interrogated: 
Justice Ginsburg: Does it work just one way? I mean, if the notion is that 
these are principles that any free society would adopt, well, a lot of free societies 
have rejected the right to keep and bear arms. 
Mr. Gura: As we mentioned—as we mentioned in our brief, this Court in 
Benton v. Maryland decided that henceforth American history and tradition are 
important to consider what rights are protected in this country. It’s true that our 
friends overseas who have more or less civilized, free societies don’t respect 
rights to the same level that we do. 
                                                 
113 These rights represent two of the federal rights that could be applied at the state and 
local levels as privileges or immunities according to the definition set by the Supreme 
Court in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases. 
114 The terms privileges or immunities and rights are considered synonymous and are 




Justice Ginsburg: But this—then it’s not one expression of this 
unenumerated rights, natural rights, or the rights that any free society—basic to a 
free society. So you—you have to trim your definition. It’s not basic to any free 
society. 
Mr. Gura: As understood by the people who ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It’s not a free-flowing license, necessarily, for judges to announce 
unenumerated rights. However, to the extent that we have unenumerated rights 
which the framers and ratifiers didn’t literally understand, they nonetheless left us 
guideposts that we can—  
Justice Scalia: Well, what about rights rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people? Would—would that do the job? 
Mr. Gura: Yes. (McDonald, Oral argument 10) 
In this exchange, Gura and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia disagree 
over how the term privileges or immunities/rights in the Fourteenth Amendment should 
be defined in the sense of its extent. In total, they offer three different answers to this 
question: 1) those rights recognized by any free society, 2) the understanding of the 
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 3) the traditions and conscience 
of the American people. The main issue of contention during most of Gura’s oral 
argument and rebuttal, thus, is a matter of how to discern the limits or scope of a term.  
 
Situational versus Interpretive Definitions 
 In the more familiar situational stasis of definition, rhetors dispute the name or 




play an enormous role in the functioning of human communities. Through naming we 
organize and structure our conceptualization of reality. Modern rhetoricians have 
variously characterized definition as a matter of essence, categorization, entitling, and 
identity.115 In this stasis, rhetors must choose a term to ascribe to an object, and the term 
chosen makes all the difference.116 Consider the difference between labeling a 
defendant’s act of killing someone as murder versus manslaughter. 
Interpretive definitional disputes involve disagreements over a given term’s 
signification or its scope and limits in a particular text. For example, what does the term 
murder mean in a particular law? The medieval rhetorician Boethius noted that this stasis 
was called “‘limit’ or ‘circumscribing’” (1209B). In these disputes, competing definitions 
are related in some way, but map onto or structure the world in significantly different 
ways. When competing definitions share no relation to one another in the minds of the 
disputants, the disagreement is better classified as an ambiguity dispute. In these cases, 
rhetors believe they are disputing two homonymous terms that share the same verbal 
form.  
Several treatises117 in the rhetorical tradition list both kinds of definition—
attaching a term to an object and determining a term’s scope—as potential sites of 
controversy. They in fact represent two related verbal means of structuring our 
conception of the world. Adjusting how a term is applied affects its scope and adjusting a 
                                                 
115 See, respectively, Weaver, “Language is Sermonic” (1354); Weaver, The Ethics of 
Rhetoric (108); Schiappa (111); Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (210). 
116 Quintilian observes that a rhetor can be faced with three kinds of questions in this 
stasis: 1) whether one term applies, 2) whether one of two (or more) terms applies, 3) 
whether one term applies in addition to another term (7.3.8-10). 





term’s scope affects its application. For this reason, rhetors can and do move between 
these two stases for persuasive advantage.  
 
Definitions and Frames 
Contemporary language theory, particularly cognitive linguistics, offers particular 
insight into the power and efficacy of arguing over the definitions of specific terms in 
texts. Research from this field suggests that selecting and arguing for the definition of a 
word as it should be understood in a text involves more than choosing between entries in 
a dictionary and that defining a term has consequences beyond the construction of a 
synonymous relationship between two sets of terms, although this is an important 
rhetorical feature of definitions. Terms do not exist with their definitions as isolated units 
of knowledge, but instead the concepts they symbolize are associated with one another 
through our experience and knowledge of the world. These associations are organized 
and structured into larger coherent conceptual units known as frames118 (Fillmore, 
“Frames and the Semantics of Understanding” 223).  
Every term has a frame.119 Understanding any term, or concept, requires 
understanding its frame, “the structure in which it fits” (Fillmore, “Frame Semantics” 
111). Concepts have specific relationships to their respective frames and to the other 
concepts that are “co-structured” by the same frame (Fillmore, “Frames and the 
Semantics of Understanding,” 223). When one term or concept in a frame is introduced 
into discourse, all of the other concepts that exist in an interlocutor’s knowledge of the 
                                                 
118 Other terms, such as domain, base, and script, are also used by cognitive linguists to 
denote similar concepts. 
119 Every term has multiple frames. Croft argues that these frames (he uses the term 




same frame are “automatically made available,” even though they may not be 
immediately salient (Fillmore, “Frame Semantics” 111). In a text, the frames of 
individual words are assumed to be coherent unless the text is considered contradictory 
(see Chapter 3).  
A classic illustration of frames involves the term weekend.120 Weekend, as it is 
used by most English-speakers, can only be understood within the frame of our Western 
society’s calendar unit of a seven-day week. In order to understand the term weekend, one 
must have knowledge of the seven-day week, idealized as consisting of five days devoted 
to one’s job,121 the workweek, and two days intended for leisure and rest, the weekend. 
Once the frame of the modern week is activated, other concepts become available and 
more readily accessible, such as the anticipation of Fridays and the dread associated with 
Mondays.  
 But terms can have alternative frames, frames which are somehow related or 
connected to one another, or construed as such, in ways that leave the choice between 
them in dispute (Fillmore, “Frame Semantics” 124). Consider the ongoing dispute among 
American evangelical Christians over the meaning of the word dominion as it is used in 
several English translations of the Bible and in particular Genesis. In the wake of the 
modern environmental movement, evangelical Christians have sought to ground their 
responses to putative environmental crises in what they believe to be the divinely 
                                                 
120 See, for example, Croft and Cruse (16); Fillmore (“Frame Semantics,” 119-120); 
Taylor, who instead uses the term Monday (88). 
121 George Lakoff argues for the concept of idealized cognitive models (ICMs) as a way 
of understanding how we conceptually organize our knowledge and experience of the 
world (Women, 68). These models are idealized in the sense that they are simplifications 
of reality and do not account for all real cases (Lakoff, Women 70). He uses the example 




established relationship between humanity and nature, as stipulated in the Bible. Two 
verses that are often used for this textual grounding are Genesis 1:26 and 28.  In these 
verses, God, according to several English translations of the Bible,122 gives humanity 
dominion over the earth and everything that lives in it:  
Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; 
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every 
creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.”  
And,  
God blessed them [humankind], and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, 
and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and 
over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” 
(Genesis 1:26, 28; emphasis mine)  
Broadly speaking, two poles have developed regarding the definition of dominion 
in these verses. In a paper given in 1999 at a conference hosted by the National 
Association of Evangelicals on poverty and environmental stewardship, E. Calvin 
Beisner, founder and national spokesman of the Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of 
Creation,123 an interfaith and interdisciplinary coalition committed to advancing a 
“biblical view” of environmentalism,124 interpreted Genesis 1:28 thus, “While tender 
cultivation is suited to a garden, forceful subduing is suited to all of the earth that has not 
                                                 
122 Including the King James Version, the English Standard Version, the American 
Standard Version, and the New Revised Standard Version (the primary translation used 
throughout this dissertation). 
123 Beisner, “E. Calvin Beisner” (1). 




yet been transformed into the garden…. Adam’s dominion mandate involved his 
transforming, bit by bit, the rest of the earth from glory to glory” (“Dominion” 5; 
emphasis mine).  Beisner in effect defines dominion as a mandate that requires humans to 
forcefully subdue and transform the earth into a garden. The frame invoked by this 
definition characterizes nature as chaotic and unordered with humans as sovereign rulers 
over the earth charged with taming its chaos. 
Opposite of individuals like Beisner, the National Association of Evangelicals 
itself, which claims to be “a untied voice for millions of American Evangelicals,” defines 
the word dominion differently (Natl. Assoc. of Evangelicals, “About Us”). In a 2004 
statement exhorting evangelicals to be civically engaged, the Association wrote, “We 
affirm that God-given dominion is a sacred responsibility to steward the earth and not a 
license to abuse the creation of which we are a part. We are not the owners of creation, 
but its stewards, summoned by God to ‘watch over and care for it’ (Gen 2:15)” (Natl. 
Assoc. of Evangelicals, “For the Health” 11; emphasis mine).  Here, the definition of 
dominion is not forceful transformation but stewardship. In this frame, humans do not 
own the earth, nor do they have a mandate to transform it, but instead they are divinely 
charged to protect and guard it. 
The controversy over the scope of the word dominion represents more than a 
quibble over the semantic meaning of a single word in an ancient Hebrew text. This 
conflict represents a broader disagreement over the “biblical approach” to environmental 
issues and action. These opposing definitions invoke opposing frames that provide 
different answers to questions regarding issues like climate change, deforestation, and 




Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation prefers private, free market economic 
action over government intervention as a solution to perceived environmental issues 
(“The Cornwall Declaration”). In contrast, the National Association of Evangelicals, 
which define dominion as watching over and caring for, argues for government action in 
the areas of resource and wildlife management, energy consumption, and citizen 
protection from the ill effects of pollution (“For the Health” 12). Through the definition 
of a single term, rhetors can affect wholesale shifts in the framing of not only a text but 
an entire situation or worldview. Thus, interpretive disputes of definition often represent 
disputes over large issues of framing. Words and definitions present a more manageable 
rhetorical means of persuading audiences to adopt or reject complex frames.   
 
Linchpin Terms 
 But not just any term in a text or debate will do. While other terms from Genesis 
1:26 and 28, such as fruitful, multiply, and subdue,125 also receive interpretive attention 
and are even disputed, the term dominion seems to be of central concern. If we were to 
order or rank the relative importance of the terms in these verses in the context of this 
interpretive-rhetorical situation, dominion would appear to be near or at the top. Its 
definition is either the start or end point for the definitions of all other terms in the text. 
But the other highlighted terms would have their place as well. While they would fall 
behind dominion, they appear to have a higher status than terms like fish, birds, and 
cattle, which in turn appear to be above terms like to, of, and over.  
                                                 
125 Cicero recognized that certain cases in this stasis required multiple words to be 





 This hierarchy of terms recalls modern rhetoricians Kenneth Burke’s and Richard 
Weaver’s discussions of ultimate terms: “…about which all other expressions are ranked 
as subordinate and serving dominations and powers. [Their] force imparts to the others 
their lesser degree of force, and fixes the scale by which degrees of comparison are 
understood” (Weaver, Ethics 212).126 However, while it appears that a similar principle 
of ordering the meaning of other terms is at work behind the terms selected for dispute in 
the interpretive stasis of definition, we should not be so quick to classify them as ultimate 
(or god, devil, or charismatic) terms. Weaver describes ultimate terms as the “‘rhetorical 
absolutes’” of a society (Ethics, 212). But the terms disputed in this stasis need not be so 
elevated. Sometimes they are: in this chapter’s opening example, right certainly seems to 
have status as an ultimate term in the U.S. and even the international community (e.g. 
human rights). Sometimes they are not: dominion, outside of the interpretive dispute over 
Genesis among evangelicals, does not have any wider cultural significance. It may, 
however, be the case that the disputation of a term can contribute to its rise to a more 
ultimate status.  
 Instead I suggest we refer to these terms as having linchpin status. The linchpin 
status of a term is directly tied to factors of the rhetorical situation. Given a particular 
rhetorical situation, certain terms are pivotal for interpreting a key text, or making 
arguments in a debate, and order the meaning of other terms. Further, certain terms more 
directly index and control the frames that rhetors desire to manipulate in a dispute. 
Evangelical Christians considering how to approach environmental issues face the 
                                                 
126 In this quote, Weaver is specifically referring to what he calls god terms, or positive 





fundamental question of the nature of the relationship between humanity and the earth. In 
Genesis 1:26 and 28, the term dominion comes closest to encapsulating that relationship 
because, whatever its specific meaning, dominion indexes a power relationship between 
people and the rest of creation. The interpretation of this term, then, holds an important 
key to biblically answering that fundamental question. It is no wonder that the term’s 
definition is hotly contested. 
 This is not to say that rhetors have no choice in the terms they choose to define 
and dispute, but those choices are constrained, sometimes severely, by the rhetorical 
situation, especially if they aim to be persuasive. Constraints on the selection or use of 
linchpin terms can include a term’s prior status, its prior or other definitions and 
associations, and the history of the dispute over the passage in question. While rhetors 
can argue that audiences should think along the lines of different terms than those that 
have formed past thinking, the force of collective mental and discursive habit is often 
against them. This presents a particular challenge for rhetors because, as Burke notes, our 
observations about reality are implicit in the terms we use (“Language as Action” 116). 
But human language is rather flexible, and the meaning potential for many terms allows 
for innovative definitions even when a word has been traditionally defined one way. 
Sometimes those new definitions are persuasive and supplant the old ones.  
In the following sections, I examine the forms that definitions take, as means of 
persuasion, and other tactics rhetors can employ to persuade audiences to accept or reject 
certain definitions of terms in texts. These tactics represent specific argumentative and 
persuasive means of adjusting the frames that audiences bring to bear when they read a 





The Scope of a Term: Conditions and Examples 
Conditions of Application 
 The discursive form that a rhetor’s definition takes represents a major factor in 
persuading audiences to maintain, reject, or adopt a particular definition of a term as 
found in a text. There appear to be two basic ways of articulating the scope of a term. A 
rhetor can outline the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a term to its 
potential referents, and/or a rhetor can provide representative examples of a term.127 
Debates over the definition or scope of a term are debates over the term’s conditions 
and/or examples.   
In their discussion of definition, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe, “To 
make their task easier, and sometimes to avoid undesired discussions, some authors 
provide, not necessary and sufficient conditions, but sufficient conditions for the 
application of a term; but the statement of these conditions, together with what is 
otherwise known about the term in question, nevertheless constitutes a choice of 
definition” (213). In a similar vein, cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch, in her 
explanation of how humans create categories from discontinuous reality, writes, “One 
way to achieve this [the creation of clear-cut boundaries] is by means of formal, 
necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership. The attempt to impose such 
criteria on categories marks virtually all definitions in the tradition of Western reason” 
                                                 
127 Cicero recognized two ways of articulating definitions: enumeration (partitionum), 
which involves dividing and naming a thing’s constitutive parts, and analysis 
(divisionum), which involves understanding the term as a genus or class and listing its 





(35). While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and Rosch disagree on whether both 
necessary and sufficient conditions form part of how people define terms or create 
categories, their observations corroborate the fact that conditions of application represent 
one means of arguing for how to define a term in a text.  
The two excerpts from the McDonald oral argument that opened the chapter 
illustrate how rhetors might define and dispute a term’s definition with respect to the 
term’s conditions. Alan Gura’s statement, “The rights secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment were understood to include the fundamental rights honored by any free 
government” expresses a definition of the term rights with respect to the sufficient 
condition of recognition by free governments (McDonald, Oral Argument 3). But 
Ginsburg questions the sufficiency of this condition, as a means of achieving Gura’s goal 
of incorporating the Second Amendment, because “a lot of free societies have rejected 
the right to keep and bear arms” (McDonald, Oral Argument 10). In response to 
Ginsburg’s rejection of Gura’s initial condition, two alternative conditions are offered: 
the understanding of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment by Gura and 
the tradition and conscience of the American people by Scalia.  
Each proposed condition changes the scope of the term privileges or 
immunities/rights, which determines which rights can be incorporated under the 
privileges or immunities clause. Because Gura’s original condition undermines his 
rhetorical goal, according to Ginsburg, the other two conditions are offered as possible 
alternatives for fulfilling that goal. This example illustrates that rhetors can choose the 
defining conditions that suit their rhetorical goals. It may be that the recognition of a free 




but as a defining condition in this context, it is insufficient with respect to encompassing 
the right to bear arms. 
 
Examples 
In addition to conditions, rhetors can also define a term through its representative 
examples.128 Rhetors may set the scope of a term through clear and accepted or agreeable 
examples,129 but in a definitional dispute, these examples may also be up for debate. Any 
example of the usage of a term is representative in some way, but degrees of 
representation vary (Rosch 40).  The examples selected and put forward by the rhetor as 
representative are used as a means of characterizing the term and drawing conclusions 
about the term’s other possible referents. But audiences do not have to accept a rhetor’s 
argument, implicit or explicit, that an example is representative. As with conditions, the 
selection of representative examples can persuade an audience towards or away from a 
particular definition.  
Not all representative examples have the same relationship or function with 
respect to their term. Some represent what is typical for a term (typical examples), others 
a term’s ideals (ideal examples), some the worst of a term (nightmare examples), still 
others are simply those examples of a term that stand out most or are well-known to an 
audience (salient exemplars) (Lakoff, Political Mind 160-161). Doubtless, representative 
examples can serve other functions as well. Competing definitions may sometimes be a 
                                                 
128 Cf. Rosch, who uses the term prototype (35-36).   
129 Cicero calls this strategy “induction (inductione)”: “Induction (inductio) is a form of 
argument which leads the person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain 
undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval of a doubtful proposition 




matter of the selection of representative examples along with their construed relationship 
to the term and to each other.  
We find two examples of definition through representative examples in a 
nineteenth century epistolary debate over the right of women to preach. The debate, 
which originally transpired through the religious journal Church Advocate, is between 
Ellen Stewart, arguing for women’s right to preach, and William Johnston, arguing 
against this right (Donawerth 88, 92).130 In one letter, Johnston argues that the word 
preacher only extends to men because the Bible, both Old and New Testaments, only 
provides examples of male preachers; there are no biblical examples of female preachers 
(Stewart 172). He charges anyone to “shew from the Scriptures, that women were called 
to do the work of an evangelist, to make full proof of their ministry, to preach the word, 
and to study to shew themselves work-women that need not be ashamed, rightly dividing 
the word of the Lord” (Johnston qtd. in Stewart 173; italics original; boldface added). 
Since preaching the word is a necessary condition for being an evangelist, if a woman 
from the Bible were found to be an evangelist, she would be a preacher, and the term 
preacher could be extended to women, giving them the right to preach.  
In response to Johnston’s challenge, Stewart begins with a dictionary definition of 
evangelist: “Our dictionary says, the work of an evangelist is to instruct in the Gospel” 
(175).  With this definition, she is able to list several examples of women in the Bible 
who were evangelists because they instructed others in the Gospel: Anna, the woman of 
Samaria, Priscilla, and the women who “labored with [Paul] in the Gospel” (Stewart 
175). Although her means of defining preacher through examples takes multiple steps, by 
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placing the examples of these biblical women, the term evangelist, and the term preacher, 
in a series of definitional relationships, she makes the argument that the term preacher 
should be widened to include women, because there were in fact biblical examples of 
female preachers, contrary to Johnston’s claim. These examples, if accepted by her 
audience, have weight because they come from a source her audience would have held as 
authoritative, the Bible. Even though all representative examples are in a sense 
potentially authoritative, these examples in particular are authoritative examples because 
their ability to represent the term preacher comes from the authority of their source rather 
than their perceived typical or ideal nature. 
While the verbal form that a definition can take itself represents an available 
means of persuasion in the interpretive stasis of definition, there are other persuasive 
strategies that the rhetor may employ in this stasis that exist apart from the articulation of 
the definition of the term. I review a few of these strategies in the following section. 
  
The Topics of Usage and Effects 
The topics or strategies of persuasion in the interpretive stasis of definition can be 
divided into two categories: those topics concerning usages of the term in question and 
those concerning the effects of the proposed definition should it be adopted.  
 
Standards of Usage 
In the first camp, one major strategy involves linking the favored definition to its 
definition according to a privileged standard of usage and conversely contrasting a 




of rhetoric that an argument aimed at falsifying the opposing counsel’s definition “will be 
based on common belief when one considers how and in what connexion people are 
accustomed to use such a word in ordinary writing or speech” (De Inventione, 2.17.54). 
In this case, the audience, upon seeing a disconnect between the definition and how the 
word is ordinarily used, is more likely to reject the definition as false. Definitions that fall 
out of line with common usage are not only harder to grasp, but may be suspect because 
they go against common sense. They argue for an organization of the world that is not 
commonly shared. 
Ordinary usage, however, is not the only privileged standard of usage. 
Dictionaries, sacred texts, other languages, and even technical jargon can all be 
privileged standards of meaning depending on the rhetor’s audience. For example, in her 
nineteenth century pamphlet Female Ministry, a defense of women’s right to preach, 
Catherine Booth attacks standard interpretations of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35: “Let your 
women keep silence in the Churches, for it is not permitted unto them to speak: but they 
are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn 
anything, let them ask their husbands at home, for it is a shame for women to speak in the 
church” (King James Version).131 Booth’s argument rests on a redefinition of the word 
speak in contrast to how it is commonly understood. She grounds her definition in the 
original Greek behind the word speak, λαλεῖν, adducing the testimony of four Greek 
scholars: “We think that with the light cast on this text by the four eminent Greek 
scholars above quoted, there can be no doubt in any unprejudiced mind as to the true 
meaning of lalein in this connection” (Booth 9). With the original ancient Greek as a 
                                                 




standard of meaning, she argues that speak means “imprudent or ignorant talking” and 
that Paul was not commanding women to keep “absolute silence” but commanding them 
to refrain from “an improper kind of speaking” (Booth 7, 8). Returning to the original 
language may be a common rhetorical move in interpretive definitional disputes 
involving translated texts. 
The explicit privileging of one standard of usage always involves the rejection or 
demotion of another standard. As we saw in the opening example in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, common usage and understanding of the term trick was a particular 
problem for scientists seeking to manage the interpretation of one of the leaked e-mails in 
the climategate scandal. Recall that leading climatologist and proponent of anthropogenic 
global warming Phil Jones had written in a leaked private e-mail to a colleague, “I’ve just 
completed Mike’s Nature trick of adding in the real temps to each series for the last 20 
years (ie from 1981 onwards) amd [sic] from 1961 for Keith’s to hide the decline.” The 
quote is in reference to his treatment of some data that would be published next year as 
the famous “hockey-stick” diagram that shows a spike in global temperatures in the latter 
half of the 20th century. The spike is a result of Jones combining data from two different 
sources. The trick referred to this data combination.  
To many people, the term trick coupled with the phrase “hide the decline” 
suggested deception on the part of Jones. However, some scientists argued that, 
“Scientists often use the term ‘trick’ to refer to a ‘a [sic] good way to deal with a 
problem’, rather than something that is secret and so there is nothing problematic in this 
at all” (Schmidt et al.). Jones himself even tried to argue that he was using the term trick 




Office). In both cases, different standards of usage are privileged instead of the ordinary 
one taken for granted by many people in the public who read the line from the e-mail. It 




The strategies that constitute the second set of topics are not primarily concerned 
with the veracity of the definition, but with a definition’s consequences or effects. 
Rhetoricians have long recognized the importance of persuading an audience not only 
that a definition is “true” or “false,” but that it is beneficial or “harmful,” “expedient” or 
“inexpedient,” “honourable” or “dishonourable” ([Cicero] 2.12.17; Cicero, De Inventione 
2.17.54). Qualities like beneficence, expedience, and honorableness pertain not to the 
truth-value of a definition, but to a definition’s effects, upon being adopted, in the world. 
These real effects arise because definition is a means of structuring our perception of the 
world, and therefore our actions and relations in and to it. Audiences can be very aware 
of the relationship between definitions and their potential consequences, which can 
sometimes outweigh considerations of veracity. As Quintilian shrewdly advises, “A 
correct Definition will be assured if we first decide in our own mind what we want to 
effect; it will then be possible to suit the wording to our purpose” (7.3.21). 
The above topics of veracity and effects can be used separately or together in 
argument, depending on the desired outcome. But now I turn to the example that opened 






A Definitional Dispute over the Term Privileges or Immunities/Rights 
 The segment of the oral argument analyzed above, involving Gura, Ginsburg, and 
Scalia, represents a dispute over the conditions of a term, and disputing the conditions of 
a term is one way of disputing a term’s limits or scope. But rhetors can manipulate and 
dispute the scope of a term through either or both of a term’s conditions and 
representative examples. When used in conjunction, conditions and examples can refine 
and even refute each other. Ginsburg demonstrates this fact when she implores Gura to 
“clarify [his] conception of privileges and immunities,” to “tell…the dimensions of what 
it is,” asking him, “What unenumerated rights would we be declaring privileges and 
immunities under your conception of it?” (McDonald, Oral argument 5). Ginsburg asks 
Gura for (representative) examples of privileges and immunities given his definition of 
the term. Although Gura at first is reluctant to answer the question, protesting, “it’s 
impossible to give a full list of all the unenumerated rights that might be protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause,” under Ginsburg’s persistence he finally responds:  
If a right is, for example, the sort of right that was mentioned in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, the piece of legislation enacted by a supermajority of Congress, 
where the Congress said, over President Johnson’s veto, here are the rights of 
American citizenship, and they are—they listed: To make and enforce contracts; 
to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property. (McDonald, Oral argument 8-9) 
But Ginsburg questions the applicability of Gura’s representative examples, 




rights?” (McDonald, Oral Argument 9). Ginsburg continues this line of questioning 
noting that married women did not have some of the rights Gura lists (McDonald, Oral 
argument 9). In response, Gura replies that, “We understand certain rights better today 
than we did 140 years ago, and the fact that First Amendment rights weren’t fully 
respected, Second Amendment rights weren’t always respected, Fourth were not always 
understood well—” (McDonald, Oral argument 9-10). At this point he is cut off by 
Ginsburg who returns to his original sufficient condition and questions its validity, thus 
provoking the dispute that opened this chapter. For Ginsburg, Gura’s examples invalidate 
his definition of privileges or immunities/rights, that is his original defining sufficient 
condition, because these rights were not universally applied. Therefore, the recognition of 
a right by the American government at a particular time, or any free society for that 
matter, is an insufficient test for determining the fundamentality of a right for inclusion 
among the privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth Amendment. The faulty 
representative examples bring into question the sufficient condition that allowed them in 
the first place. 
Another example of a dispute over representative examples can be found in 
Gura’s rebuttal during the last three minutes of oral argument. (Gura had saved three 
minutes of time allotted to his beginning oral argument in order to make a rebuttal at the 
end of oral arguments after the other two lawyers had stood and argued before the 
Justices.) During the rebuttal, Justice Kennedy puts a question similar to Ginsburg’s 
before Gura: “…what are examples of privileges and immunities that are being denied by 
the States that—which denial would be remedied by following your proposal to overrule 




the available examples are restricted: only privileges and immunities currently being 
denied U.S. citizens are on the table. Besides the Second Amendment, which Kennedy 
says to leave out, Gura and Kennedy come up with jury trial in civil cases and grand jury 
(McDonald, Oral argument 62). Gura concludes that since “Those are the only two 
provision of the Bill of Rights that have not been held incorporated under due 
process…perhaps we should have the Second Amendment incorporated. There’s no 
reason to treat it any differently” (McDonald, Oral argument 62). 
While Gura sees the paucity of remaining unincorporated Bill of Rights 
guarantees as a signal that the Second Amendment should be incorporated, Ginsburg 
does not seem so sure. Ginsburg suggests that incorporating the rights to a jury trial in 
civil cases and grand jury would be inefficient, an argument from effect, specifically 
expedience (McDonald, Oral argument 62-63).  Gura retorts that, “it’s not just what 
we’re saying; it’s what the framers of the Constitution said. …the right to a jury trial, for 
example, may not be efficient, but it is free” (McDonald, Oral argument 63). While Gura 
sees the number of examples as reason to incorporate the Second Amendment, Ginsburg 
suggests that their inefficient application at the state level may imply similar 
inefficiencies in regards to the Second Amendment. The qualities of representative 
examples, which determine the scope of a term, can be used not only to test whether a 
potential example should be included or excluded as a case but also to confirm or negate 
the definition in question. In this case, Gura sees these two examples as reasons to 
confirm his definition of privileges or immunities/rights, as fundamental to American 




Amendment. Ginsburg’s response suggests that these examples cast doubt on whether 
that definition should be adopted.   
Kennedy’s initial question in this exchange demonstrates that even the pool of 
available examples is a matter of construal on the part of the disputants. Restricting the 
available examples to those rights currently being denied U.S. citizens affects the 
character of those examples.  In this case, current examples of rights being denied U.S. 
citizens, at least with respect to those that are culled from the Bill of Rights, are few in 
number and possibly cumbersome in application. We also see the role that power has to 
play in disputation, as Gura had little control over this restriction but still must build his 
argument around the parameters provided to him.  
Lastly, I turn to a discussion concerning the effects of definition. Gura, in arguing 
for a redefinition of privileges or immunities to include the right to bear arms, calls for 
the Slaughterhouse Cases to be overturned, stating that, “the Slaughter-House Cases 
should not have any stare decisis effect before the Court. The Court has always found that 
when a case is extremely wrong, when there is a great consensus that it was simply not 
decided correctly, especially in a constitutional matter, it has less force” (McDonald, Oral 
argument 4). To this charge Justice Sonya Sotomayor retorts: “What injustice has been 
caused by it that we have to remedy? Meaning States have relied on having no grand 
juries; states have relied on not having civil trials in certain money cases; they have relied 
on regulating the use of firearms based on us, the Court, not incorporating the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in the way that you identify it” (McDonald, Oral argument 4). She 
continues, “What—in which ways has ordered liberty been badly affected?” (McDonald, 




In essence, Sotomayor asks Gura to provide arguments from effect to support his 
argument that the definition of privileges or immunities should be changed. But Gura 
refuses to list the effects of the current legally recognized definition of privileges or 
immunities: “Justice Sotomayor, States may have grown accustomed to violating the 
rights of American citizens, but that does not bootstrap those violations into something 
that is constitutional” (McDonald, Oral argument 5). Gura, instead of entering a dispute 
over effects, simply maintains that the current definition is false, that is unconstitutional. 
He demonstrates that, while appealing to the effects of a definition can be a very 
persuasive move, rhetors may sometimes refuse to make such appeals on principle.132  
Sometimes such refusals can even be persuasive.    
 
Primary versus Secondary Stases 
 This example demonstrates how the stases, interpretive and situational, interact in 
human communication. The principal stasis is one of situational definition: is the right to 
bear arms a fundamental right of private U.S. citizens? Gura decided to approach this 
question by arguing for the inclusion of the right to bear arms as one of the privileges or 
immunities of the 14th Amendment. In order to make this argument, he needed to redefine 
the term privileges or immunities in the 14th Amendment, a question of interpretive 
definition. In this way, arguments in the interpretive stasis of definition worked to serve a 
larger rhetorical goal in the situational stases of definition.  
                                                 
132 As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe, “…it must not be overlooked that the 
orator is nearly always at liberty to give up persuading an audience when he cannot 
persuade it effectively except by the use of methods that are repugnant to him. It should 
not be thought, where argument is concerned, that it is always honorable to succeed in 




 In the end, the Court rejected Gura’s arguments for redefining privileges or 
immunities and his approach to incorporation through the privileges or immunities clause 
(McDonald, Opinion 10). Part of the problem may have been Gura’s inability to 
satisfactorily outline the limits of the term. As Justice Alito observed in the opinion, 
“…petitioners are unable to identify the [privileges or immunities] Clause’s full scope” 
(McDonald, Opinion 10). Instead, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, incorporated the right to 
bear arms through the due process clause, an interpretive move of assimilation, following 
precedent with respect to other portions of the Bill of Rights (44). (The argument for 
incorporation through the Due Process Clause came from Paul D. Clement, another 
lawyer arguing in support of the plaintiffs, on behalf of the National Rifle Association.)  
 In light of this outcome, perhaps we might agree with the sentiment expressed by 
fifth century encyclopedist Martianus Capella: “The principal [situational] issues are 
separate and distinguished from these legal [interpretive] questions, and these latter are 
termed incidental issues, while those which give rise to the lawsuit are more correctly 
called the issues or fundamentals” (466). As McDonald illustrates, while certain conflicts 
may revolve around texts, these textual issues are at times debated in order to answer 
non-textual questions. In these cases, the non-textual or situational questions are primary, 
and the textual or interpretive questions are secondary.  
 Yet we do not want to extend Capella’s idea too far. The oral argument from 
McDonald also demonstrates just how crucial questions of interpretation can be in 
contexts in which answers, results, or reasoning must be, or are more persuasive if they 
are, textually grounded. Sometimes there is no escaping an interpretive dispute except to 




answer to the question of whether to apply the Second Amendment to the fifty states in 
the Constitutional text, but had two passages at their disposal to do so. And even though 
they chose the route of assimilating the Second Amendment by way of the due process 
clause, the question of the definition of privileges or immunities remains open to future 
dispute, even though the Justices declined to answer it for the time being. If the term were 
redefined, the decision would have significant consequences for U.S. citizens. While it is 
important to recognize the relationship between the situational and interpretive stases, we 
should not think the interpretive stases merely peripheral. Questions of an interpretive 


















Chapter 6: Assimilation 
 Abraham Lincoln stirs the national imagination perhaps like no other president. 
According to polls, the sixteenth president of the United States consistently ranks as one 
of the public’s most revered commanders-in-chief (Newport). Yet in recent years, his 
legacy and personal life have come under closer scrutiny, as scholars and laypersons alike 
have attempted to uncover the Lincoln behind the iconic image. A few major points of 
investigation have revolved around such questions as: Was Lincoln a racist? What were 
his religious beliefs? Was he, as secessionists believed, a dictator (Boritt vii)? 
Besides these questions, another source of contention has concerned Lincoln’s 
sexuality. While speculation on this subject is not new,133 public interest seems to have 
especially grown around the turn of the twenty-first century. One notable example of the 
public energy around this issue is the media attention given to gay rights activist Larry 
Kramer’s claim in a 1999 speech at an LGBT conference that Lincoln “was a gay man 
and a totally gay man” (qtd. in Lloyd; Kalk).134 The rise in public interest seems to have 
paralleled and even in some cases influenced critical attention to this issue, as scholars 
subsequently began to seriously consider the question in published works igniting a 
historical debate over whether or not Lincoln was gay. At stake is not only Lincoln’s 
image in the nation’s collective memory but also the social and legal status of members 
of the LGBT community, which a gay Lincoln would undoubtedly bolster (see Morris 
103).  
                                                 
133 For example, Shively who declared Lincoln a homosexual as early as 1989 (71-90).  
134 As other evidence, historian David Donald notes that during his 1995-1996 publicity 
tour for his biography of Lincoln, the most frequent question he received concerned 




Scholars in this debate have paid especially close attention to Lincoln’s 
relationship with one of his most intimate associates, Joshua Speed, Springfield, Illinois 
store owner and member of the Kentucky elite. Although much about their relationship is 
contested, scholars seem to generally agree on the following key points: Lincoln and 
Speed met for the first time on April 15, 1837, at the shop that Speed owned; Lincoln 
attempted to buy furnishings for a bed from Speed on credit; being moved by Lincoln’s 
circumstances and melancholy state, Speed offered Lincoln to share with him his own 
bed for free; and finally that the two men shared the same bed for the next four years.135 
Lincoln scholars seem to generally agree that bed sharing between men was not 
uncommon in the nineteenth century;136 thus, Lincoln and Speed’s sleeping arrangement 
alone does not offer indisputable evidence that there was a romantic-sexual relationship 
between them. Scholars, therefore, have turned to written testimonies from those 
acquainted with the two men as well as letters Lincoln sent to Speed to reconstruct their 
relationship. Thus, the historical question concerning Lincoln’s sexuality rests largely on 
the documentary evidence from the time. The interpretation of these documents, 
however, is hotly contested.  
One of these contested documents is a letter Lincoln wrote to Speed on February 
25, 1842. Speed had married Fanny Henning on the 15th of that month and afterwards 
related to Lincoln how the wedding night went.137 Lincoln’s response includes the 
following: “I opened the latter [letter of the 16th], with intense anxiety and trepidation—
                                                 
135 Donald 29-32; Katz 3; Strozier 54-56; Wilson 172-173. Tripp however has doubts 
about some of the usually accepted details of the story, which are based on Speed’s 
account (126). 
136 Donald 36; Katz 6; Strozier 56-57; Tripp 128. 




so much, that although it [the wedding night] turned out better than I expected, I have 
hardly yet, at the distance of ten hours, become calm” (Lincoln 90). 
In his study of Lincoln’s closest male companions, “We Are Lincoln Men”: 
Abraham Lincoln and His Friends, historian David Herbert Donald interprets Lincoln’s 
response in this letter as excitement for his friend Speed, grounded in their shared 
heterosexuality: “Having feared the worst, Lincoln was delighted that the letter—and 
presumably the wedding—‘turned out better than I expected’” (50). According to 
Donald, this letter along with others “stemmed from his desire to comfort and encourage 
his closest friend, but they also had another purpose” (50). Because of his own pending 
marriage with Mary Todd, Lincoln wanted to know “how Speed’s marriage was working 
out” (Donald 50). Thus, Donald firmly places Lincoln’s response to Speed within a frame 
of shared heterosexual desire, feeling, and interest. 
C. A. Tripp, on the other hand, in his book-length study of Lincoln’s sexuality, 
The Intimate World of Abraham Lincoln, interprets Lincoln’s response to the news about 
Speed’s wedding night as a clear indication of his homosexual feelings towards Speed:  
This is perhaps the clearest ‘smoking gun’ in the Lincoln-Speed correspondence. 
Had Lincoln been merely a close friend he would of course have reveled in the 
good news of a wedding night that ‘turned out better than I expected.’ Instead, he 
suffered a major anxiety attack that had hardly let up ‘at a distance of ten hours.’ 
One hears in this the loud bang of a traumatic blow, if not of an outright tragedy, 
not because Lincoln wished Speed any ill luck, but because he saw, or thought he 




Against the argument that this letter simply expresses deep platonic feeling, Tripp argues 
that Lincoln’s letter indicates “a traumatic blow” to his romantic relationship with Speed.  
In trying to ferret out the nature of Lincoln’s relationship with Speed from this 
letter, both of these interpretations attempt to elicit something from the text that the text 
itself does not explicitly state. They attempt to “read between the lines” to determine 
facts about Lincoln’s sexuality and his relationship with Speed that Lincoln himself never 
articulates. Indeed, because terms and even concepts of sexuality, such as homo- and 
heterosexuality, did not exist, or at least as they do now, in his time, we would not expect 
to find a definitive statement of Lincoln’s sexuality in any of his letters or contemporary 
testimony.  
Thus, this disagreement lies not in what is written, but in what can be inferred 
from what is written. Neither scholar negates the text, as in a letter versus spirit dispute. 
Rather, both go beyond it, attempting to pull out information only perhaps hinted at in the 
text. Manuals from the rhetorical tradition classify such arguments under the interpretive 
stasis heading of assimilation (ratiocinatio). The following sections of this chapter 
explore the distinctive qualities of the stasis of assimilation, the exigence or precipitating 
circumstances for arguments or disputes in this stasis, types of assimilation disputes, the 
kind of argumentation particular to this stasis and one natural consequence of this kind of 
argumentation, specific argumentative strategies available to arguers in this stasis, and 
finally a closer examination of the historical debate over Lincoln’s sexuality before 
broader conclusions about the stasis of assimilation are drawn.  
 




In assimilation, arguers infer or work to prevent the inference of a particular 
meaning from a text that goes beyond its letter, its agreed upon apparent meaning.138 As 
Martianus Capella explains, “we draw something that is not in writing by argument from 
what is in writing” (5.465). This definition sounds quite similar to the kinds of arguments 
made in regards to spirit in letter versus spirit disputes. However, while assimilation and 
letter versus spirit share some commonalities, they diverge in important ways.139  
In both stases, a dispute arises because the parties in the dispute disagree on the 
value of the letter of the text. In letter versus spirit, the letter is either affirmed as fully 
encapsulating the meaning of the text or negated as an insufficient or even negative 
indicator of the text’s meaning, with an alternative interpretation based on alternative 
(contextual) sources. In assimilation, on the other hand, both parties affirm the letter of 
the text, but at least one side uses the letter as a springboard for inferences into additional 
meanings while the other side argues against these inferences either by pointing to the 
letter of the text or offering competing inferences.140  
Consider the following classical rhetorical example from Hermogenes: “It is 
illegal to ridicule anyone by name in comedy; someone introduces characters in a 
comedy with identifiable masks, and is brought to trial under the law as having ridiculed 
by name in comedy” (88). In this example, Hermogenes describes an ancient law similar 
to modern day laws proscribing libel. Here the law explicitly prohibits comedic 
playwrights from defaming anyone by name. In the case brought to trial, a playwright has 
used no names but had the actors wear recognizable masks. Both sides affirm the letter of 
                                                 
138 See Chapter 2 for a more thorough discussion of letter. 
139 The following discussion is based on Quintilian 7.8.1-2. 




the law, but the defense argues against the law’s extension to recognizable masks, saying 
that the masks did not violate the law, which only prohibits ridicule by name, while the 
prosecution argues an assimilation: that there is no difference between using recognizable 
masks and using names.  
A further distinction between letter versus spirit and assimilation is that in 
assimilation not just one but both sides may use the spirit of the text, as they interpret it, 
to support their arguments, especially if both sides are offering competing inferences.141 
In the example from Hermogenes, both sides may appeal to the legislator’s intent (spirit). 
The prosecutor may argue that the legislator intended to outlaw all slander, while the 
defense may argue that the legislator only intended to outlaw the record of explicit 
slander (88-89). While arguments in support of letter in letter versus spirit disputes can 
involve appeals to authorial intent, these appeals confirm what is evident in the text. But 
in assimilation, appeals to authorial intent in support of letter make a supposition that the 
text alone cannot sustain: that the author wanted to limit the meaning and application of 
the text to what is evident in the text. In letter versus spirit, the defender of letter does not 
place such limitations on the application and interpretation of the text. One can always 
build on the letter as long as one does not negate it.   
Finally, in assimilation, the ultimate question facing the disputants is whether the 
inferences presented can be supported. The jurors in Hermogenes’s example must answer 
the question: is using identifiable masks the same as using names? 
 
Exigence 
                                                 





What motivating circumstances, or exigence, encourage arguers to assimilate a 
text in the first place? One exigence is the absence of an available text that explicitly 
addresses the situation or issue at hand.142 This kind of exigence can only occur when 
arguers are confined to a closed body of texts or passages for grounding their arguments, 
as in law and many religious disputes.143 Thus, when an arguer advances an assimilation 
in this context, the working premises are 1) that no available text explicitly addresses the 
present concern and 2) that the appropriate response is to assimilate an existing text from 
the sanctioned corpus. However, a fellow disputant may reject either of these premises 
causing the dispute to fall back onto preliminary questions of interpretation, thus entering 
the stasis of jurisdiction (Quintilian 7.8.7; Julius Victor 3.15). Should the disputants 
together reject the first premise, the dispute will move into one of the remaining four 
interpretive stases. Should the disputants together accept the first premise but reject the 
second premise, the dispute will be asystatic within the framework of the interpretive 
stases, as there will be no text in which the arguers can ground their arguments and judge 
the situation. Both premises must be accepted for an argument or dispute in assimilation 
to proceed. 
                                                 
142 Many of the definitions of assimilation recorded in Western rhetorical treatises assume 
this situation because their primary reference frame was the law. The description found in 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium is representative: “The controversy is based on Analogy 
(ratiocinatione) when a matter that arises for adjudication lacks a specifically applicable 
law, but an analogy is sought from other existing laws on the basis of a certain similarity 
to the matter in question” ([Cicero] 1.13.23). Cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.50.148; 
Cassiodorus (2.2.6); Melanchthon (164); Fortunatianus (1.25); Julius Victor (3.15); 
Hermogenes (40). 
143 In the case of Erasmus, the Christian Bible: “Reasoning (ratiocinatio) also occurs 
when no scripture offers a clear definition of the subject in question and instead God’s 




The Supreme Court encountered the exigence of the absence of an available text 
in one of its most divisive decisions ever, Roe v. Wade. The Constitution, the Court’s 
closed textual corpus for adjudicating legal disputes, nowhere explicitly addresses the 
issue of abortion. Thus, the Court, in ruling 7-2 that women have a constitutional right to 
abortion, had to extend existing law. The Court grounded its ruling in previous extensions 
of the Constitution, in which previous decisions determined that, although nowhere 
explicit, the Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens “a right of personal privacy, or 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy” (Roe v. Wade, Opinion 152-153). With 
this interpretation of certain passages of the Constitution, the Court then extended the 
right to privacy to include women’s right to abortion:144 “This right of privacy, whether it 
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restriction 
upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court145 determined, in the Ninth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not terminate her pregnancy” (Roe v. Wade, Opinion 153). 
Of course, it is this act of interpretive extension that many who oppose abortion argue 
invalidates the ruling.  
It would seem that the exigence of textual absence can put pressure on arguers to 
advance assimilations and can even be used as a line of argument. Authoritative texts 
must continually be adapted to address the constantly changing issues and concerns of 
                                                 
144 See discussion of assimilation creep below. 
145 The District Court of the Northern District Texas, which first heard the case, had ruled 
in Roe’s favor for her and other women’s right to abortion, but granted only declaratory 
relief, thereby merely determining that women had a right to abortion, rather than 
injunctive relief, which would have prohibited further violations of this right. Both parties 




those whose lives they govern.146 The lack of an available text or passage that explicitly 
addresses a new issue or circumstance can encourage arguers to make assimilations in 
order to maintain the comprehensiveness of their authoritative texts.  
But a text can also be extended without the classic exigence of textual absence. 
Another motivation for assimilating a text is to confer particular value, significance, or 
meaning to a situation or issue that it would otherwise not have. While argues can choose 
any text, including texts that explicitly address the situation or issue at hand, sometimes 
assimilating a text whose connections to the situation or issue can only be inferred seems 
more advantageous. A good example of an assimilation motivated by this kind of 
exigence can be found in Ronald Reagan’s 1985 “Radio Address to the Nation on Civil 
Rights.” In this address, Reagan used part of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” 
speech to support his administration’s general campaign against the use of quotas in 
affirmative action:  
Twenty-two years ago Martin Luther King proclaimed his dream of a society rid 
of discrimination and prejudice, a society where people would be judged by the 
content of their character, not by the color of their skin. That’s the vision our 
entire administration is committed [to—a] society that keeps faith with the 
promise of our Declaration of Independence, a proud society in which all men and 
women truly are created free and equal under God. (Reagan) 
At the time some saw Regan’s opposition to quotas as part of his larger opposition to the 
civil rights of minorities (Overbea; Raines). Although King did not address the issue of 
                                                 
146 The process of adaptation does not have to be through assimilation and can even 





affirmative action in his original speech, Reagan, by using King’s message of hope about 
future racial equality, with a near direct quote, as a premise of his opposition to quotas, is 
able to argue that his position is in line with King’s dream.   
While the corpus of texts is not closed in this type of exigence, the selection of the 
assimilated text is still paramount. Whatever text the arguer chooses to assimilate must be 
known, valued, and otherwise authoritative to the audience. If not, the assimilation will 
have little argumentative value.  
 
Types of Assimilation 
Assimilation Disputes over the Letter of the Text 
 Both Quintilian and Julius Victor observe that arguments in the stasis of 
assimilation can be divided into two main varieties, with Quintilian making the partition 
along the dividing line of letter versus spirit. Assimilation disputes that hinge on the 
letter of the text arise because the text’s agreed upon apparent meaning, which is 
understood as its exact verbal formulation, does not explicitly prescribe the requirements 
for interpreting its meaning beyond the circumstances of its initial uttering (Quintilian 
7.8.3). Thus, the central question is “whether there be enough provision” in the text itself 
for further interpretations (Julius Victor 3.15). Any inference derived from the text 
beyond its explicit prescriptions for its interpretation is an assimilation, and when 
acknowledged or drawn into question constitutes an assimilation argument or dispute. All 
sides in disputes of this kind rely on the letter of the text to support their assimilative 
interpretations (Quintilian 7.8.5-6). The text in this sense is ambiguous as arguers elicit 




under the stasis of ambiguity because in ambiguity arguers contest a verbal form that is 
present in the text, while in assimilation these disputes arise because of the lack of a 
verbal form in a text. As Quintilian explains, the arguer “deduces something which is 
uncertain from the Letter of the law” (7.8.3).  
A number of questions can arise revolving around a text’s lack of explicit 
prescriptions or instructions for interpreting additional meaning from it beyond the initial 
circumstances of its uttering, including:  
 1) Does a text apply once or more than once (Quintilian 7.8.3)? In other words, is 
a text limited to one application in time or does its application persist across time? 
Quintilian provides a poignant example, which we find in a similar and more detailed 
form in Seneca’s Controversiae. According to the given law, “An unchaste woman shall 
be thrown from the rock” (Seneca 1.3). In examples offered in both Quintilian and 
Seneca, the convicted woman is thrown off a rock but survives (Quintilian 7.8.3; Seneca 
1.3). The question then is should she be thrown off the rock again, and again and again, 
until she dies? Or has her punishment already been satisfied? 
 2) Does a text apply to a single, specific event or situation or can it apply to 
multiple events or situations of the same kind (Quintilian 7.8.3)? At first, this question 
may seem to restate the first one, but, as Quintilian points out with an example, one could 
have a scenario where several events of the same kind occur simultaneously (Quintilian 
7.8.3). Along these lines, Francis Wayland, a prominent Baptist antislavery moderate in 
the antebellum period,147 argues against a defense of U.S. slavery grounded in its 
apparent sanction in the Hebrew Scriptures: “It is therefore clear, that a practice may 
                                                 




have been sanctioned to the Hebrews, which is not sanctioned to all men at all times…” 
(Fuller and Wayland 57). For Wayland, the Bible’s putative sanctioning of slavery only 
applied to the ancient slavery of the Hebrews. However, no doubt recognizing the 
potential failure of his argument to persuade proponents of slavery, he offers the 
following apparent concession:  
Suppose this proposition, that whatever was sanctioned to the Hebrews is 
sanctioned to all men at all times, be granted, I do not see in what manner it could 
justify slavery in the United States. It is, I presume, conceded, that a permission of 
this kind is to be understood according to the utmost strictness of application. If 
slavery be justified by the law of Moses, it is of course, only justified in the 
manner and with the restrictions under which it was placed by that. (Fuller and 
Wayland 58; emphasis original) 
Here Wayland allows for the biblical sanction of slavery to extend beyond ancient Israel, 
but only if the slavery practiced is of the same kind as that which is permitted in the 
Bible. Of course, he admits no such similarity between the biblical and U.S. practice of 
slavery (Fuller and Wayland 59). 
3) Can a text apply any time or should certain changes in circumstances or 
intervening events be taken into account (Quintilian 7.8.5)? This question assumes an 
answer to the first question—that the text’s application persists across time—but 
questions the circumstantial conditions for a text’s application. This question represents a 
serious point of contention for contemporary Christians with respect to two verses in 
Leviticus that some have argued condemn all male homosexual relations and behavior: 




and the similar Leviticus 20:13.148 In his book Jesus, the Bible, and Homosexuality, Jack 
Rogers suggests that these two verses are concerned with “[r]itual purity,” which “was 
considered necessary to distinguish the Israelites from their pagan neighbors” (69). 
However, he argues that the coming of Christ changes their applicability: “When we see 
Jesus as the fulfillment of the law (Matt. 5:17), we understand that our challenge is not 
meticulously to maintain culturally conditioned laws, but rather, with Jesus, to love God 
and love our neighbor (Matt. 22:36-40)” (Rogers 73). For Rogers, Jesus’ life and example 
are the turning event that negates the subsequent application of the Leviticus prohibitions 
against homosexuality.   
4) The last two questions, which Quintilian treats separately, involve how texts 
apply to parts and wholes: Does a text that applies to the whole apply to the part? And 
does a text that applies to the part apply to the whole (7.8.4)? These are questions of 
transferability. Even though the text only asserts that it applies to a specific object, can 
the text then be argued to apply to the larger whole that the object belongs to? Or a 
smaller discrete part that belongs to the object? The direction of transfer in the first case 
is centrifugal. Quintilian gives the following example: It is forbidden to export wool from 
Tarentum [a place that was famous for its wool];149 he has exported sheep.” Is it illegal to 
export sheep, since wool is made from their fur? The direction of transfer in the second 
case is centripetal. Quintilian provides this example: “‘It is forbidden to accept a plough 
as a pledge; he has accepted a ploughshare150’” (7.8.4). As Quintilian’s translator Donald 
Russell explains, “Security for a loan had to be given in such a way as not to advantage 
                                                 
148 Leviticus 20:13: “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have 
committed an abomination; they shall be put to death; their blood is upon them.”  
149 Quintilian 278n6. 




the creditor (who must not appropriate the articles deposited with him) or ruin the debtor 
(as the removal of an essential tool of his trade—plough or ploughshrae for example—
would do)” (Quintilian 278n5). Does the ploughshare constitute such an essential part of 
the plough to therefore have the same law applied to it? 
 
Assimilation Disputes over the Spirit of the Text 
In assimilation disputes over the spirit of the text, the question of assimilation 
hinges not on a text’s internal prescription for its own application, but on the kinds of 
situations and issues a text can be applied to that are not explicitly referenced in the text 
(Quintilian 7.8.6). In essence, one argues that a text should or should not be applied to a 
new kind of situation or issue based on the likeness between the situation presented in the 
text and the situation in question. Such an argument rests on the preliminary question of 
whether there is an approximate text to fit the situation (for those working within a 
governing, closed body of texts), and if so, whether the text is similar enough to the 
situation to warrant its application (for both open and closed bodies of texts) ([Cicero] 
2.12.18; Quintilian 7.8.7). According to ancient rhetorical manuals, disputants can take a 
number of approaches to argue for an approximate text’s application, each based on 
showing how key elements and relationships in the textual and non textual situations are 
in some way alike. These approaches, specific lines of argument, are discussed in detail 
below in the section on the particular strategies of persuasion in this stasis available to the 
arguer. 
Before assimilating a text according to its spirit, disputants working within a 




tacitly, the question of whether a text that references an issue or situation like the one in 
question can be used when no other text appears to apply (Quintilian 7.8.7; Julius Victor 
3.15). The answer may be no, that we should only follow what is stated in the available 
texts. The answer may be yes, that we should always find a similar text to apply to a 
situation not currently covered in the available texts. Or the answer may be sometimes, 
that sometimes we should only follow what is explicitly stated in the available texts, and 
that sometimes we should follow an approximate text when nothing explicit can be found 
in the available texts. The heuristic for determining when to follow an available text and 
when to apply an approximate text can be principled and explicit, or ad hoc depending on 
the situation.  
If all parties agree in the negative to this question, then the controversy ends and 
falls out of stasis. If the parties disagree (both yes and no or sometimes), the controversy 
continues but within the stasis of jurisdiction (see Chapter 7). If the parties agree in the 
affirmative, or if the parties agree to a more nuanced answer (sometimes),151 then the 
controversy proceeds as an assimilation dispute over the spirit of the text. 
 
Analogical Reasoning about Texts 
The Classic Case: Textual Extension 
 As the most common Latin term for this stasis, ratiocinatio, suggests, assimilating 
a text involves analogical reasoning. Classically,152 assimilation involves extending a text 
                                                 
151 The answer of sometimes can also lead to a dispute in the stasis of jurisdiction, as 
arguers wrangle over which approximate texts can be applied when or which situations 
demand textual governance.  
152 That is, considering the definitions and examples given in the ancient rhetorical 




to a new situation, or kind of situation, or case. In order to argue that a text should be 
applied to a new situation, an arguer must draw parallels between key relations among 
elements in the situation described in the text and the situation in question.  
 Abolitionist Henry Highland Garnet illustrates the classic assimilation argument 
in his February 12, 1865 sermon to the U.S. House of Representatives, the first ever 
preached to the House by a black person.153  Preaching near the end of the Civil War, 
after the Emancipation Proclamation had been issued but before slavery had been 
constitutionally outlawed,154 Garnet draws parallels between the religious legalism 
decried by Jesus in the New Testament and contemporary American slavery. His text is 
Matthew 23:4:155 “For they [the Scribes and Pharisees] bind heavy burdens, and grievous 
to be borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders, but they themselves will not move them 
with one of their fingers” (qtd. in Ofari 187).156 Garnet argues that contemporary 
lawmakers, including members of his audience, are “modern Scribes and Pharisees” who 
like their “prototypes” know what is right and just according to the law and God, but 
institute an unjust system of oppression by enslaving African Americans, just as the 
scribes and Pharisees of the New Testament instituted an oppressive code of religious 
legalism for the Jewish people to abide by (Garnet qtd. in Ofari 188).    
Textual extension, following analogical reasoning more generally, involves 
mapping relational structure157 (i.e. any relationship between objects) from the situation 
                                                 
153 Ofari 114. 
154 Ofari 115. 
155 Garnet refers to other verses from this chapter as well throughout his sermon. 
156 King James Version. 
157 As Macagno and Walton point out, analogical reasoning has been studied in modern 
times from two different perspectives: with respect to the relation between the terms used 




described in the text to the situation in question.158 The textual situation is the source 
domain, the system of objects providing the relational structure to be mapped, and the 
non-textual situation is the target domain, the system of objects upon which that structure 
is being mapped (Fauconnier, Mappings 102). In Garnet’s sermon, the source domain is 
the religious legalism of the scribes and Pharisees as described in the biblical text, and the 
target domain is contemporary American slavery. In some cases, the source and target 
domains can be the same as long as the objects are different (Fauconnier, Mappings 102). 
In these cases the systems of objects placed in analogical relationship can be seen as 
separate domains unto themselves, even if in fact they occupy the same conceptual space 
in the disputants’ minds. In any case, the distinction between domains cannot be taken for 
granted—for an assimilation dispute to take place participants must accept the distinction 
between the domains or agree on the criteria to establish them (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 393). 
 In analogical reasoning, the mapping of structure across domains is arguable 
based on parallel relations, or perhaps in the beginning resemblances between individual 
objects,159 that are taken to be “instances of a common, more abstract schema” 
                                                                                                                                                 
studies analogical reasoning with respect to the relation between terms because such 
relations better model the persuasive strategies at work in argument and perhaps even 
underlying mental processes. But the two perspectives need not be mutually exclusive, 
nor does one need to be discounted in favor of the other. 
158 See Gentner 156; Fauconnier, Mappings 102. Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 372-
373; Aristotle, Topica 4.4.15 “similar relation.” 
159 True analogical reasoning involves the mapping of relations, but resemblance between 
individual objects can “be the start of an analogy” (Gentner 161; Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 377, 397). Indeed, amplifying object similarities is one means of 
securing an assimilation (see “Making Explicit Connections” under “Strategies for 




(Fauconnier, Mappings 103; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 397).160 As Fauconnier 
explains, “The schema is a frame with roles that can be filled by elements161 of one or the 
other domain” (Mappings 103; emphasis original). Roles are autonomous, descriptive 
categories that can be mapped across domains (Hofstadter 547). In interpretive disputes, 
the criteria for determining the appropriate schema is largely determined by the issue at 
hand, though competing schemas can and do arise. In Garnet’s sermon, the abstract 
schema is perhaps best characterized as oppression by legislators. This schema also 
includes a number of roles including most obviously the role of the legislator or 
oppressor filled by the Scribes and Pharisees in the biblical text and U.S. lawmakers in 
Garnet’s own time. In a schema, some roles are more central than others, and an 
assimilation that fills these more central roles is stronger than one that only fills 
peripheral ones (Hofstadter 553, 555-556). The arguer will also want to select those roles 
that are most salient to the audience (Hofstadter 555). The most persuasive assimilations 
select schemas with roles that highlight aspects of the text and/or situation that the 
audience considers important and essential (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 390). It 
would seem that Garnet’s assimilation follows these guidelines, although one cannot say 
for sure without a more in-depth analysis of the prevailing understandings of his selected 
text at the time. However, the arguer need not name the roles being filled or make his 
analogical process explicit. Depending on the rhetorical situation, doing so may serve to 
strengthen or weaken the extension. Tactics for making explicit connections between 
                                                 
160 Note that I am not advancing an order of reasoning here, only the argumentative 
relationship between conceptual entities. A schema may arise in the process of 
assimilating a text, and not necessarily precede it. But the process of assimilation relies 
on some kind of bridge, however implicit or unconscious, between the text and the 
situation. 




elements in the same roles across textual and non-textual domains explicit can be found 
in the section below on strategies of argument for this stasis. 
 The schema, however, does more than warrant the mapping of structure from text 
to situation—it “specifies” that mapping (Fauconnier, Mappings 103). In other words, the 
specific relations mapped from the text to the situation are determined by whatever 
schema is selected to understand both.162 Thus, relations that better fit the schema will be 
favored in an assimilation over others (Gentner 163-164; cf. Macagno and Walton’s 
“genus,” 173). As the theory predicts, in Garnet’s sermon the parallel between the Jewish 
lay person/the Mosaic law and African American slaves/U.S. law is emphasized 
according to the schema of oppression by legislators, but the ethno-racial difference, or 
lack thereof, between the legislators and those under the law—the scribes and Pharisees 
are the same ethnicity as the Jewish lay people they oppress while white U.S. lawmakers 
oppress black people—is de-emphasized. Ill-fitting relations can be used to refute an 
assimilation.163   
While textual extension represents a form of analogical reasoning and 
argumentation, because it involves texts it has a couple of unique twists. In classic 
assimilation arguments, the source domain is encoded in a text from which structure is 
then mapped onto a non-textual target domain.164 In this way, the text gains a privileged 
status with respect to the situation in question. Further, while cross-domain structure 
mapping is what gives arguments in this stasis their basic form, the privileged status of 
                                                 
162 Cf. Gentner’s systematicity principle, 162-163. 
163 See tactics under “Contrast the Textual and Non-textual Situations” and “Taking an 
Assimilation to Its Logical Conclusions” under “Strategies for Supporting or Refuting 
Assimilations” below. 





the text affords particular lines of arguments, such as narrowing definitions of key terms 
in the text or appealing to authorial intent, that one does not necessarily see with 
analogical reasoning in other contexts. Thus, textual assimilation represents a unique 
form of analogical reasoning and argumentation with its own particular strategies for 
persuasion.  
 
The Non-Classic Case: Textual Extraction 
But assimilation, as it is treated here, includes not only the classic case of 
extending a text to address a new situation, but also the non-classic, but no less common, 
case of attempting to extract an implicit, hidden, or obscure meaning from a text, as in the 
controversy over Lincoln’s sexuality (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 383-384). Even 
though there is no situation onto which structure from the text is mapped, the arguer still 
makes use of analogical reasoning. Specifically, the link between the inferred meaning 
and what is explicit in the text is argued through analogy. But in these non-classic cases 
of assimilation, the direction of the mapping is reversed: structure is mapped from the 
domain of the inferred meaning onto the domain of the text. Yet the text maintains its 
privileged position as the proving ground for whatever implicit meaning is proposed. In 
the debate over Lincoln’s sexuality, scholars examine the textual evidence to see if any 
details of his life, when reconstructed, parallel modern conceptions of homo-, hetero-, or 
even bi-, sexuality, conceptions which probably did not inform Lincoln’s or his 
contemporaries’ thinking during his life. Thus, as scholars attempt to settle the question 




the textual clues to Lincoln’s life as found in the historical documents. We can see how, 
even in the non-classic case, the arguer still brings the text into his or her situation.  
In both kinds of cases, textual extension and textual extraction, the structure-
mapping process of assimilation brings together and associates the elements of the textual 
and non-textual situations such that the value of those elements changes (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 381, 382, 387, 397). Garnet’s association of nineteenth century U.S. 
lawmakers with biblical scribes and Pharisees revalues them from reputable legislators to 
hypocritical oppressors. In the controversy over Lincoln’s sexuality, the association of 
Lincoln with homosexuality could reduce the current stigma of LGBT people in 
contemporary U.S. society.  While the direction of the mapping differs in each kind of 
case, the outcome does not. The acceptance or rejection of an assimilation does not 
merely amount to a dis/agreement concerning the structural similarity of the textual and 
non-textual domains, but dis/agreement concerning the set of value changes affected by 
the assimilation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 390; cf. Hofstadter 602).  
 
Assimilation Creep 
 Like the term mission creep, the term assimilation creep indicates the tendency of 
an instance of assimilation to spawn further assimilations, either within the same domain 
or to closely related domains, a tendency that appears to be a feature of analogical 
reasoning more generally (Fauconnier, Mappings 104; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
385-386). One cause of assimilation creep is that, as a result of being assimilated, the 
meaning of the text is expanded. The text now applies to a class of situations or otherwise 




enables subsequent interpretations, including further assimilations, that are now more 
plausible given the text’s expanded meaning. The text has a wider range of immediate 
interpretive possibilities, covering and bordering more conceptual points and coming 
closer to still others. Situations or issues that may not have previously seemed within the 
text’s “interpretive range” now appear within argumentative reach. 
We can see assimilation creep at work in a recent ACLU (American Civil 
Liberties Union) amicus brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of the United States. The case 
involves a Hampton, Virginia, sheriff who, when running for reelection in 2009, fired a 
number of his employees for expressing support for his opponent, which included liking 
his opponent’s Facebook page. The employees sued, but lost their case in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in part because the Court ruled that 
liking a Facebook page was not protected speech under the First Amendment. The 
employees appealed. In support of the employees’ appeal, the ACLU in its brief argues 
that liking a page on Facebook is protected speech under the First Amendment. To 
support its claim, the civil liberties advocacy group cites previous applications of the First 
Amendment to non-verbal “symbolic” speech (ACLU 8). While the First Amendment 
expressly prohibits “abridging the freedom of speech,” the ACLU lists several cases in 
which the Courts have decided that the Amendment protects symbolic expressions or 
conduct, including the burning of the American flag, wearing military uniforms to 
criticize U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and sit-ins to protest racial segregation (U.S. 
Const. Amend. I; emphasis added; ACLU 8). None of the cited instances are primarily 
verbal in nature, but through analogy the Courts have decided that these instances are 




 As a result of the First Amendment being extended to these cases, the meaning of 
the First Amendment itself has been expanded. The phrase “abridging the freedom of 
speech” no longer simply includes verbal expressions, but also symbolic acts and 
conduct. The ACLU therefore uses this expanded meaning of the First Amendment to 
argue for the Constitutional protection of liking a Facebook page: “Even if the Court 
concludes that ‘Liking’ is not pure speech, it is surely constitutionally protected as 
symbolic expression” (ACLU 7).   
As this example illustrates, whenever a schema is abstracted in the process of 
assimilating a text, that schema governs the new meaning of the text. In the case above, 
as U.S. Courts broadened the scope of the kind of activity protected as “speech” by the 
First Amendment, an abstract schema of symbolic expression developed governing what 
could be protected. The ACLU is now trying to argue that liking a Facebook page, an 
electronic action, counts as symbolic expression, that it fits this agreed upon schema for 
interpreting and applying the text. Should the Fourth District Court accept the ACLU’s 
argument, it will extend the protection of the First Amendment to a new class of actions.    
The use of a text for particular purposes always has an effect on its meaning to 
varying degrees. Depending on how abstract the governing schema is for an assimilation, 
the text can be very flexible (see Fauconnier, Mappings 104-105). (The ACLU seems to 
be counting on the flexibility provided by the schema symbolic expression in its 
arguments.) Furthermore, additional, more abstract schemas can always be extracted 
(Fauconnier, Mappings 104; Hofstadter 559). Thus, when people sometimes object to the 
assimilation of a text because they are concerned that further, undesirable assimilations 




Indeed, an arguer can take advantage of the fact that an audience has accepted one 
assimilation of a text to demand its acceptance of a further assimilation based on the 
same schema (see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 386-387).  
The assimilation of a text, however, only makes further assimilations more 
possible and perhaps more argumentatively plausible. Assimilating a text never 
guarantees that a particular further assimilation will occur. Many other conditions must 
also be in place for a subsequent assimilation to be persuasive. While arguing for further 
assimilations of a text can strengthen the underlying schema governing the interpretation 
of the text, further assimilations can also undermine that schema (see Hofstadter 594-595; 
see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 386). Assimilating a text “too far” can actually 
confuse the meaning of the text in the audience’s mind (see Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 380, 398). Subsequent assimilations can pick up the meanings, associations, and 
even consequences of prior assimilations. Plus, the direction of further assimilations is 
not necessarily predictable. Different relational correspondences between the domains of 
the text and the situation or implicit meaning than those originally advanced can always 
be argued for, sometimes as the result of different schemas (see Fauconnier, Mappings 
104). This can lead not only to the alteration of the original assimilation but also its 
replacement. In any case, tracing how a text has been assimilated over time can prove 
very useful to scholars attempting to understand one way in which the meaning of a text 
evolves in a community. 
 
Strategies for Supporting or Refuting Assimilations 




Praising the Text 
 One of the primary issues an arguer faces when assimilating a text is persuading 
the audience of the text’s suitability for a new context. One helpful strategy for extending 
a text, according to Cicero, is to speak in “praise and support of the law which you quote” 
(De Inventione 2.50.150). Cicero in fact suggests that this tactic be taken up first (De 
Inventione 2.50.150). If audience members have negative or neutral feelings towards the 
text, they may be less receptive of the assimilation. But if they have positive feelings 
toward the text, they may be more inclined towards the assimilation. Any kind of appeal 
to the greatness or influence of a text or, by metonymy, of the text’s author is an example 
of this tactic. This strategy of course is not limited to this stasis, but only fitting texts are 
worthy of assimilation.  
  
Making Explicit Connections 
 Since arguments for extending a text rest on analogical reasoning, one important 
strategy involves explicitly drawing out for the audience the similarities between the 
“accepted principles” of text and the “circumstances” of the situation in question (Cicero, 
De Inventione 2.50.150).165 As stasis theory developed into the late antique period, a 
specific group of topics for making connections between the textual and non-textual 
situations were recognized and catalogued. These lines of arguments are based on 
equivalence, relative significance, opposition, and consequences, and are discussed in the 
following sections.166 
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166 Cf. Melanchthon’s commonplaces, which he say writes “[i]n this [stasis]…are very 





Equivalence. In equivalence-based arguments, one side argues that certain relevant 
elements in both the textual and non-textual situations are for all intents and purposes 
equivalent (Julius Victor 3.15; Martianus Capella 5.465; Fortunatianus 1.25). 
Fortunatianus gives an example in which the law stipulates that, “‘He who beats his 
father shall lose his hand’” (1.25). In the non-textual situation, “‘[a] man beat his mother 
and is sought for [the same] punishment’” (1.25). Here, we imagine that the prosecutor 
argues that the father in the text and the mother in the non-textual situation are equivalent 
in their status as parents and that the spirit of the law is to punish those who beat their 
parents. The gender of the parent is irrelevant. (Note that this is not a dispute in letter 
versus spirit because the prosecutor does not argue for the spirit against the letter, but 
argues for both the letter and the spirit.) The defense would need to mount an argument 
for the non-negligible relevance of gender.   
 
Greater/lesser.167 If the relevant elements in the textual and non-textual situations cannot 
be persuasively argued to be equal, one can either argue that accepting a text with greater 
weight compels one to accept the situation in question that somehow has lesser weight, or 
one can argue that since something holds in a lesser situation, here the textual situation, it 
holds even more in a situation with greater weight, here the non-textual situation 
                                                 
167 Cicero outlines four points by which similarity grounded in equality or degree of 
difference (greater/lesser) can be considered: quantity, quality, value, and relation to 
other things (Topica 18.68). Quantity involves any characteristic that can be compared 
numerically; quality involves those characteristics intrinsic to the form of the objects 
compared; value involves those characteristics attributed to the object by virtue of its 
acting in the world; and relation involves the static relationships between the object and 
other things in the world (Topica 18.69-70). All of these may be a matter of perception 




(Fortunatianus 1.25; Julius Victor 3.15).168 In the classical rhetorical example for arguing 
from greater to lesser, the law allows anyone to kill an exile who returns to his or her 
former state (Fortunatianus 1.25; Julius Victor 3.15; Martianus Capella 5.465). Someone 
finds, beats, but does not kill a returned exile, and is charged with unlawful punishment. 
The defense argues from greater to lesser that if it is permissible to kill a returned exile, 
then it must be permissible to beat one because it is a lesser punishment. The logic of the 
argument is that if one allows the more severe punishment, one must also grant the less 
severe punishment.  
But this reasoning can also work in reverse. Fortunatianus gives the following 
example: a law stipulates that “‘He who shields a fellow-soldier in the battle line, shall 
seek a reward’” (1.25). But in the case that is brought to trial, “‘[a] man shields the 
general, wishes to ask for a reward, and is refused’” (Fortunatianus 1.25). Here, we 
imagine that the man who shielded the general argued (unsuccessfully) from lesser to 
greater that if a man who protects a fellow-solider in the line of duty may ask for a 
reward, so much more should a man who protects the leader of his fellow soldiers. 
Fortunatianus, however, provides no information as to why the man was refused.  In 
general, those opposed to greater to lesser or lesser to greater arguments assert that the 
letter of the text must be followed, perhaps by refuting the greater/lesser relationship 
drawn by arguing that the original relations outlined in the text are perfectly matched, or 
that there are other (external) reasons (e.g. consequences) for adhering to the letter. 
 
                                                 




Opposites. Another ground for drawing a similarity between a textual and non-textual 
situation is opposition (Martianus Capella 5.465; Fortunatianus 1.25; Julius Victor 
3.15).169 If a certain set of variables leads to a certain set of conclusions in the text, then, 
should the opposite of those variables exist in the non-textual situation, following the 
logic of the text, one can argue that the opposite conclusions should hold.170 Martianus 
Capella gives an example in which the law mandates that a “brave man,” presumably one 
whose actions in battle have been especially noteworthy, “deserves a reward” (5.465). 
Should a prosecutor, however, wish to bring a “deserter” to trial, but have no specific law 
under which to try such a soldier, he or she could reason that since a “deserter” is 
contrary to a “brave man,” the “deserter” deserves the opposite of what a “brave man” 
deserves: a “penalty” (5.465). The specifications of the penalty could be argued in the 
same way, if the law stipulated certain rewards for certain kinds of “brave” deeds.     
 
Consequences. Ancient rhetorical treatises also noted that an assimilation could be made 
based on consequences (Martianus Capella 5.465; Fortunatianus 1.25). That is, if the 
result or conclusion in the text and the situation could be shown to be the same, then an 
analogy could be drawn between the causes of the results when those causes were 
different. Thus, one argues that whatever applies to the cause in the text should also apply 
to the cause in the non-textual situation.  
                                                 
169 The phrase for this topic in the treatises is a contrario, but assuming they are 
following the tradition of topics found in Cicero and Aristotle, this topic probably does 
not strictly refer to arguments based on contraries but to arguments based on opposites 
more broadly defined.  




We find an example of this line of argument in a 1960 speech to the Nashville 
Christian Leadership Council by white civil rights activist Everett Tilson (Houck and 
Dixon 362-363). With a series of assimilations, Tilson argues that racial segregation 
violates the Ten Commandments. His argument concerning the ninth commandment, 
which prohibits bearing false witness against one’s neighbor, is specifically based on 
consequence. After giving a number of examples of how segregation results in bearing 
false witness against both whites and blacks, Tilson concludes: “Segregation has betrayed 
us into bearing false witness about both races. It has betrayed us into granting the white 
man undeserved advantages. It has betrayed us into denying the Negro basic rights. In 
short, thanks in part at least to segregation, we have broken the ninth commandment 
against members of both races” (qtd. in Houck and Dixon 368). According to Tilson, 
segregation causes society to grant and deny privileges and rights according to race, acts 
which violate the ninth commandment because they perpetuate the falsehood that skin 
color correlates with superior/inferior qualities or higher/lower intrinsic value. Because 
segregation is a cause of acts of false witness, Tilson argues that segregation itself 
“breaches the ninth commandment” (qtd. in Houck and Dixon 367).  
 
Appeal to the Appropriateness of Inferential Reasoning with Texts 
 Other lines of argument in support of an assimilation, besides explicitly tying the 
textual and non-textual situations, are also available to the rhetor. For example, the 




common and appropriate means of interpreting texts (Cicero, De Inventione 2.50.152).171 
This strategy can also involve arguing that authors expect their audiences to infer 
meaning from their work, given the limitations of discourse, and that they write 
accordingly (Cicero, De Inventione 2.50.152). In deploying this line of argument, one can 
simply state that inferential reasoning is a normal approach to interpreting texts and is 
expected by authors and/or one can give examples of accepted interpretations derived by 
this method.172 If a rhetor chooses to use examples, an especially effective example 
would be an inferential interpretation previously argued by the opponent. This line of 
argument can neutralize attacks from the opposition that one’s method of interpretation is 
unorthodox or radical. While the opponent still has other grounds of attack, unless he or 
she wishes to be exposed as inconsistent, this particular ground of attack will be 
effectively removed.  
For example, Jack Rogers, in his book Jesus, the Bible, and Homosexuality, cites 
historical assimilative interpretations of the Bible that were instrumental in changing the 
Presbyterian Church (USA)’s positions on slavery, the role of women in the church, and 
divorce and remarriage, in support of his argument that the Bible can likewise be 
inferentially read to support modern homosexual relationships (40-44). Since Rogers’ 
primary audience is the Presbyterian Church (USA), this move should theoretically shield 
him from attacks by fellow Presbyterians against his choice of interpretive method. 
 
                                                 
171 Cicero classifies this line of argument as a common topic, denoting that it can be 
applied in virtually any context (De Inventione 2.50.152). 
172 When working with a closed body of texts, this particular tactic can involve 
demonstrating how inferences drawn from certain texts rely on the inferences drawn from 




Appeal to the Naturalness of the Assimilation 
Another strategy is to argue that the new application or inference is a natural or 
logical extension of the text (see Hofstadter 550-551). One argumentative effect of the 
ACLU’s citation of several previous extensions of the First Amendment is to suggest that 
extending the protection of speech to liking a Facebook page is a natural and logical 
application of the text.   
 
Outstripping the Extension 
In some cases the rhetor may want to “outstrip” the assimilation, that is, argue that 
the interpretation “is more than just a simple analogy” or mere inference (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 393). It is as if the assimilation never took place because the gap 
between the domains of the textual and non-textual situations has been erased. Erasing 
the gap is not necessarily a difficult task as the distinction between domains is not always 
easily discernible or sustained (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 393). Thus, the 
outstripping of an assimilation is really an effect of arguing, implicitly or explicitly, that 
the textual and non-textual situations are examples or illustrations of the same common 
schema (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 393, 394, 396). The assimilation, whose trace is 
then erased, is thus an argumentative step towards placing the textual and non-textual 
situations on the same plane.  
For example, historically and even today it has been a common move across 
multiple black discursive spaces to outstrip the assimilation of the Exodus narrative found 
in the Bible and the African American experience. As scholar of African American 




This sense of connection with the biblical story [of the Exodus] went beyond that 
of explicitly identifying, by means of analogy, the elements of correspondence 
between their [African Americans’] situation and that of ancient Israel—offering 
a hope 'embalmed in detached, lifeless sermons.' Rather, their songs and sermons 
emotionally transported them into experiences that transcended the boundaries of 
geography and chronology. (41) 
The outstripping of this particular assimilation can be traced to as early as slave times. As 
we can see in the chorus from the slave spiritual “Go Down Moses,” the non-textual 
situation has been completely collapsed into the textual situation: 
Go down (go down) 
 Moses (go down Moses) 
 Way down in Egypt’s land 
 Tell old Pharaoh 
Let my people go! (qtd. in Selby 36) 
For many enslaved African Americans, songs like these were not simply ancient tales 
with striking and hopeful parallels. They truly believed that God would send them a 
Moses to deliver them from their Pharaohs, the whites who enslaved and oppressed them 
(Selby 35, 45-46). Prophetic calls for emancipation, equal rights, and equal treatment 
gained a divine urgency and weight when supported by such biblical outstripping. 
But the outstripping of an assimilation may not always be a desired or useful 
effect. Sometimes the textual and non-textual situations are inadvertently blended in the 
audience’s mind, and sometimes the rhetor will want to prevent such blending from 




has occurred, a rhetor wishing to use the established assimilation in argument may have 
to find ways to mitigate an outstripping’s undesired effects, as we see in the example of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Although the historical assimilation of the Exodus narrative with 
African American experience was a rich resource for King’s rhetorical call for nonviolent 
resistance of racial oppression, its outstripping also presented challenges (see Selby 45). 
When outstripped, certain elements in the Exodus narrative could have exacerbated racial 
tensions, encouraged passivity on the part of blacks, and led them to look for a real, 
geographical Promised Land (see Selby 45-48). In response to these challenges, King 
minimized, omitted, and transformed certain elements of the familiar biblical narrative to 
fit his social and political agenda (see Selby 45, 48). In any case, both the power and the 
danger of an outstripped assimilation lie in its collapse of the textual and non-textual 
situations in the audience’s mind.  
 
Equity  
 Quintilian remarks that “the most effective treatments are based on Equity” 
(7.8.7; cf. Cicero, De Inventione 2.50.151). If the rhetor can make the case that his or her 
assimilation is fair or just, the assimilation is more likely to be accepted by the audience. 
The interpretive principle of equity, which accommodates texts to particular situations,173 
may be so effective because it is grounded in the common desire to fairly or justly 
address a situation, rather than in something for which the textual evidence is equivocal. 
For example, after assimilating several passages of the New Testament, including the 
words of Christ, to support homosexuality, John McNeill in his book Freedom, Glorious 
                                                 




Freedom offers the following ultimatum which aligns his interpretation with a more 
equitable treatment of gays and lesbians: “Will we deny them [lesbian women and gay 
men] the place which Christ evidently found for them in his proclamation of the Good 
News, or will we as a faith community seek to overcome our fears and prejudices, so long 
influenced by those of the world, to embrace the love and freedom of the Gospel, which 
reaches forth to embrace all people?” (144). As this example illustrates, this line of 
argument seems most appropriate in settings where the text in question is used as a means 
of governing the beliefs or behaviors of the audience’s community. 
 
Assimilating Multiple Texts 
 Although this is not technically a line of argument, one feature of assimilation is 
that a rhetor may assimilate multiple texts at once in support of a larger argument (see 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 391). But there is a danger in this strategy, since each 
text brings with it different structures and therefore can lead to different interpretations of 
the non-textual situation (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 392). An equal danger is that 
the different texts will interact with each other in the audience’s mind thereby affecting 
their meaning (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 392). To avoid too much interference 
between texts, a rhetor can keep discussion of each text sufficiently separated in the 
discourse, a matter of arrangement (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 392). In terms of 
argument structure, each text can have a specific role or use in an argument. For example, 
certain texts might take a more central role as the main texts supplying the structure or 
being structured, while other texts might take on a more “reinforcing role” supporting the 




Conversely, one text can be assimilated to multiple situations or implicit 
meanings in the same argument. But the arguer must decide if it is wise to divide his or 
her argumentative energy in this way.  
 
In Opposition to an Assimilation 
Propose an Alternative Assimilation 
The rhetor opposed to an assimilation can propose an alternative assimilation, 
following the lines of argument appropriate for supporting an assimilation (Cicero, De 
Inventione 2.50.152). The assimilated texts of the opposing disputants may be the same, 
but the disputants will disagree over how the text should apply to the situation—the 
structures they map will be different. In the main case study of this chapter, scholars 
oppose the conclusion that the historical evidence supports that Lincoln was gay by 
arguing that the evidence shows that he was heterosexual, offering an alternative 
assimilation. Since neither category of sexuality was available to Lincoln under those 
terms at the time, both interpretations involve reading back into the text contemporary 
conceptions of sexuality. 
But should the arguer be unable to come up with an alternative assimilation, or 
proposing an alternative assimilation seems less persuasive, he or she may argue that the 
text should be interpreted according to its letter using the following strategies as support 
(Cicero, De Inventione 2.50. 152) 
 




 A rhetor opposed to an assimilation will need to attack the assimilation at its base 
by arguing that the textual and non-textual situations are in fact dissimilar and therefore 
do not warrant assimilation. Cicero suggests that the rhetor “point[] out that the cases 
differ in kind, nature, meaning, importance, time, place, person or repute…” (De 
Inventione 2.50.151; cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.12.18, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 393). The goal is to relate the textual and non-textual situations in such a way that 
“it is not proper to take the same position in regard to both” (Cicero, De Inventione 
2.50.151).174 For example, to argue against the assimilative reasoning that justified 
American slavery based on the lack of its condemnation in the New Testament, John Fee, 
a southern abolitionist, points out that most of the Romans’ slaves “were as white or 
whiter than the Romans themselves,” noting that most of them were from Germany, 
Gaul, Spain, Greece, Egypt (Fee 29). Fee therefore concludes, “if the apostles’ teaching 
and practice sanctioned slavery, it sanctioned the slavery of the age...WHITE 
SLAVERY” (Fee 28; capitalization original). In contrasting the racial difference between 
contemporary slavery in America and slavery in Roman times, Fee attempts to unhinge a 
common biblical justification of the institution.  
 
                                                 
174 Specific strategies for countering specific lines of logical arguments (equivalence, 
greater/lesser, opposition, consequence) can be found in some of the classical and early 
modern rhetorical manuals: to counter arguments of equivalence or degree difference, the 
arguer may relativize the importance of the textual or non-textual situation, or elements 
thereof, in order to show that the text does not fit the situation (Hermogenes 89.10). To 
counter an extension based on consequence, an arguer can demonstrate that the natures of 






Take the Proposed Assimilation to Its Unacceptable, Incompatible, or Absurd 
Conclusions 
An arguer opposed to an assimilation may continue to assimilate the textual and 
non-textual situations based on the original assimilation proposed by the other side, but in 
this case the goal is to refute rather than affirm the assimilation. The arguer achieves this 
goal by taking the assimilation to “its logical conclusions,” which are either unacceptable 
to the audience, produce an incompatibility, or are absurd (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 387). As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out, “This method of refutation 
assumes…that…it [the original analogy] was already inadequate at the start” (387).175 
Here, the arguer would rely on the lines of argument available to an arguer in support of 
an assimilation, but especially effective would be the “logical” lines of argument, such as 
equivalence, greater/lesser, opposition, and consequence.176  
The debate over Lincoln’s sexuality, including the nature of his relationship with 
Joshua Speed, is rife with arguments of this kind. For example, in the following passage 
David Donald relates the textual anecdote that convinced him that Lincoln and Speed 
were simply friends along with his reasoning:  
James Speed, he [Lincoln] told Titian J. Coffey, the U.S. assistant attorney 
general, was ‘a man I know well, though not so well as I know his brother Joshua. 
That, however, is not strange, for I slept with Joshua for four years, and I suppose 
                                                 
175 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also observe that, “this kind of refutation is nearly 
always possible” (387). Furthermore, “The refutation is never compelling, as one may 
refuse to accept the extension. The main significance of the refutation is, however, that it 
emphasizes the fragility and arbitrary character of the analogy” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 387).  
176 As Melachthon remarks, “We must see, however, that there be good logic in the 





I ought to know him.’ I simply cannot believe that, if the early relationship 
between Joshua Speed and Lincoln had been sexual, the President of the United 
States would so freely and publicly speak of it. (Donald 38)  
Donald takes the premise that Lincoln had a sexual relationship with Speed to one of its 
logical conclusions: Lincoln would have kept any implication of it a secret as President of 
the United States in the nineteenth century. Donald’s argument is based on logical 
incompatibility, as Lincoln’s presidential obligation to act honorably would have clashed 
with the cultural shamefulness of same-sex relations at the time. But since Lincoln does 
publicly discuss his sleeping arrangements with Speed, which would have been the site of 
their sexual activity, his relationship with him must have been platonic.  
 
Deride the Method of Inferring Meaning from Texts 
Another means of undermining an assimilation is to argue that inferential 
reasoning is “no better than divination” (Cicero, De inventione 2.50.153). In other words, 
the rhetor attacks the method of assimilation on principle. As Cicero remarks, “all things 
can be proved to be like or unlike” (2.50.152). This strategy, however, is a dangerous 
move for the rhetor if he or she has ever used inferential reasoning to interpret a text in 
the past or accepted an interpretation based on inferential reasoning, as this point could 
be pointed out by an opponent. 
In a similar vein, the rhetor may also argue that authors who rely on inference to 
get across their meaning are incompetent (Cicero, De inventione 2.50.153). This line of 




on the author’s part rather than deftness, or it can be used to attack the suitability of the 
text for assimilation in this situation through the ethos of the author by metonymy.  
Cicero considers both of the strategies outlined in this section common topics, 
that is strategies that can be deployed in virtually any setting. 
   
Strategies Common to Both 
Definition 
Another strategy available to an arguer against an assimilation is definition 
(Hermogenes 88.15). By defining the key words in a text, or the key terms of a dispute, in 
a particular way, a rhetor can exclude certain elements of the non-textual situation or text 
such that the proposed assimilation fails seemingly on its own merits. For example, in the 
original Bland v. Roberts case heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, the Court ruled that liking a Facebook page is not constitutionally 
protected speech under the First Amendment because in previous “cases where courts 
have found that constitutional speech protections extended to Facebook posts,” the 
contested speech “involved actual statements” (6). And as we shall see, in the debate over 
Lincoln’s sexuality the definition of homosexuality/gay plays a crucial role in 
determining how to interpret the available textual evidence.  
 
Rewriting or Amending the Original Text 
Some strategies of argument in this stasis are available to both rhetors in support 
of and against an assimilation. For example, either kind of rhetor may rewrite or amend 




enough of the original is retained so that the text is not terribly altered, and new elements 
are grafted in according to a certain spirit. This tactic has been executed many times with 
such foundational documents as the U. S. Declaration of Independence. Here are the first 
two original sentences of the Declaration followed by its 1902 adaptation by W. A. 
Corey, who offers a Declaration of Independence for the working class. 
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people 
to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to 
assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions 
of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the 
separation. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. (qtd. in Foner 42) 
 
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for the 
enslaved class to dissolve the economic bonds which have connected them with 
another and to become the masters of their own destiny, it is essential that they 
should declare the causes which compel them to the separation. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal: 
equal in opportunities, equal in rights, among which are life and the pursuit of 




But when this strategy is used to refute an assimilation, the arguer amends the text 
to demonstrate how it would have to be written to fit the situation in question (see 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 388). Here, the starker the difference between the 
amended text and the original, the more effective the refutation. In the hands of the rhetor 
opposed to an assimilation, this strategy is a form of taking the assimilation to its logical 
conclusions as manifested in necessary changes to the text. And, according to Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “The advantage in this technique is that the user profits by such 
measure of adherence as was given to the analogy [assimilation] in its primitive form” 
(389).  
Martin Luther briefly makes use of this strategy in a sermon criticizing 
contemporary capitalistic practices that was published in 1524 as a pamphlet titled “On 
Trade and Usury.” In one particular place, Luther, who is staunchly opposed to 
monopolies, anticipates an assimilation in which the Genesis story of Joseph is cited as a 
righteous example of a monopoly (given that the Bible nowhere explicitly addresses the 
issue). In this story, Joseph saves the people of Egypt, along with people from 
surrounding countries, from hunger by gathering all of Egypt’s grain during a time of 
surplus and distributing it during a subsequent time of famine.177 To counter a possible 
assimilation of this story in support of monopolies, Luther in one place writes, “For the 
text does not say that he alone gathered corn, but that he gathered it in the king’s 
cities178,” and in another place, “Moreover, Scripture does not report that Joseph gathered 
the corn in order to sell it as dear as he pleased. For the text says clearly he did it not to 
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satisfy greed, but in order that land and people might not perish.179 But our merchant sells 
as dear as he pleases, and seeks his own profit solely, without concern whether land and 
people perish” (“On Trade and Usury” 27, 28). Luther contrasts what the text would need 
to state, but does not, to fit an assimilation supporting monopolies, with what the text 
does state. What the biblical text does state, according to Luther, does not support 
monopolies.   
 
Appeal to Authorial Intent 
In addition to amending the original text, various appeals to authorial intent can 
be made by both those in favor and against an assimilation. To support an assimilation, 
according to Cicero, rhetors “argue that no rule was laid down for this case, because 
when the rule was made for the other, the author of the law thought that no one would 
have any hesitation about this case” (De Inventione, 2.50.150). In essence, the rhetor 
argues that the author had the contested situation or inference in mind all along, but given 
its apparent or obvious inferential application or meaning saw no reason for explicitly 
referencing it in the text. The arguer may then choose to draw on contextual evidence to 
support this claim.  
This line of reasoning is often used to support the argument that Jesus condemned 
homosexuality. Although there is no explicit biblical record of Jesus mentioning 
homosexuality, arguers will sometimes point to passages such as Matthew 19:4-9 and 
Mark 10:1-12. In these synoptic passages, Jesus is asked by the Pharisees about the 
lawfulness of divorce. He responds that divorce and remarriage amount to adultery, 
                                                 




drawing on Genesis to argue that “God made them [humans] male and female”180 and 
that “no one [should] separate”181 a man and a woman once God has made them “one 
flesh”182 (Mark 10:6, 8, 9). Based on these passages, Robert Gagnon in his book The 
Bible and Homosexual Practice argues that, “There was no need for him to comment on 
whether homosexual unions should be permitted and, if so, whether his stance on divorce 
and remarriage should apply to them too…. It would have been a foregone conclusion for 
him that homoerotic relationships…were unacceptable” (194). According to Gagnon, 
Jesus would not have seen a need to explicitly condemn homosexual relationships 
because the only unions ordained by God were those between a man and a woman. 
If a rhetor opposes an assimilation, he or she may argue that no text exists that 
treats the situation at hand “because the framer was unwilling to make any provision,” or 
that the text in question does not address the issue at hand because the author thought the 
issue was addressed in other texts, even if inferentially ([Cicero] 2.12.18). Therefore, the 
proposed assimilation between the text and situation in question is inappropriate because 
it goes against the author’s original intent.  
Bradford Vivian makes an argument along this line in his attempt to disentangle 
Nietzschean thought from its appropriation by the Nazis to justify their mass 
extermination of the Jews and others. In his book Public Forgetting, in which he argues 
that “forgetting can play a positive, formative role in works of public memory,” Vivian 
claims that his notion of public forgetting enacts Nietzsche’s concept of critical history in 
which certain legacies of the past are purposefully destroyed (6, 52-53). Admitting, 
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however, that Nietzsche’s words were used to justify Nazi policies, he asserts, “one may 
measure the perversity of that appropriation, however, by the fact that the Nazis 
interpreted the meaning of Nietzsche’s assertions here in a manner directly opposed to his 
intent”  (Vivian 53). According to Vivian, while the Nazis’ actions were unjust, 
unethical, and deadly, Nietzsche envisioned critical history serving justice under ethical 
guidance to promote life (53). 
 
Reading between the Lines for Lincoln’s (Homo)Sexuality 
We return now to the historical debate over Lincoln’s sexuality and his 
relationship with Speed that opened this chapter. As mentioned earlier, this controversy 
represents a non-classic case of assimilation because it does not have an instance of 
textual extension where a text is analogically applied to a new circumstance. Instead we 
have a case of textual extraction. We have multiple historians arguing over whether a 
particular case fits a general category. Here, the general category is the modern concept 
of homosexuality and the case is Lincoln, or more specifically his relationship with 
Joshua Speed. The evidence for determining this case consists of letters from a time 
before the modern notion of homosexuality was commonplace. These letters are also 
incomplete—many of the letters from Joshua Speed have been lost, thus giving us mostly 
one half of the correspondence between Lincoln and Speed. Thus, we not only have 
textual extraction but also conversational reconstruction. However, in any interpretive 
dispute, arguers always have to fill in certain blanks. It is just that in this case the degree 




not stopped historians from attempting to determine whether Lincoln is gay or not using 
the available texts.  
While historians draw on a range of texts as part of their investigations, their 
disputes seem to coalesce around a few key documents. In the following paragraphs, we 
will examine the disputes surrounding two of these documents: an excerpt from a letter 
from Lincoln to Speed describing an especially turbulent emotional time for the 
president-to-be and another excerpt, mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, from a 
letter Lincoln wrote to Speed in response to the details of Speed’s wedding night. We 
look at arguments by David Donald, Jonathan Katz, and C. A. Tripp, who arrive at 
different answers to the question of Lincoln’s sexuality: Donald concludes that Lincoln 
was not gay and that his relationship with Speed was platonic, Tripp that Lincoln was 
primarily homosexual and his relationship with Speed was romantic if not sexual, and 
Katz that the two men were romantically involved even though our modern conceptions 
of sexuality do not apply to them. These scholars primarily rely on appeals to authorial 
intent, taking the opposing assimilation to absurd conclusions, and context (often in the 
form of other textual evidence) to interpret key historical documents and support their 
conclusions. But first, we will examine how the definition of the terms homosexual/gay 
influences how the textual evidence is interpreted. 
The first issue that must be addressed by any scholar entering this controversy, 
even if tacitly, is the definition of gay or homosexual, as the answer to whether Lincoln 
was gay or not heavily depends on one’s definition of these terms. The term 
homosexuality was not coined until after Lincoln had died (Herzer 1). And although the 




history, this belief has always been a distinctly minority position until the late nineteenth 
century when it ultimately gained traction within the psychological and psychiatric 
communities (Greenberg 404, 407-409). How then does one determine the nature of 
Lincoln’s sexuality according to categories he probably would not have recognized? This 
question is a matter of definition although it ultimate serves an issue of assimilation. As 
Charles Morris notes, “definitional argument[s]…limit interpretive ground for assessing 
[the] evidence” for Lincoln’s sexuality (107). The stipulative definition a scholar posits 
for gay/homosexual determines the interpretive frame by which he or she will test the 
textual evidence for Lincoln’s sexuality. In other words, even as scholars turn to the 
textual evidence to infer the nature of Lincoln’s relationship with Joshua Speed, their 
conclusions hinge on their definitions of these key terms. 
At the very beginning of his investigation into the sexual nature of Lincoln and 
Speed’s relationship, Donald establishes a definition of homosexual/homoerotic based on 
sexual activity: “Was the close relationship between Lincoln and Speed a homosexual 
one? Or, since the word homosexual did not come into use until the 1870s, could it be 
called a ‘homoerotic’ one? To be blunt, did they have sex together?” (35). Following this 
definition, Donald proceeds to demonstrate that no evidence exists that suggests Lincoln 
and Speed had sex. He points out that none of Lincoln or Speed’s contemporaries, 
including Lincoln’s political rivals and detractors, “ever raised the question of sexual 
relations between [them]” (Donald 35-36). He dismisses the potentially suggestive nature 
of Lincoln and Speed’s bed sharing since such arrangements were common at the time 
and held “no sexual implication[s]” (36). And though he concedes that there were indeed 




“with rare exceptions, they do not appear to have been sexual relationships,” meaning 
that these relationships fail his definitional test for homosexuality (37). But Lincoln and 
Speed’s relationship, according to Donald, does not even fit into this “category” of male 
relationships as their letters to one another are “totally lacking in expressions of warm 
affection” (37-38). Donald goes on to interpret their letters to one another in support of 
this conclusion (see below), but he is “finally convinced” that Lincoln and Speed did not 
have a sexual relationship because Lincoln, when he was President, publicly stated that 
he had slept with Speed for four years (38; see discussion above). Because in his 
estimation Lincoln and Speed never had sex, Donald concludes that they “were simply 
close, warm friends, who came close to achieving Montaigne’s definition of complete 
comradeship” (38).  
Tripp, on the other hand, seems to have a broader definition of homosexuality. 
Although he nowhere explicitly defines the term homosexuality in his book, given that he 
follows sex researcher Alfred Kinsey’s 0-to-6 homosexuality scale for rating Lincoln’s 
sexuality (with 6 being exclusively homosexual, Tripp gives Lincoln a 5), we can 
reasonably assume that he shares Kinsey’s definition of the term: “sexual relations, either 
overt or psychic, between individuals of the same sex” (Tripp 20; Kinsey, Pomeroy, and 
Martin 612; emphasis mine). Further evidence of Tripp’s adoption of a broader definition 
includes his statement that “particular acts [would not] have affected [Lincoln’s Kinsey] 
rating[]” (20). And in his chapter on Lincoln’s early puberty, Tripp expresses interest in 
not only Lincoln’s “sexual actions” but also his “desires” (31). Unlike Donald, Tripp 
does not equate homosexuality with sexual activity between members of the same sex, 




historical documents need not point to overt sexual activity for Tripp to conclude that 
Lincoln was homosexual. 
 In contradistinction to both Donald and Tripp, Jonathon Katz claims to reject 
modern terms for sexuality in the context of this debate altogether: “Projected on the past, 
homo, hetero, and bi distort our present understanding of Lincoln’s and Speed’s 
experiences” (9). Katz’s rejection is grounded in his belief that not only are sexual 
identities “changing, time specific constructions,” but so are the ways people understand 
sexual desires and acts (10). Katz’s rejection of the terms of the debate theoretically 
leaves him open “to locate the intimacies of Lincoln [and] Speed…within the erotic and 
emotional institutions of their own time” (9). However, the effect of Katz’s stated 
rejection of these terms seems to be more a rejection of any definition that might 
constrain him from discovering homo-erotic or sexual desire in Lincoln and Speed’s 
relationship, as he adopts modern conceptions of sexuality to frame their relationship 
rather than understanding it on their or their context’s terms. For example, even though 
Katz states that he wishes to “[t]o understand Lincoln and Speed” using “their language,” 
he argues that Lincoln’s term for Speed, friend, “inadequately expressed his depth of 
feeling” and that the two “were at a loss for words—at least for adequate affirmative 
terms—by which to name, characterize, and judge their relationship” (9). Further, 
throughout his analysis of the textual evidence, Katz resorts to modern divisions of 
sexuality, in one place claiming neither man had an “instinctual heterosexual desire,” and 
in another calling Lincoln and Speed’s separation a “divorce” (19, 24). Katz may never 
call Lincoln gay, but most modern readers will have no trouble drawing that conclusion 




With these various definitions, scholars then examine texts such as the following 
excerpt from a letter Lincoln wrote to Speed on March 27, 1842, for evidence of 
Lincoln’s sexuality: “I am not going beyond the truth when I tell you that the short space 
it took me to read your last letter gave me more pleasure than the total sum of all I have 
enjoyed since the fatal first of Jany—’ 41.” (Lincoln 93).  In general, scholars agree that 
the “fatal first” of January 1841 signifies a “truly major trauma of Lincoln’s life” (Tripp 
130).183 But what lies in dispute is the cause of that trauma. Did Lincoln break off his 
engagement with Mary Todd that day, thus sending him into a downward emotional 
spiral? Or did Lincoln’s emotional world collapse when he learned that day that Joshua 
Speed would be leaving Springfield to move back to Kentucky thereby breaking their 
bed-sharing arrangement? While the dispute over the phrase “fatal first” itself is a 
question of ambiguity (What is the real world referent of the phrase?), the answer further 
confirms or disproves various theories about Lincoln’s sexuality as inferred from the 
textual evidence.   
Donald, while conceding that the text may be connected to Lincoln learning of 
Speed’s imminent permanent departure, argues that Lincoln’s romantic relationship with 
Mary Todd played an undeniable role. Donald observes that Lincoln had earlier sent 
Todd a letter asking to break off their engagement, and on January first, he received a 
letter from her stating that she accepted his decision (Donald 42-43). Thus, Donald uses 
the contextual information involving both the content of Todd’s letter and the timing of 
when Lincoln received it to support his interpretation of the “fatal first:” “The news 
devastated Lincoln. Though he had earlier longed to end his commitment to Mary Todd, 
                                                 




he now began to suspect…that he loved her more than he had thought. Even more 
important, he was haunted by ‘the never-absent idea’ that he had made Mary unhappy” 
(Donald 44).  
Katz, however, questions such a sure link between the “fatal first” and the end of 
Lincoln’s engagement with Todd. He appeals to a strict adherence to the letter, to the 
textual evidence, by noting that, “Speed’s sale of his store is the only event of that 
January first that is actually documented” (Katz 18; emphasis original). He also questions 
the certainty of whether Lincoln and Todd were actually engaged, and if so who actually 
broke off the engagement (Katz 18). For Katz, the textual evidence suggests a much surer 
link to Speed’s impending move to Kentucky than to his possible broken engagement 
with Todd: “The evidence does show that after that January first, Lincoln was deeply 
distraught and depressed, perhaps at another failure as a suitor, perhaps at losing the 
vivacious Mary Todd, certainly at losing his closest male intimate, Joshua Speed” (Katz 
18; emphasis original). But for whatever reason, according to Katz, “Lincoln’s loss of 
Speed on January 1, 1841, has been consistently underrated by Lincoln scholars” (Katz 
353n64). 
Tripp outright disagrees with Donald’s interpretation, countering that, “If 
Lincoln’s break with Mary Todd had been the focus of his depression over the fatal first, 
as many of his biographers have assumed, he could easily have reversed it simply by 
seeing her again, or even by writing a short note” (Tripp 131). Tripp finds the logical 
conclusions of the standard view lacking: Lincoln’s broken engagement with Mary Todd 
could not have been a cause for Lincoln’s depression given the fact that he had initiated 




scholars such as Donald, Tripp reverses the cause-effect relationship between Lincoln’s 
emotional dive and his broken engagement with Todd, claiming that Lincoln broke up 
with Mary Todd in the wake of his emotional “shake up” from learning that Speed was 
leaving. According to Tripp, it was “Lincoln’s loss of Speed” with “overtly homosexual 
elements” that left him “evidently crushed” (130-131).  
Finally, let us return to the excerpt from Lincoln’s correspondence to Speed on 
February 25, 1842 highlighted at the beginning of this chapter: “I opened the latter [letter 
of the 16th], with intense anxiety and trepidation—so much, that although it [the wedding 
night] turned out better than I expected, I have hardly yet, at the distance of ten hours, 
become calm” (Lincoln 90). As we saw in the beginning of the chapter, David Donald 
cast this quote within a heterosexual frame, arguing that its sentiments flowed from 
Lincoln’s wish to reassure Speed and learn how his friend’s marriage was going before 
he committed himself to Todd (50). Donald’s argument against a reading of this letter as 
evidence for Lincoln’s homosexuality is based on authorial intent, what he presumes to 
be Lincoln’s “desire” and “purpose” (Donald 50). He grounds his presumptions about 
Lincoln’s intent in other textual evidence and contextual clues, especially a letter Lincoln 
sent Speed eight months later and the event that followed: in this letter, Lincoln inquired 
after his friend’s marriage, and soon after receiving what some scholars assume to be a 
positive response from Speed,184 Lincoln married Mary Todd (Donald 50-51). According 
to Donald, Lincoln’s interest in Speed’s consummation and marriage was rooted in his 
own anxieties regarding sexual relations with women, not in any anxiety over his 
romantic and/or sexual relationship with Speed. 
                                                 




Much like Donald, Tripp draws on evidence from other letters (extra-textual 
context) to frame Lincoln’s expression of intense emotional feeling in his response to 
what he learned of Speed’s wedding night. Tripp asserts that one letter, written about a 
month before the letter Lincoln wrote in response to Speed’s wedding night, expresses “a 
level of intimacy and warm support well in excess of friendly advice” and that its words 
“are not the words of even the closest chum; they are the language of love” (136-137). 
Arguing that this “language of love” was intentional, Tripp states that “Lincoln seem[ed] 
fully aware of the risk here” of expressing his feelings to Speed (137). Tripp also claims 
that Lincoln’s “motives” to “support” Speed’s “heterosexual venture” with Fanny, while 
remaining “close by and fully informed,” “are crystal clear in his final sentence [of the 
letter]: ‘I shall be so anxious about you that I want you to write me every mail’” (137). 
According to Tripp, “Such sentiments, amounting to one affectionate embrace after the 
other, are apparent in every one of Lincoln’s early letters to Speed. But they reach their 
peak, a kind of crescendo, in the sixth letter,” the letter Lincoln sent to Speed after 
learning about the details of the consummation of his marriage (137).  
For Tripp, there is no question that Lincoln’s words to Speed after his wedding 
night indicate romantic interest. However, to cast doubt on the conclusion that Lincoln 
was simply revealing deep platonic feelings, Tripp writes the following: “Had Lincoln 
been merely a close friend he would of course have reveled in the good news of the 
wedding night that ‘turned out better than I expected.’ Instead, he suffered a major 
anxiety attack that had hardly let up ‘at a distance of ten hours’” (138). Tripp argues that 
a platonic friend would have “reveled” in Speed’s successfully consummated wedding. 




consummation, contrary to what one would expect if his feelings for Speed were purely 
platonic. Tripp maintains that the text suggests that Lincoln had romantic feelings for 
Speed, which Speed’s newly consummated marriage now threatened. Tripp takes the 




Assimilations are at the same time both one of the most powerful kinds of 
interpretive arguments that a rhetor can make as well as one of the weakest. The power of 
assimilation lies in its ability to relate a text in an almost wholesale fashion to a non-
explicitly related situation, or to otherwise discover in it some meaning that cannot be 
found explicitly in the text. In the process, the values of the elements brought into 
association with one another are changed. Its weakness, however, lies in the manner in 
which this is done: analogical reasoning. At best analogical reasoning establishes a 
tethered relationship between the argued meaning and the text. For this reason, the arguer 
may need to work to establish a link between the assimilated meaning and the text in 
other ways, through explicit appeals to intention or equity, for instance. Ultimately an 
arguer may simply try to collapse the assimilated meaning into the text, eliding the fact 
that the argued meaning is derived by means of assimilation. Because arguers may try to 
cover their tracks when assimilating a text, pinpointing analogical reasoning in textual 
interpretation is not always an easy task. Further, the analyst must always consider what 




opponent, an audience, or some “objective” stance. Not all parties may see the argument 
or dispute in the same light. 
While the features of any text can be highlighted and structured in multiple and 
various ways, the choice of text represents a major constraint on the kinds of relations 
that can be mapped or discovered. Therefore, analysts can study the specific texts that are 
selected in communities with the same bodies of text across different contexts for clues as 
to the milieus or ways of thinking of those communities in those contexts. Analysts may 
find that interpretive communities in different contexts prefer similar or different texts to 
adjudicate new, unforeseen situations depending on their mindset and motivations. 
Analysts might also study the kinds of questions that interpretive communities put to 
their texts in different contexts, especially those questions that their texts do not 
apparently or readily answer. Such an investigation would also shed light on the milieus 
of an interpretive community at a certain time in a certain place. Indeed, a similar study 
on an individual interpreter could shed similar light on his or her interpretive proclivities 
and preferences.  
Each interpretive stasis, each kind of interpretive argument, represents an 
orientation towards the text. Assimilation in particular represents an orientation of 
discontinuity. Rhetors who argue in the stasis of assimilation act under the assumption 
that there is a discontinuity in reality between the domains of the text and the situation or 
the hidden meaning put in parallel or being extracted from the text. But whether there is 
continuity or discontinuity between the textual and non-textual domains in question is a 
matter of perception and construction, and assimilation arguments themselves build on 




question, implicit or explicit, of whether the structures of the text are identical to the 
question at hand or merely parallel; or when to conceive of a situation according to the 
parameters of a particular or given text according to a particular conceptual framework 
(see Hofstadter 566). In the process, the arguer must decide what relations carry over into 
the new ways of perceiving the textual and non-textual domains and what relations do not 
(Hofstadter 566). But it is through this process of assimilation that the interpretive reach 
of a text can be extended indefinitely. A rhetor can always make a text apply to a new 
case or reveal a hidden meaning.  


















Chapter 7: Jurisdiction 
 Whether at graduation ceremonies, sporting events, or military functions, the Star 
Spangled Banner has become a part of the pomp and circumstance of many U.S. public 
rituals and pastimes. While it has arguably become somewhat banal due to its 
pervasiveness, it remains a potent site for protest and controversy. Theologian and 
ethicist Stanley Hauerwas, for example, writes that he does not sing the national anthem 
at baseball games because not singing “reminds [him] that [his] first loyalty is not to the 
United States, but to God and God’s church” (481). When a Spanish-language version of 
the anthem was released in 2006 in support of the millions of immigrants living in the 
U.S., then-president George W. Bush, remarked that, “I think the national anthem ought 
to be sung in English, and I think people who want to be citizens of this country…ought 
to learn to sing the national anthem in English,” expressing a sentiment that others shared 
(Sands, ellipses original; Montgomery). And rock guitar prodigy Jimi Hendrix’s wordless 
1969 Woodstock rendition of the song remains a defining classic of his era, capturing the 
anti-Vietnam spirit of his generation.  
 But the controversy surrounding the song’s lyrics in recent years pales in 
comparison to the contention they stirred in the years that preceded its legislative 
sanction as the country’s national anthem. Originally a poem written in 1814 by Francis 
Scott Key, inspired by the victory of American forces in the Battle of Fort McHenry, the 
tribute to the flag that “was still there” did not become the official national anthem until 
117 years later in 1931 (Svejda 339, 384). Beginning in the 1910s, over forty bills and 
joint resolutions were introduced in Congress under public pressure to recognize the Star-




But the push for legal recognition of the song sparked a heated, national public debate 
(Svejda 342). Those in favor of making the Star-Spangled Banner the national anthem 
argued that the song was “essentially American” (John Philip Hill qtd. in Prothero 222). 
They pointed out that, as a tribute to the flag, the symbol of our country, it was associated 
with “all the principles of liberty and of righteousness that America and Americanism 
imply” (“The Star Spangled Banner,” St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat editorial qtd. in 
Svejda 366). Further, they observed that the song had already acquired an elevated status 
in the national consciousness and therefore it “should be our National Anthem in name as 
in fact or practice” (Matthew Page Andrews qtd. in Svejda 357). 
 Opposition to this legislative move, however, was vocal and fierce. Opponents 
argued that it would give “millions of children” required to sing it in school “the notion 
that the only real patriotism is warlike activity” (M. B. Hillegas qtd. in Molotsky 156). 
Others found its “intense hatred of Great Britain” “outmoded” (Stetson 4; Bard 18). 
Those with pacifistic leanings balked at making a war song the national anthem (Svejda 
359). Opponents suggested alternatives such as “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee,” “America 
the Beautiful,” “The Battle Hymn of the Republic,” and “Yankee Doodle” (Svejda 352; 
Prothero 215). Contests were even held to produce a new, more fitting candidate for the 
national anthem (Svejda 376-378).  
This early 20th century debate over whether “The Star-Spangled Banner” should 
be the country’s national anthem is an example of a dispute in the interpretive stasis of 
jurisdiction. Arguments in the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction concern the preliminary 
conditions for interpreting texts on particular occasions for particular audiences by 




public worship settings? This question concerns the gender of the interpreter and the site 
of the interpretation, both potential qualifying conditions for interpretation. In the 
controversy over “The Star-Spangled Banner,” the condition at issue is the song’s 
eligibility as the national anthem. Elevating the song to the status of national anthem 
authorizes certain kinds of interpretive arguments about the song as a text. The song 
becomes America’s song, a song that specially frames America’s identity, and thus 
interpretations of the national anthem become part of the process of constructing the 
country’s identity. And indeed “The Star-Spangled Banner” seems to hold a special place 
in national identity construction among the country’s patriotic hymns. But before “The 
Star-Spangled Banner” could hold an authorized position in framing America’s identity, 
various parties had to determine through argument that it satisfied certain eligibility 
conditions to be the national anthem.  
As we will see, canonization, elevation of a text to a particular status, is just one 
of several issues that fall under the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction, in which we find 
any argument concerning preliminary conditions for interpreting texts. While some 
treatises from the rhetorical tradition count jurisdiction among the interpretive (legal) 
stases,185 none of the treatises, to my knowledge, conceives of a stasis in which 
procedural concerns specifically pertaining to the interpretation of texts are debated. 
When jurisdiction is counted among the interpretive/legal stases, it is because procedural 
concerns pertaining to court cases are grounded in law and such disputes are interpretive 
                                                 





by nature.186 However, this chapter demonstrates that questions of jurisdiction have 
significant bearing on the resolution of interpretive problems, and much of the advice 
from the rhetorical tradition regarding jurisdiction, no matter how the original authors 
classified it, can be translated to an interpretive context. In what follows, I outline and 
explore the preliminary conditions for interpreting texts, examine various strategies for 
making jurisdiction arguments, return to and examine the case of the Star-Spangled 
Banner debate in more depth, and finally draw some general conclusions about what 
studying jurisdiction arguments can tell us about the nature of textual interpretation. 
 
Preliminary Conditions for Interpreting a Text 
In the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction, the central issue of contention concerns 
the preliminary conditions for interpreting a text (Cf. Quintilian 3.6.70; Hermogenes 42). 
When the preliminary conditions of interpretation, which are ordinarily assumed in the 
other stases, are questioned, the dispute enters into the stasis of jurisdiction. A 
disagreement in the stasis of jurisdiction can occur over whether a particular preliminary 
condition has been fulfilled or whether a particular condition is indeed necessary for a 
legitimate act of textual interpretation to take place. Until the question of the satisfaction 
or necessity of preliminary conditions has been resolved, a rhetor’s argument concerning 
the meaning of a text cannot move forward in a persuasive manner for those parties who 
currently find the preliminary conditions unacceptable. Thus, when a dispute in the stasis 
                                                 
186 More recently, Hanns Hohmann, who attempts to reconstitute classical stasis theory to 
advance modern legal argumentation, argues that the stasis of jurisdiction “does not at all 
contribute to the resolution of interpretive problems, and has thus nothing in common 
with the other legal issues, other than its relation to the law, which of course it shares 




of jurisdiction arises, it postpones or suspends an actual dispute over the meaning of a 
text (Cf. [Cicero] 1.12.22; Hohmann 176). Because of this effect, raising a jurisdiction 
concern can be used as a tactic to avoid resolving or answering a dispute or question over 
the meaning of a text ([Augustine] 10; Melanchthon 168).187 A jurisdiction dispute may 
in fact end in a stalemate for certain participants, such that only a selection, if any, of the 
original participants moves forward with the original argument over textual meaning.  
Thus, like its situational counterpart, the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction has a 
special relationship to the other interpretive stases.188 As Alan Gross observes, albeit in 
the context of the situational stases, jurisdiction is prior to the other stases (142). Among 
the situational stases, jurisdiction is concerned with procedure rather than the 
contingencies of the situation, placing it outside the hierarchical order of the other 
situational stases. A question of situational jurisdiction, therefore, can be invoked at any 
point, thus suspending the current dispute until the procedural question is resolved. 
Interpretive jurisdiction, existing outside the hierarchy of the other interpretive stases and 
able to be invoked at any point in an interpretive dispute, is also in this way something 
like a meta-interpretive stasis. It switches attention from a question of interpretation to a 
                                                 
187 But as Quintilian would reminds us, even though these conditions are preliminary, 
disputes over them need not necessarily occur before a disputant begins arguing the 
meaning of a text (7.5.2). Jurisdiction disputes can occur before, during, or after an 
interpretive dispute or argument has taken place.  
188 Despite this overlap between the situational and interpretive stases, just as with 
definition, we must distinguish and maintain a separation between the situational stasis of 
jurisdiction and the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction. Interpretive jurisdiction concerns 
specifically the preliminary conditions of interpretation, while situational jurisdiction 
involves procedural questions involving the outcome of a dispute over factors that lie 
outside of constructing the meaning of a text. We could consider both kinds of 
jurisdiction to be species of a larger genus of jurisdiction, which would include any 




question concerning the conditions necessary for a legitimate act of textual interpretation 
to take place.  
The key word here is legitimate. Anyone who reads a text interprets it. But 
whether or not that interpretation is legitimate, appropriate for a particular audience on a 
particular occasion from a particular rhetor, is another matter. Disputes in the stasis of 
jurisdiction, therefore, are really disputes over the legitimacy of interpretations by virtue 
of the conditions of production of those interpretations. Textual interpretation is like any 
other form of discourse, which, as Foucault explains, “is at once controlled, selected, 
organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to 
avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events…” (216). Jurisdiction 
represents the range of argumentative procedures by which individuals, communities, and 
institutions attempt to control textual interpretation. Here we should note that, while 
many jurisdiction arguments are concerned with admitting or rejecting interpretations, 
they need not always present all or nothing alternatives. They can also be used to order 
the value of textual interpretations in a kind a hierarchy of legitimacy.  
 A useful perspective to introduce here is J. L. Austin’s speech act theory. In 
articulating his theory of “how to do things with words,” Austin emphasizes that certain 
preliminary conditions must be met in order for a successful speech act to take place (7). 
He explains, “Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which 
the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very 
commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform 
certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering 




circumstances felicity conditions, using the term felicity to signify that the fulfillment of 
these conditions does not determine the verity of a speech act but whether it has been 
happily or satisfactorily performed (14). 189 I reproduce the conditions he outlined here: 
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate 
for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and 
(B.2) completely.  
(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on 
the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the 
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must 
intend so to conduct themselves, and further 
(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. (14-15)190 
                                                 
189 Pierre Bourdieu, whom I reference in this chapter along with Austin, is very critical of 
Austin’s theory of language. Bourdieu argues, “he thinks that he has found in discourse 
itself—in the specifically linguistic substance of speech, as it were—the key to the 
efficacy of speech. By trying to understand the power of linguistic manifestations 
linguistically, by looking in language for the principle underlying the logic and 
effectiveness of the language of institution, one forgets that authority comes to language 
from outside…” (109). But from my perspective, Austin does not at all ignore this fact as 
evidenced by his notion of the felicity of speech acts and his attention to felicity 
conditions, which I recapitulate here and build my own work on. Bourdieu describes 
Austin’s conditions as “very bland and thin” (115). Later, however, he adopts Austin’s 
terminology of felicity (116).  
190 Austin of course is neither the first nor the last person to recognize the connection 




 In the context of textual interpretation, interpretive arguments are themselves 
performatives or speech acts: arguers are not merely elucidating the meaning of a text but 
are actively constructing its meaning through argument. But while an interpretive 
argument itself may represent a central part of the performance of the act, other factors, 
like Austin’s felicity conditions, are necessary, preliminary, for a successful act of textual 
meaning construction to take place (see Austin 8). These factors have everything to do 
with the legitimacy of an interpretation in a particular situation and nothing to do with its 
verity. In the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction we seem to primarily encounter arguments 
dealing with the conditions that fall under the Roman letter A and to some extent B as 
well. In these cases, another rhetor may argue that the interpreter has or lacks certain 
qualifications or that a certain style required when interpreting a text was or was not 
followed. 
While qualifying an interpretation certainly enables it to have authorized effects, a 
“disallowed” or “void” interpretation is not automatically rendered “‘without 
consequences, results, effects’” (Austin 16, 17). If the interpretation already exists and is 
accessible, it may still exert an influence and even be accepted despite an arguer’s best 
persuasive efforts to disqualify it. Or, if an arguer is attempting to control conditions prior 
to interpretations being expressed, such attempts do not ensure that undesired 
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction, Cicero, with the realm of law in mind, observes, “But in every case it will be 
proper for both sides to consider by whom and through whom and how and at what time 
it is fitting that action be brought or judgment given or any decision made about this 
case” (Cicero, De Inventione 2.20.60; cf. Fortunatianus 1.22 and Cassiodorus 2.2.5). 
More recently, Bourdieu reminds us that legitimate language use “must be uttered by the 
person legitimately licensed to do so…known and recognized as being able and enabled 
to produce this particular class of discourse…it must be uttered in a legitimate situation, 
that is in front of legitimate receivers…; finally it must be enunciated according to the 




interpretations, whether procedurally or substantively, will not be issued. Individuals can 
and do defy norms, customs, and other socio-cultural and institutional pressures, and they 
can even act in defiance of threats of violence and death. The history of women’s 
defenses of their right to preach in the Christian church, replete with institutionally 
unauthorized preaching by women, exemplifies the fact that unauthorized rhetoric and 
interpretation may still be efficacious (see Donawerth 73-104).  
While it seems that most jurisdiction arguments are based on the conditions listed 
under points A, and some under B, these sorts of arguments can also be based on the 
conditions listed under Γ. These conditions solely concern the interpreter. For example, a 
rhetor may argue that an interpretation is disqualified because an interpreter was 
interpreting the text in bad faith, perhaps knowingly suppressing key evidence that might 
weaken his or her case. We will look more closely at arguments grounded in the person 
of the interpreter later in the next section. 
Every time an interpretive argument is made legitimately, all participants must, at 
least tacitly, agree to the preliminary conditions and procedures for interpretation. The 
fact that a certain condition has been in place does not mean it must remain in place or be 
accepted (Austin 29). In principle, any participant at any time can argue for the rejection 
of any condition or procedure, constituting an argument of jurisdiction, though doing so 
may put that participant at risk of “sanctions” (Austin 29).  
While one can see the establishment of preliminary conditions as a way of 
controlling interpretation,191 they are also a group’s, community’s, institution’s, or 
                                                 
191 As Foucault argues, “We know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, 
that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like or where like; not just anyone, 




society’s way of coordinating acts of textual interpretation (see Clark 35). The fact that 
the United States’ Supreme Court has final interpretive authority over the meaning of the 
Constitution helps prevent legal chaos. Conventional preliminary conditions192 can help a 
community easily address recurring interpretive situations, reducing the need to 
determine the who, what, when, and where of these situations, and bring interpretive acts 
in line with a community’s values, beliefs, and larger systems (Clark 70, 71-72).  
Any argument concerning a preliminary condition for textual interpretation, 
whether about its fulfillment or its preliminary status, constitutes an interpretive 
jurisdiction argument. However, the two central constituents of interpretation, to which 
specific conditions can be attached, stand out as particularly effective means of enabling 
or disabling an interpretive act: the interpreter and the interpreted text. Arguing over the 
qualifications of the entities that fill these two roles can be an especially effective means 
of enabling or disabling an interpretive act because, of all the features of an interpretive 
act, they are the least mutable and most visible and defined, and they seem to be more 
closely tied to the interpretation that is produced. In a sense, these two constellations of 
conditions are first among preliminary conditions for textual interpretation.193 The 
following two sections examine these two grounds of interpretive jurisdiction arguments 
more closely. However, it is worth emphasizing that the preliminary conditions 
established for carrying out textual interpretation often work together in relationship with 
                                                 
192 Preliminary conditions can also be established by explicit agreement or precedent (see 
Clark 65). Here we have a useful expansion or nuancing of Austin’s “conventional 
procedure” (14). 
193 As the author of the Rhetoric ad Herennium writes in regards to the person bringing a 
case to trial, “In causes based on Transference (translationibus) we first examine whether 
one has the right to institute an action claim or prosecution in this matter…” ([Cicero] 




one another in context and the analyst should be cautious when isolating any one factor 
as the condition that enables or disables an interpretation.   
 
Concerning the Interpreter 
 When considering the interpreter, the key questions are the following: Who gets 
to say what the text means? and Does it matter? While anyone, of course, may interpret a 
text and inevitably does so in the process of reading it, the role of speaking for the text 
for an audience (even an audience of the self) must be officially “ratified” by the other 
participants in an interpretive situation, even if tacitly (Goffman 131; Clark 33; Bourdieu 
106, 107). As Foucault writes,  
This amounts to a rarefaction among speaking subjects: none may enter into 
discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain conditions or if he is 
not, from the outset, qualified to do so. More exactly, not all areas of discourse 
are equally open and penetrable; some are forbidden territory (differentiated and 
differentiating) while others are virtually open to the winds and stand, without any 
prior restrictions, open to all. (224-225)  
To Foucault’s last point, we would expect the restrictiveness of the qualifications for the 
interpreter to increase as the importance or centrality of the text increased. Of course, this 
correlation need not always be the case. Grounding jurisdiction arguments in the 
qualifications of the interpreter opens and closes the door to persons who may interpret 
the text in ways the rhetor finds unfavorable. However, as mentioned earlier, an 
unsanctioned individual can always offer an interpretation of a text—the interpretation 




In any interpretive situation, the interpreting rhetor becomes a mediator between 
the text and an audience of that text, in effect making a case for the meaning of that text. 
Such persuasive mediation implies power. We therefore should expect that the 
qualifications for who is authorized to articulate legitimate interpretations of certain texts 
for certain audiences would correspond to the overarching power structures of the 
community194 in which the interpretation takes place, though anomalous rituals can 
always be erected around specific texts. As Bourdieu reminds us, “[R]elations of 
communication are always, inseparably, power relations” (Bourdieu 167). What this 
means is that in some cases only people with certain identities, statuses, beliefs, roles, or 
positions195 may be allowed to speak for a text.196 For example, in certain religious 
communities, only men (perhaps with further qualifications) are permitted to interpret the 
community’s sacred text(s). Because disputes concerning the qualifications of the 
interpreter are inextricably linked with issues of power, they can be very heated.  
                                                 
194 Any analysis that takes into account the communities in which an interpretive act is 
situated should recognize the multiple, overlapping, and in some cases encircling 
communities that may influence the qualifications of who may articulate a legitimate 
interpretation of a text. 
195 Cf.: “[W]ho is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded 
the right to use this sort of language (langage)? Who is qualified to do so? […] What is 
the status of the individuals who—alone—have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, 
juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?” (Foucault 
50). Cf. also: “Most of the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for a performative 
utterance to succeed come down to the question of the appropriateness of the speaker—
or, better still, his social function…” (Bourdieu 111). 
196 These restrictions can even apply in cases of a self-audience, in which the individual 





The larger ritual or activity of which the interpretive act is a part also affects who 
can issue an interpretation (see Goffman 143; Clark 33, 59; cf. Foucault 225).197 For 
example, again looking at male-female differences in religious communities, in Roman 
Catholicism women are barred from the priesthood because a “priest represents Christ 
himself in his relationship to the Church,” a relationship which is “spousal in nature” 
(Paul II). (For the Catholic Church, marriage can only be between a man and a woman.) 
This larger concern of representing Christ in his spousal relationship to the Church has 
the effect of barring women from a significant and powerful mode of textual 
interpretation in the Church: preaching. Considerations of ritual and activity in which an 
act of textual interpretation takes place of course involve issues of power—the 
asymmetrical status of men and women cannot be ignored in this example—but they are 
not necessarily contiguous with one another.  
Qualifications, and similar ones, can also be applied to the adjudicating audience, 
the persons the interpreting rhetor is trying to persuade concerning the meaning of the 
text. Here the qualifications control the adjudicating audience’s right to decide whether to 
accept an offered interpretation or not.198 Examples include the Supreme Court (discussed 
below) or church councils in Catholicism. When an audience is disqualified from its role 
                                                 
197 As Foucault explains, “[R]itual defines the qualifications required of the speaker (of 
who in dialogue, interrogation, or recitation, should occupy which position and formulate 
which type of utterance); it lays down gestures to be made, behaviour, circumstances and 
the whole range of signs that must accompany discourse; finally it lays down the 
supposed, or imposed significance of the words used, their effect upon those to whom 
they are addressed, the limitations of their constraining validity. Religious discourse, 
juridical and therapeutic as well as, in some ways, political discourse are all barely 
dissociable from the functioning of a ritual that determines the individual properties and 
agreed roles of the speakers” (225). 
198 In the rhetorical tradition, this notion of arguing over the adjudicating audience is 
somewhat parallel to arguing over the proper court (e.g. Cicero, De Inventione 2.19.57; 




as interpreter, it becomes a passive audience. No longer an adjudicating audience, it is 
supposed to accept whatever interpretation is sanctioned by those in power in the 
community.  
One should not assume, however, that because an audience has the right to 
adjudicate a text that it also has the right to offer an interpretation with the same force as 
the interpreting rhetor arguing before it, or even to offer an alternative interpretation at all 
depending on the context. Thus, the power of an adjudicating audience correlates with the 
degree to which audience members can enter an interpretive dispute on the same level as 
the original interpreting rhetor.199 For example, ordinary U.S. citizens are free to voice 
their disagreements with rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, but only the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution are legally binding. While interpretive 
arguments presented before the Court during oral arguments or in amicus briefs can 
influence the Justices’ decision, these arguments do not have the force of determining the 
law of the land. Ordinary U.S. citizens, thus, are free to adjudicate the decisions of the 
Court, but their interpretations lack legal force.200  
  
Concerning the Text 
                                                 
199 Cf. Fahnestock and Secor’s “warrant of jurisdiction”: “an assumption that the 
audience addressed is indeed the appropriate, effectual audience to take action—that they 
have the right to take it, the time and occasion to take it, the means to take it, in short the 
power to take it” (“Toward a Modern Version of Stasis” 222).  
200 From another perspective, the Court adjudicates the various interpretations of U.S. 




The other perhaps most important grounds for qualifying an interpretation is the 
text itself.201 Disagreements over the qualifications of a text are disagreements over 
whether a text is admissible in a particular discussion.202 When a text is qualified, this 
ensures that the text can apply to a given issue or context and opens the door to any 
interpretation that can be or has been drawn from it. When a text is disqualified, it is 
thrown out in regards to a given issue, and along with it any interpretations that could 
have been or have been drawn from the text. For example, when a judge tells a jury to 
strike a piece of testimony from the record, legally this evidence can have no bearing on 
the jury’s judgment (though of course it may still have an effect). Whole texts as well as 
parts of a text can be qualified and disqualified, and even what counts as part of a text—
textual boundaries—can be disputed in these discussions (see below).  
We should emphasize that arguments over the appropriateness of texts concern 
admissibility, which we might usefully distinguish here from applicability. While one 
interpretation of a text may render it inapplicable to an issue, with another interpretation 
the text may be very applicable. But in both cases, the text is presumed to be admissible, 
that is it can be applied to the issue, whether or not it is actually found to be applicable. If 
participants decide a text is inadmissible, then there can be no discussion of applicability.  
Particular variations of this question of textual qualification can arise, sometimes 
tied to or as a preliminary to the other interpretive stases. One particular question 
involves the issue of textual boundaries. Which parts of a continuum or collection of 
discourse count as part of the text (or the passage—the boundaries of any meaningful unit 
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of discourse can be disputed) that can be interpreted and applied in a particular context? 
Textual boundaries are always arguable and are another way of qualifying and 
disqualifying discourse in the context of interpretation. An example of an argument that 
turns on this point comes from a statement by former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, 
who draws textual boundaries to disqualify leaked diplomatic cables from public 
discussion about U.S. foreign policy.  
One specific variant of the question of textual boundaries involves the issue of 
canonization. A canon is a textual corpus that has some acknowledged significance for an 
interpretive community. Members of a community can argue over what belongs and what 
does not belong in a canonical corpus using a number of the tactics surveyed in the next 
section of this chapter. At stake in the question of whether a text (or passage) belongs in a 
canon is whether it should be accorded the same significance as that accorded to the 
corpus. Canonizing a text thus privileges its position in a community, perhaps permitting 
it to speak in new contexts or at the very least speak to old ones in a special way. 
Decanonizing a text or excluding a text from a canon denies that text the privileged 
position other texts in the corpus receive and perhaps also admission to certain 
discussions.    
 
Contradictory Passages 
Questions of textual boundaries can play a role in disputes in the stasis of 
contradictory passages to determine whether the conflicting passages indeed belong to 
the same text. Wherever apparent contradictions are found within a text, one solution is to 




texts. We saw this tactic used by L. T. Townsend in chapter 3 in his defense of women’s 
preaching. In that example, Townsend resolves the apparent contradiction between Paul’s 
putative prohibition against women preaching in 2 Timothy 2:12 and other biblical 
passages that seem to commend it by dividing fallible apostolic opinion from infallible 
apostolic commands. This division, a move of jurisdiction within the stasis of 
contradictory passages, argumentatively resolves the contradiction. (Townsend’s 
categories also have the effect of removing the binding force of 2 Timothy 2:12.) Should 
Townsend have been questioned on his division, the discussion would have (at least 
temporarily) shifted to the stasis of jurisdiction.  
 
Ambiguity 
Questions of textual boundaries can also play a role in disputes in the stasis of 
ambiguity to determine the relevant co-text for resolving an ambiguity. We saw an 
example of this particular variant of jurisdiction in chapter 4 in the controversy over the 
ambiguous meaning of an instance of that in one of Barack Obama’s 2012 presidential 
campaign speeches. In that example, the selection of co-text played a crucial role in 
interpreting the ambiguity, as demonstrated by the Romney presidential campaign video 
that played a clip of the speech edited down to the single sentence, “If you’ve got a 
business, that—you didn’t build that,” thereby impressing upon its audience that the final 
that referred to businesses, implying that Obama is anti-free enterprise (“Hard-Working 
Americans”). On the other hand, Slate columnist David Weigel included Obama’s 
gestures as part of the co-text and from them argued that that refers to “the stuff that 




Weigel points out the Romney campaign’s (and Fox News’) editing, his argument shifts 
into an embedded stasis of jurisdiction within the larger ambiguity dispute. 
 
Assimilation 
Another question of textual qualification that can arise involves not particular 
texts, but classes of texts. A preliminary question in any argument in the stasis of 
assimilation is whether an approximate text, a text that applies to an issue only similar to 
the one at hand, is admissible. In order for an assimilation argument or dispute to 
proceed, participants must agree that approximate texts are admissible in considering an 
issue. But like any other jurisdiction question, disagreement on this point postpones or 
suspends an assimilation argument. Unlike other jurisdiction questions over texts we have 
discussed, which deal with the qualifications of specific texts, this question is one of 
principle. Are approximate texts in principle admissible to discussions?203 For any 
individual or community, this principle does not have to be applied universally, but can 
be established for particular kinds of situations or even ad hoc. After this principle has 
been established, specific texts can be qualified or disqualified based on whether 
participants believe them to be approximate or not.  
Consider as an example the opposition of originalism and purposivism as judicial 
philosophies for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Originalists argue that the role of the 
Supreme Court is to uphold the Constitution’s “entrenched” meanings, i.e. the putative 
specific, original intent of its authors, in any given case, not to adapt or translate them to 
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fit new cases (Calabresi 7, 8, 10-11).  Purposivists, on the other hand, see the wording of 
the Constitution as “broad” with “generalities” that “call[] forth interpretation” (Brennan 
56; cf. Eskridge et al. 221). They hew not to the text’s specific, original “static” 
meanings, but to its principles, which are adaptable “to cope with current problems and 
current needs” (Brennan 61; cf. Eskridge et al. 221). Purposivism provides a hermeneutic 
basis for using approximate Constitutional texts when new situations arise, while 
originalism by definition does not. This debate over how broadly the Constitution can be 
adapted to fit new cases falls under the stasis of jurisdiction and is preliminary to the act 
of interpreting the text itself. (See chapter 6 for more on the relationships between this 
jurisdiction concern and assimilation.) 
 
 The potential effect of qualifying or disqualifying a text exists on a continuum 
with regards to the range of contexts or issues the arguer hopes to open or close to the 
text. On one end, arguers attempt to extend the reach of a text, at the extreme claiming 
that a text has universal applicability so that nothing stands outside its reach. Arguments 
for regulating all arenas of life with a particular text or set of texts, as with some religious 
movements that wish to use their scriptures to govern both church and state, are found 
near this end. On the other end, arguers try to close several contexts to a text, and in an 
extreme form attempt to close all contexts to a text. For example, in 1919, Bishop J. B. 
Cheshire of North Carolina introduced resolutions in the Episcopal Church’s House of 
Bishops to exclude the songs “The Star Spangled Banner” and “America” (“My Country, 
‘Tis of Thee”) from the church’s hymnal on the grounds that they were not addressed to 




have denied these songs any authorized, ecclesiastical bearing in any Episcopal context. 
Of course, the only way to shut down all discussions of a text is to eliminate all traces of 
it, as people have attempted to do with book burning. But such actions go beyond the 
scope of this work as they exceed the category of argument.  
 Before we survey the lines of argument specific to this stasis, we should observe 
one more general note about qualifying and disqualifying interpreters and texts: in some 
cases, the interpreter or text is disqualified absolutely, or as absolutely as possible, but in 
other cases the question of qualification is simply postponed for another time or 
transferred to another set of arguers ([Augustine] 10). 
 
Using the Preliminary Conditions of Interpretation as Lines of Arguments  
 If arguments in the stasis of jurisdiction are concerned with the preliminary 
conditions for offering an interpretation of a text, then we should expect the available 
tactics of argument to form along these lines. As Quintilian notes, specific questions of 
jurisdiction are grounded in the circumstances of the issue at hand (3.6.70). For each 
condition, rhetors can argue that a particular condition has either been satisfied or 
unsatisfied, or argue that the particular condition should not be a consideration in 
determining the legitimacy of the text and its interpretation (see strategy “Relevance of 
the Condition”). Here, I group these lines of argument into three categories: those 
pertaining to the text, those pertaining to the interpreter, and more general conditions.  
 





 One way to control who has the right to interpret a text is to stipulate that 
interpreters must be in possession of the text. In other words, the text must belong in 
some way to the person who wishes to interpret it. (That “belonging,” of course, must be 
recognized by the other participants in the situation.) Conversely, one can argue that no 
one possesses the text, or that the text belongs to everyone, or that possession of the text 
is not a requirement for having the right to interpret it. 
We see an example of this line of argument in the 3rd century work The 
Prescription against Heretics by Tertullian, one of the church fathers of the Latin West. 
Writing in a context of intense conflict over the meaning of the Bible, Tertullian inveighs 
against minority groups, or “heretics,” whom he believes “weary the strong…catch the 
weak and dismiss waverers with a doubt” (15). Probably taking a cue from classical 
rhetorical theory on this point,204 Tertullian wishes to forestall their interpretation of the 
Bible altogether: “Accordingly, we oppose to them this step above all others, of not 
admitting them to any discussion of the Scriptures” (15). And he does so on the basis of 
possession: “If in these [the Scriptures] lie their resources, before they can use them, it 
ought to be clearly seen to whom belongs the possession of the Scriptures, that none may 
be admitted to the use thereof who has not title at all to the privilege” (15; emphasis 
mine). He later argues that possession is a matter of “true” belief:  
[T]he natural order of things would require that this point should be first 
proposed, which is now the only one which we must discuss: “With whom lies 
that very faith to which the Scriptures belong. From what and through whom, and 
when, and to whom, has been handed down that rule, by which men become 
                                                 




Christians?’ For wherever it shall be manifest that the true Christian rule and faith 
shall be, there will likewise be the true Scriptures and expositions thereof, and all 
the Christian traditions. (19; emphasis original) 
Tertullian essentially argues that only those with true faith, that is faith that adheres to the 
doctrine of the Church, can be said to possess the Bible and therefore interpret it. The 
result is that those within the church can interpret the Scriptures, while those outside of it 
cannot. The reasoning is circular, but Tertullian recognized that the only way to squash 
heretical interpretations of the Bible was not to engage with and refute heretics, which 
would only leave the door open for counter-interpretation, but to strike at their right to 
interpret the Bible in the first place.   
 Tertullian’s argument for possession falls under what Foucault calls doctrinal 
adherence, in which adherence to a certain set of dogma or beliefs authorizes those who 
can speak, or, in our context, interpret a text (226). This particular grounding for 
possession more finely controls what might be said concerning a text, because, ideally, 
the interpreter’s doctrinal beliefs shape their discourse so that they produce a favorable 
interpretation—an interpretation that upholds the given doctrines. But arguments for 
possession can be grounded in other ways as well, including tradition, cultural 
association, and ancestral heritage. One can see each of these as variations on the line of 
argument based on possession.   
 
Attitude towards the Text 
 An appropriate attitude towards a text can be expected of interpreters when they 




argumentative point for qualification. In his essay “Bible Scholarship and Faith-Based 
Study: My View,” posted on the Society of Biblical Literature’s forum in 2006, Michael 
V. Fox argues that “faith-based study of the Bible,” which according to Fox’s description 
is guided in part by a reverent and uncritical orientation to the text, has no place “in the 
forum of academic scholarship.” He explains that,  
Faith-based study of the Bible certainly has its place—in synagogues, churches, 
and religious schools, where the Bible (and whatever other religious material one 
gives allegiance to) serves as a normative basis of moral inspiration or spiritual 
guidance. This kind of study is certainly important, but it is not scholarship…. 
Secular scholarship allows the Bible to be seen as a rich and vital mixture of texts 
from an ancient people in search of God and moral culture. (Fox) 
For Fox, what disqualifies faith-based study of the Bible from academic scholarship is, at 
least in part, the individual’s pious stance towards the text. Secular scholarship, on the 
other hand, is qualified in this realm because it takes the appropriate posture towards the 
Bible, one that is, as Fox puts it, “religiously-neutral.” 
 
Having the Necessary Qualifications 
 An interpreter can be qualified or disqualified to enter a dispute over the textual 
interpretation of a text based on whether he or she has the “necessary” qualifications for 
the job, so to speak. These qualifications can include certain kinds of expertise, skills, 
group membership, or authority that enable or permit the interpreter to carry out the sort 
of interpretation desired. These qualifications are community and audience determined. 




interpreter. Interpretations advanced by individuals without such qualifications, 
especially when interpretations by qualified individuals are available, may not necessarily 
be dismissed out of hand.  However, interpreters must ardently demonstrate that their 
interpretations merit attention through other means. (Here is a case where jurisdiction 
arguments may be used to order interpretations in a hierarchy of legitimacy rather than 
outright choosing one over another. Of course, privileging an interpretation gives it an 
edge.) 
 In the debate over the authorship of the Shakespearean canon, a matter of textual 
interpretation from a number of angles, professional status—whether someone has a 
Ph.D. in English literature or not—is sometimes used to qualify or disqualify the 
contenders in this debate and the answers they give to this question. Almost all 
professional literary scholars believe William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon was 
the true author of (many of) the works attributed to him, a belief earning them the 
collective title of Stratfordians. Anti-Stratfordians, on the other hand, who dispute 
Shakespearean authorship of the Shakespeare canon, generally tend to fall outside of this 
specialized, professional realm. As William Leahy, editor of a volume of essays 
exploring this subject, notes, “This has led to a situation whereby Stratfordians have 
found themselves able to characterize non-Stratfordians as ‘amateurs’, and damn them 
with the pejorative value inherent in that term” (Leahy 2). And indeed, we find this very 
kind of argumentative valuation in an introductory textbook to Shakespeare studies 
published by Oxford: 
Scholars universally agree that [the] person [who wrote Hamlet and King Lear] 




died in Stratford-upon-Avon, and was an actor and theatrical shareholder. Yet 
there are some people, generally amateurs in the field, who argue that ‘William 
Shakespeare’ was actually a pseudonym for a mysterious hidden author. 
(Kathman 620; emphasis mine) 
David Kathman, author of the textbook’s chapter “The Question of Authorship,” calls the 
investigation of Shakespearean authorship “the realm of crackpots” and compares anti-
Stratfordians to creationists and people who claim to see UFO’s, in contrast to “those in 
the field” and “[p]rofessional Shakespeare scholars” (620, 621). Through these 
antitheses, Kathman disqualifies the interpretations of anti-Stratfordians based on their 
non-professional and non-specialist status.205   
 
Arguments concerning the Admissibility of the Text 
Coherence 
A text’s coherence is one possible qualification for its admission to a discussion 
of an issue. A general requirement for a text to be usable is that it be coherent. But while 
arguers may attribute coherence or incoherence to the text itself, coherence is ultimately a 
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conditions concerning the interpreter or text: As the analyst attempts to understand why 
an interpretation succeeds or does not succeed in a particular instance on procedural 
grounds, a useful though not hard and fast distinction drawn from Austin might be 
whether a text or interpreter is incapable of performing the text required of it or whether 
it is of the incorrect type (Austin 35). Lines of argument, such as those concerned with a 
text’s coherence and an interpreter’s attitude toward the text, seem to consider 
interpreters or texts in terms of their capacity to perform the desired task. Lines of 
argument, such as those dealing with textual boundaries, the interpreter’s possession of 
the text, and an interpreter’s membership in a specialist group, seem on the other hand to 
qualify or disqualify interpreters or texts according to whether they are a certain “type” of 
person or text. But again, this distinction is not hard and fast, and lines of argument may 




function of reader construction,206 built up from features of the text, context, and reader 
expectations, assumptions, and goals. Thus, whether a text is coherent or not is arguable. 
There are multiple aspects of coherence and therefore multiple lines of argument that 
rhetors can employ to qualify or disqualify a text in regards to this matter. I survey two 
specific lines of argument—contradiction and perspicuity—below.  
 
Contradiction. Whether a text contradicts itself or not becomes an issue in the stasis of 
jurisdiction when the text’s admissibility depends on the answer. A contradiction in a 
text, when a text contains a proposition and its negation, brings a text’s coherence into 
question.207 Therefore, rhetors can argue that a text does or does not contradict itself to 
grant or deny that text bearing on an issue.  (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion 
of textual contradiction.)  
 For example, critics of religion sometimes point to apparent contradictions found 
within sacred texts to discredit those texts and by extension the religions that adhere to 
those texts. Such is the thrust of Tom Flynn’s early 2000s article “Matthew vs. Luke: 
Whoever Wins, Coherence Loses,” published in the Secular Humanist magazine Free 
Inquiry. He argues that the canonical Gospels Matthew and Luke should be disregarded 
as historical accounts of the birth of Jesus because they “contradict each other on almost 
every detail” (34). The apparent points of contradiction he lists include the existence of 
the star in the east, where Joseph and Mary originally lived, and Herod’s slaughter of 
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Judean male infants (34).208 Flynn also argues that each of these Gospel shares an internal 
contradiction: they trace Jesus’ ancestry through Joseph to show that he is a descendant 
of King David even though they both claim that Jesus was born of a virgin and therefore 
not descended from his father or any of his father’s ancestors (34-35). Flynn concludes 
that, “the dueling accounts of Matthew and Luke” are “so wholly contradictory in their 
details that when it comes to the Nativity, Christianity’s foremost sources tell us quite 
literally nothing at all” (35). Given their contradictions, Flynn denies the Gospels any 
role in a historical discussion of the birth of Christ, supporting his larger contention 
which frames the article: “Indeed, need we assume that anything the Gospels say about 
Jesus is historical?” (34).  
 
Perspicuity. The putative degree of clarity of a text, a factor in reader perception of 
coherence, can be used to argumentatively qualify or disqualify a text from having any 
bearing on an issue. Sometimes a text may be dismissed for its incoherence for 
grammatical, lexical, pragmatic, or stylistic reasons because it is so ambiguous or obscure 
no sense can be made of it.209 Another critic of the Christian religion (probably the 
philosopher Porphyry), who lived during the religion’s early period, takes up this line of 
argument in an attack on the words of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels. Claiming that 
particular sayings of Jesus, such as “‘The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard 
seed’ or, ‘The kingdom of heaven is like leaven’ or, ‘The kingdom of heaven is like a 
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merchant seeking pearls of value’”210 are obscure, this ancient critic of Christianity 
writes:  
These wild images are not the work of wise men nor even of the sibyls. When 
someone wants to say something concerning the realm of the divine, it is 
necessary for him to make his point clearly using everyday images. But these 
images are not commonplace: they are degraded and unintelligible. They are unfit 
to convey the intended comparison. They make no sense. (Porphyry 77)  
In this argument, the critic undercuts the authority of Jesus’ sayings by pointing out their 
obscurity. “Wise men” communicate clear words about the divine realm. But, according 
to this critic, the obscurity of these words suggest that they were not produced by a wise 
man, and therefore should not be taken as wise or divinely inspired, as Christians take 
them to be.  
Conversely, a rhetor may defend against such an attack and shore up a text’s 
admissibility by solving presented ambiguities or obscurities, minimizing or transposing 
their negative effects, or by extolling a text’s clarity in the first place. In De doctrina 
Christiana, Augustine of Hippo pursues this line of defense for the Bible not only by 
offering solutions to problematic biblical passages,211 but also by arguing that the more 
obscure passages in the Bible work together with its clearer ones to meet the spiritual 
needs of its readers.212   
 
Textual Boundaries 
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Another way to qualify or disqualify a text is to determine whether it falls within 
or outside of a textual boundary, the special case being canonization. These boundaries 
can be used to argue for whether a text can be interpreted in a particular context or way. 
Hilary Clinton pursued this strategy in response to the disclosure of over two hundred 
confidential U.S. diplomatic cables by Wikileaks, an organization that releases secret 
documents to the public, and several news outlets, including The New York Times, in 
November 2010 (Shane and Lehren). These documents revealed the forthright and 
sometimes unflattering opinions of foreign and domestic diplomats, embassies, officials, 
and leaders (Shane and Lehren). Relations between several countries, including those 
involving the U.S., were threatened by these revelations (Shane and Lehern). In an effort 
to mitigate some of these negative effects, Clinton argued that leaked documents 
disclosing statements by U.S. representatives or their counterparts should not be 
interpreted as indicative of U.S. foreign policy. In an official statement, she stressed, “I 
want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but 
here in Washington” (Clinton). In the same section of this speech, she contrasted the 
“private” nature of the discourse exposed in these leaks with the fact that U.S. “policy is a 
matter of public record” (Clinton; emphasis mine). Clinton drew a line between the 
private cables, which were leaked, and the public record. Only the latter represents 
official U.S. foreign policy, and therefore only the latter can be interpreted as such. 
Discourse boundaries, such as the line between public and private, are always 
arguable. Further, a specific boundary need not be accepted as a point of qualification, 






 Another qualification for the admissibility of a text is its adherence to certain 
principles.213 Demonstrating that a text aligns with the audience’s principles can be an 
effective move to persuade members of the audience to accept the arguer’s textually 
grounded claims. Conversely, showing how a text violates the audience’s principles can 
disabuse an audience of the admissibility of a text. We see this line of argument used in 
both directions in the dispute over “The Star-Spangled Banner”’s eligibility to be the 
national anthem. Supporters of the song argued that it singularly expressed American 
ideals like freedom and liberty, while detractors maintained that it conveyed hatred and 
violence antithetical to the nation’s spirit. We look more closely at these arguments in the 
penultimate section of this chapter.  
 But sometimes arguers can contend that a text cannot be judged by a priori 
principles. They can argue that the text is prior to or outside of any principle, perhaps as a 
source of principles. For example, Henry Van Dyke, in an 1860 sermon, attempted to 
undermine the persuasiveness of the abolitionist cause by arguing that the movement 
displaces the Bible as an ultimate authority, asserting other principles above it to then be 
used to judge the sacred text: “One of its [abolitionism’s] avowed principles is, that it 
does not try slavery by the Bible; but…it tries the Bible by the principles of freedom. It 
insists that the word of God must be made to support certain human opinions, or forfeit 
all claims upon our faith” (163). In his argument, Van Dyke appeals to his audience’s 
belief that the Bible cannot be judged by a priori standards, and he concludes that, “This 
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assumption, that men are capable of judging beforehand what is to be expected in a 
Divine revelation, is the cockatrice’s egg, from which, in all ages, heresies have been 
hatched” (163). According to Van Dyke, because the Bible is divine revelation, it cannot 
be judged, and therefore cannot be admitted or rejected on the basis of any a priori 
principle. To do so leads to heresy. There is no yardstick for the Bible which is the 
measure of all things.   
 Of course, a text’s apparent violation of a sacrosanct principles does not 
automatically eject it from discussion. Other lines of argument, as found in the other 
interpretive stases, can be used to square the text with the apparently violated principle. 
When rejecting a text is not an option for participants (or is a very last resort), disputes 
over a text’s apparent violation of a principle may never move into the jurisdiction stasis. 
 
Facticity 
 A text can be qualified or disqualified from having any bearing on a particular 
issue based on its facticity, that is the degree to which the text is or seems to be grounded 
in the facts of the world. We find this line of argument in Stefan Maechler’s 2000 The 
Wilkomirksi Affair: A Study in Biographical Truth. Maechler’s book exposes the 
fraudulent nature of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s Fragments, a critically acclaimed and 
award-winning autobiography published in 1995 that describes the author’s supposed 
survival of two concentration camps during the Holocaust. Having shown Wilkomirski’s 
autobiography to be spurious, Maechler concludes that the text no longer has a privileged 
connection to the Holocaust. As part of his argument, he quotes another critic of 




And however valid it may be that much of this may have happened to other 
children, with the falling away of the authentic autobiographical aspect and 
without the guarantee of a living first-person narrator identical with the author, it 
merely becomes a dramatization that offers no illumination…. We shall continue 
to have to read those books that claim to be history differently than those that 
merely contain stories. (Klüger qtd. in Maechler 281).  
For Maechler (and Klüger), testimonial literature has an illuminating role to play in our 
understanding of the Holocaust, a role that fictional accounts of the event can never fill. 
While this point may seem obvious, Maechler acknowledges that, at least at the time of 
his writing, there existed a contingent of Holocaust survivors who defended the book, 
even when faced with its fraudulence, because “they see their own experiences expressed 
in [it]” (305). For these survivors, the book’s ability to reflect their experiences is a more 
important qualifier than its facticity. For them, its historical falsity does not disqualify it 
from having an important bearing on their understanding of the Holocaust.  
 
General Lines of Argument 
The following lines of argument are based on points on which one can ask is the x 
(time place, hermeneutic method, etc.) appropriate for this situation? Any of these points 







 The first general qualification we will consider is an interpretation’s temporal 
appropriateness.214 We see an example of this line of reasoning in Louis Michael 
Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience, in which he argues that Americans should 
reject the Constitution as a legally binding document that grounds our political discourse, 
and that instead we should determine policy based on the merits of our proposals. In 
defense of this proposition, Seidman makes the following argument:  
The American Constitution is the oldest currently in force in the world. It 
was written generations before the advent of the technological, material, cultural, 
and moral conditions that define modern American life…. The framers knew 
nothing of nuclear weapons, mass production, multiculturalism, cell phones, 
professional sports, modern birth control, or global warming….  
This gap between them and us provides a powerful argument for giving up 
on constitutional obedience. The sheer oddity of making modern decisions based 
upon an old and archaic text ought to give constitutionalists pause. (11-12) 
Seidman presents and amplifies the temporal gap between the original writers of the 
Constitution and modern Americans, with its intervening historical events and socio-
cultural changes, to demonstrate that the text was not written from a modern perspective. 
Seidman’s premise appears to be that modern proposals should be informed by a modern 
perspective. The Constitution, therefore, should not serve as a basis for modern policy in 
America. Imaginably, for Seidman the appropriate time for basing policy on the 
Constitution was within the period of time when it was written.  
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In Seidman’s argument, the appropriate time for policy arguments grounded in the 
Constitution is the past, perhaps the late 18th and early 19th centuries. But the appropriate 
time can be the present, the near or distant future, a marked period of time like post-
Emancipation, or even a recurring and periodic time frame (e.g. perhaps at certain times 
of the week, month, year, or larger lengths of time).  
 
Place 
 Another qualification for an interpretation can be place: is the place, the spatial 
context, appropriate?215 Such a question was raised in response to the June 26, 2011 Faith 
Shared events in which dozens of churches participated (Faith Shared). With the goal of 
strengthening interfaith relations, these services involved clergy members, almost 
exclusively from Christian denominations it seems, reading sacred texts from other 
religions, such as the Koran, during their worship services (Faith Shared). One blogger, 
with the moniker da Tagliare, took exception to this event, writing that if his or her pastor 
read from the Koran at church, “I would ask my pastor to explain why he would dare use 
the pulpit on the Lord’s Day to teach or promote the religion of a false prophet. My 
attendance at his church would depend upon his answers to these questions” (emphasis 
mine). While da Tagliare’s argument is also grounded in time (“the Lord’s Day”), he or 
she also expresses strong feelings that the church pulpit is an inappropriate place to offer 
a reading of the Koran. 
 
Purpose 
                                                 





 An interpretation can be qualified or disqualified based on what motivates or 
drives the interpretation.216 In her essay “Dwelling in Decencies: Radical Criticism and 
the Feminist Perspective,” Marxist feminist literary critic Lillian Robinson explains the 
value of feminist criticism in contrast to standard literary criticism at the time 
(formalism), locating its value in part in its motivations: 
Feminist criticism, as its name implies, is criticism with a Cause, engaged 
criticism. But the critical model presented to us so far is merely engaged to be 
married. It is about to contract what can only be a mésalliance with bourgeois 
modes of thought and the critical categories they inform. To be effective feminist 
criticism cannot become simply bourgeois criticism in drag. It must be ideological 
and moral criticism; it must be revolutionary. (3) 
Robinson finds fault with the standard critical model because it perpetuates “bourgeois 
modes of thought.” But she argues that “effective” feminist criticism is properly 
“ideological” and “moral” in its motivations. Robinson’s concern is not so much the 
specific hermeneutic method employed by a school of criticism, but a school’s goals, 
which should be, in her view, “revolutionary” against the oppressive status quo. 
 
Consequence 
Another point on which an interpretation can be qualified or disqualified is its 
effects or consequences. We find an example of this line of argument in a 1853 letter, 
later published in his newspaper the Liberator, that William Lloyd Garrison wrote in 
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response to a letter he received from Harriet Beecher Stowe, who expressed deep concern 
that there were leading abolitionists who rejected the Bible. Garrison was one of those 
leading abolitionists who rejected the Bible, and he explained his reasoning as follows:  
You say it is on the Bible you ground all your hopes of the liberties, not only of 
the slave, but of the whole human race. How does it happen, then, that, in a nation 
professing to place as high an estimate on that volume as yourself, and 
denouncing as infidels all who do not hold it equally sacred, there are three 
millions and a half of chattel slaves, who are denied its possession, under severe 
penalties? Is not slavery sanctioned by the Bible, according to the interpretation of 
it by the clergy generally, its recognized expounders? What, then, does the cause 
of bleeding humanity gain by all this veneration for the book? 
While Garrison also had other reasons for rejecting the Bible as a moral authority, here he 
strongly implies that the veneration of the Bible has if anything led to the perpetuation of 
slavery rather than its abolition. Upon these grounds of negative or at least not positive 
consequences, he rejects the Bible as a moral authority, and asserts in its place “the 
nature of man, the inherent wrongfulness of oppression, the power of truth, and the 
omnipotence of God” (Garrison). 
 
Persons Involved 
 An interpretation can be qualified or disqualified based on the persons involved in 
the process of the production or interpretation of the text, besides the interpreter.217 Here 
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other persons might be the author of the text, the various audiences of the text, and the 
audience of an interpretation. One needs certain individuals or kinds of people, or 
individuals or groups with certain capacities, involved in these various roles for an 
interpretation to be qualified for consideration, and in other cases certain individuals or 
kinds of people involved in these roles can disqualify an interpretation from having its 
day in court. 
 Such is the case in the controversy over the authorship of the New Testament 
“pastoral epistles.” The Pastoral Epistles, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus, have traditionally 
been attributed to the Apostle Paul, but modern scholarship has called this claim into 
question. For those who believe that the authentic Pauline authorship of these letters is 
one of, if not the determining factor with respect to their canonicity, this dispute is of 
great importance. In his article “Pauline Authorship and the Pastoral Epistles: 
Implications for Canon,” Stanley E. Porter explores the issues surrounding the contested 
Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles and settles on two alternatives: 
It may well be necessary to conclude that even though the early church failed to 
detect the non-Pauline nature of the letters one must now decide to exclude them 
from their place as canonical writings. Or, it may be necessary (even if 
begrudgingly) to accept them as Pauline, because the alternative demands that we 
give up too much that we are unwilling to sacrifice. (123) 
While Porter concedes that there is pressure to maintain the ecclesiastical status quo and 
uphold the canonicity of the Pastoral Epistles, his conclusion demonstrates that for him 
the continued canonicity of these texts even today depends upon whether we can rightly 




status as part of the biblical canon, and therefore determines what kinds of interpretations 
can be derived from it (i.e. “biblical” interpretations). Although the specific argument 
presented here concerns the author of text, it is similar to qualifying arguments made in 
regards to other roles in the textual production and interpretation process. 
 
Hermeneutic Method 
 Another qualification for an interpretation can be the method by which the 
interpretation is carried out, often referred to as an interpreter’s hermeneutic method.218 
In his book Practicing Safer Texts: Food, Sex, and Bible in Queer Perspective, Ken 
Stone presents a unique approach to the Bible: “to ‘think’ food and sex in comparable 
ways” and to employ that thinking in the interpretation of the Bible, especially in regards 
to sexual matters (7). Because this hermeneutic method might be met with skepticism, 
even leading to the rejection of the interpretations he offers in the book prima facie, 
Stone justifies his approach at the very beginning. While his arguments are too numerous 
and complex to recapitulate here, the thrust of his justification is summarized in the 
following: “At a time when sexual disputes threaten to tear apart religious denominations 
and local congregations, I believe that a great deal of insight can be obtained from careful 
considerations of the many possible relations that exist, have been thought to exist, or 
could be made to exist between food and sex” (Stone 7). By offering a defense of his 
hermeneutic method in the beginning of his book—a defense built on offering some 
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amelioration of current religious strife over sexuality—Stone in effect authorizes the 
biblical (and other textual) interpretations that follow.  
 
Practice or Custom 
An interpretation can be enabled or disabled according to how well the various 
aspects of the interpretation, such as the who, what, when, and how, arguably fall in line 
with community practice. As the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium explains, 
“[Customary law] is that which, in the absence of any statute, is by usage endowed with 
the force of statue law” ([Cicero] 2.13.19; see [Cicero] 2.12.18). This qualification can be 
based on the precedent set by a single instance, convention,219 widespread or common 
practice,220 or the lack, dearth or rarity of practice. We see practice appealed to in the 
dispute over “The Star-Spangled Banner”’s eligibility to be the national anthem by 
supporters of the proposed legislation. Supporters often argued that the song had already 
achieved anthemic status and that it was a logical next step to legally recognize what was 
in practice true. We look more closely at specific arguments supporters offered in this 
vein in the penultimate section of this chapter. 
 
Style and Delivery 
                                                 
219 See Clark (65) on precedent and convention.  
220 As Austin points out, “for a procedure to be accepted involves more than for it merely 
to be the case that it is in fact generally used” (29; emphasis original). Even appealing to 
common practice assumes a higher principle that custom has prescriptive force, and 




 The quality or particulars of the style and delivery of an interpretation, or any 
concomitant rituals, can qualify or disqualify the legitimacy of that interpretation.221 We 
see a clear example of the qualifying nature of delivery in textual interpretation in 
African American preaching. In this genre of textual interpretation, preachers are 
expected to deliver their discourse with special attention to such features as rhythm, 
intonation, and language play. If the preacher does not properly deliver his or her sermon 
attuned to these expectations, the congregation will likely discount the sermon as not 
being a word from the Lord,222 regardless of the quality of the content (Selby, “Preaching 
as Mimesis” 251, 254). As Selby explains, “[O]nly as it is enacted in a particular mode of 
oral delivery does the African American congregation recognize and respond to th 
sermon as a successful exemplar of the genre” (“Preaching as Mimesis” 250). A 
successfully delivered sermon (with appropriate content) will garner lively participation 
from the congregation, but a poorly delivered sermon will be met with relative silence 
(see Moss 99; Callender and Cameron 163). 
 
Definition 
 Whether the facets of an interpretive situation meet a certain point of qualification 
depends on the definitions of the terms in which that point of qualification is cast. Thus, 
definitional arguments can play an important role qualifying or disqualifying texts.223 
(See chapter 6 for more on definition.) In chapter 6, we saw an example of a definitional 
dispute over the word preacher that was in the context of a larger jurisdictional dispute 
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over women’s preaching. The dispute in this example was between Ellen Stewart and 
William Johnston. Johnston argues that only men can be preachers because there are no 
examples of women preachers in the Bible (Stewart 172). Stewart challenges Johnston’s 
jurisdictional exclusion of women from preaching by defining preacher so that it 
includes the title of evangelist, of which there are multiple, indisputable biblical examples 
of women (175). Through her definition, Stewart presents biblical examples of women 
preachers, and thus argues for women to have the jurisdictional right to preach.  
 
The Right to Make a Jurisdiction Argument 
In some cases, jurisdiction arguments are concerned with the rights of a rhetor to 
make a jurisdiction argument in the first place.224 That is, does the person qualifying or 
disqualifying interpreters have the right to make such determinations? Or might there be 
a higher authority whose judgments supersede the original rhetor’s proclamations? 
Again, the historical debate over women’s right to preach and expound the Bible 
provides a helpful example. Argula von Grumbach, the first European woman to offer a 
defense of the right of women to speak on religious matters,225 writing in her 1523 
published and circulated open letter to the theologians at the University of Ingolstadt in 
Bavaria, checks the jurisdiction exclusion of herself as a woman from scriptural 
exposition by arguing that a higher power authorizes her discourse. She begins by 
asserting that she, like anyone else, is instructed about the true meaning of the Bible by 
the spirit of God (von Grumbach 86-87). She then continues with, “I don’t intend to bury 
my talent, if the Lord gives me grace” (von Grumbach 87). She follows this conditional 
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with a dozen biblical references that either exalt the power of the word of God or 
underline the importance of preaching (von Grumbach 87-88). After this litany of 
references, she points out: “Now I don’t find such promises from human beings, or papal 
laws or utterances,” followed by verses about the certainty and power of the word of God 
(von Grumbach 88).  Finally, she declares: “I cry out with the prophet Jeremiah, chapter 
22: ‘Earth, earth, earth! Hear the word of the Lord’” (von Grumbach 88). Through this 
line of reasoning, von Grumbach in effect pushes against claims made by various people 
that as a woman she should not expound the scriptures by appealing to a higher authority 
on the issue: God.   
 
Audience Values 
 One qualification for the legitimacy or admissibility of an interpretation is the 
degree to which it or any of its pursuant concomitants align with certain of the audience’s 
values, such as fairness, truth, or justice.226 We have already seen a manifestation of this 
line of argument in connection with the admissibility of texts: principle arguments in 
which texts are admitted or barred depending on whether the principles they espouse 
accord with the audience’s. We encounter specific examples of this kind of audience 
values argument in the penultimate section of the chapter, where disputants in the debate 
over “The Star-Spangled Banner”’s eligibility to be the national anthem argue whether 
the song is in line with or antiethetical to American ideals. But this line of argument can 
also be used to enable or disable interpretations on other points as well, for example, to 
argue that certain persons are rightly or wrongly barred from interpreting a text. 
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Relevance of the Condition 
 While arguing over the preliminary conditions of interpretation is itself a step 
removed from the act of interpreting a text, rhetors can take even another step back and 
argue over the relevance of a stipulated preliminary condition.227 Arguers can emphasize 
the relevance of a condition if they believe the audience has some doubt or disagreement 
about its preliminary nature, or they can assert that the condition is irrelevant and not 
necessary for carrying out the kind of interpretation in view. The latter angle may be used 
to help authorize certain kinds of interpretation that may be otherwise barred.  
A number of arguments in defense of women’s preaching have been of this latter 
sort. Jarena Lee, for example, argues for the irrelevance of gender as a preliminary 
condition for preaching in her 1849 autobiography. Lee, who was a member of the 
African Methodist Episcopal Church and felt a call to preach but was initially 
discouraged from doing so, contended: 
O how careful we ought to be, lest through our by-laws of church 
government and discipline, we bring into disrepute even the word of life. For as 
unseemly as it may appear now-a-days for a woman to preach, it should be 
remembered that nothing is impossible with God. And why should it be thought 
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then may be subject to an interpretive dispute in one of the interpretive stases (cf. 
Quintilian 3.6.72; Hermogenes 42; Fortunatianus 1.22). Because much of the discussion 
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Fortunatianus 1.11) argued that there could be no question of jurisdiction without law, 
that is law-defined procedure. However, when we expand our scope to non-legal 
discourse, we can see that many questions of procedure for interpreting texts are not 




impossible, heterodox, or improper for a woman to preach? seeing the Saviour 
died for the woman as well as for the man. 
If the man may preach, because the Saviour died for him, why not the 
woman? seeing he died for her also. Is he not a whole Saviour, instead of a half 
one? as those who hold it wrong for a woman to preach, would seem to make it 
appear. (11) 
Lee grounds her argument for the irrelevance of gender difference for preaching in her 
audience’s shared belief that Jesus died for men and women, thus, she argues, giving both 
the right to preach. 
 
Debating the Eligibility of “The Star-Spangled Banner” to Be the National Anthem 
 We now turn our attention back to the early 20th century debate over the legal 
designation of “The Star-Spangled Banner” as the national anthem of the United States, 
just as previous chapters have opened and later returned to an illustrative example of the 
stasis in focus. This debate concerned the appropriateness of the song given its lyrics, that 
is, whether it should occupy such an elevated place in the nation’s hymnbook or even 
canon. This public debate involved many players, but rather than focusing on a few as in 
previous chapters, we will sample discourse from a variety of players, focusing on a few 
main lines of argument that seem to characterize their contentions. Those in favor of 
making “The Star-Spangled Banner” the national anthem often used evidence from 
common practice or custom to support their position, while those against such legislative 
action often relied on consequential arguments to support their opposition. Both sides, 




Spangled Banner” express the essential spirit of the nation? The role of a national anthem 
is to convey a country’s ethos, thus the selection of a national anthem is a part of 
constructing a country’s identity. Because of this high stake, the arguments, as we will 
see, could be quite heated and bombastic.   
 Proponents of legislative action to make “The Star-Spangled Banner” the national 
anthem often argued that the song was already the national anthem in practice, a custom 
as it were, and that designating the song as the national anthem simply would officially 
acknowledge what was already true. The Bronx Memorial and Executive Committee of 
the “Grand Army of the Republic,” for example, referred to the flag tribute as “our long 
standing National song” (qtd. in Svejda 361). The author of the July 4, 1923 editorial in 
the St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat declared that the song “has been the most popular of 
patriotic airs, not even excepting ‘America’228…. It is a fully and truly a national anthem 
as if it were established in the constitution itself” (qtd. in Svejda 365-366). Perhaps best 
capturing this line of argument is a June 9, 1929 editorial that appeared in the Allentown 
Morning Call:  
This country has been ready for it [“The Star-Spangled Banner”] a long time. The 
song is old enough to have well-developed traditions surrounding it. It has no 
rival. It is almost universally known in this country. It is regarded as the national 
anthem even tho there is no official action to this end. Why not put it on the books 
as such? Eventually it is going to be done. Why not now? (qtd. in Svejda 382) 
While opponents to the official recognition of “The Star-Spangled Banner” would 
occasionally offer feeble rebuttals to these arguments from common practice, given that 
                                                 




the song did appear to in fact be rather popular, they had to rely on other argumentative 
resources to dampen enthusiasm for the song. 
 One such resource was argument from consequence. These arguments seem to 
largely advance the idea that the song perpetuates or promotes militarism, whether 
militarism against Great Britain, militarism in children, or militarism more broadly as an 
obstacle to peace, these three points not necessarily being unconnected. For example, in a 
1918 letter to the editor of the New York Times, Kitty Cheathem, who started a campaign 
against legislative action to recognize “The Star-Spangled Banner” as the national 
anthem,229 wrote, “To keep alive the emotion which this hymn expresses appears to me to 
prevent Great Britain and America from being allies in the true sense. We must forget 
‘those things which are behind’ and recognize ourselves as brothers” (22). While 
Cheathem argued that making “The Star-Spangled Banner” the national anthem would 
stymie relations between America and Great Britain, M. B. Hillegas, a professor of 
elementary education at Columbia University’s Teachers College, claimed that such a 
move would negatively affect the country’s children:  
It [“The Star-Spangled Banner”] gives to millions of children who sing it 
the notion that the only real patriotism is warlike activity….  
Just so long as ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ is made the symbol of 
patriotism, just so long will it be difficult to convey to children the broader ideals 
of patriotism—love of home, neighborliness, good citizenship, pride in worthy 
accomplishment, regard for those great builders who have made our country what 
it is and an eagerness to emulate them…. If we have an official national anthem, it 
                                                 




should be one whose effect upon the mental and spiritual development of our 
children will be in keeping with real patriotism. (qtd. in Molotsky 156) 
Gesturing to broader consequences, some detractors of “The Star-Spangled Banner” 
asserted that its legal institution would impede progress to peace. Returning to Cheatham 
again, she argued, “The song of the Star-Spangled Banner is certainly retarding it [the 
coming biblical millennium of peace] and is not doing anything to usher in the days of 
‘Peace on earth, good will toward men,’ to which the whole world is assembled, trying to 
direct their efforts” (qtd. in Prothero 224).  
 While proponents of official recognition of the “Star-Spangled Banner” seemed to 
favor arguments from practice and opponents seemed to favor arguments from 
consequence, both sides had to argue whether “The Star-Spangled Banner” expresses 
American ideals. In other words, were the principles expressed in the “Star-Spangled 
Banner” the same or congruent with the principles of America? Augusta Stetson, in an 
advertisement she published multiple times in multiple newspapers in the eastern U.S. in 
the 1920s,230 offers a good illustration of the arguments used by those against making 
“The Star-Spangled Banner” the national anthem, albeit with a religious bent.231 Having 
first quoted the third verse of the song, which glories in the bloody and deadly defeat of 
the British, she wrote,  
Do these phrases fittingly express the spirit of America, the nation to 
whom the longing world looks today for moral and spiritual leadership with 
Christ as the head? …. 
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The spirit of America is not suitably expressed by hatred, nor by the 
horrors of war, which all nations today are praying may be abolished….  
From the pages of America’s historic record, ‘The Star Spangled Banner’ 
is to-day being erased, by fiat of God. In its place will be revealed America’s true 
national anthem, written and composed by Americans, penned by Christly 
inspiration and illumined with spiritual light. (Stetson 4) 
While Stetson felt that the sentiments expressed in the “Star-Spangled Banner” did not 
represent the American spirit, others felt quite oppositely. John Philip Hill, Republican 
U.S. Representative from Maryland, exemplifies many of the arguments from principle 
made in support of “The Star-Spangled Banner” becoming the national anthem in opining 
that,  
“The Star-Spangled Banner” is essentially American. It belongs to the 
American people. It is the only American anthem, and whenever I hear “The Star-
Spangled Banner” or think of “The Star-Spangled Banner,” I think of the men 
who died in France, the men who died in the War of the Revolution, the Spanish-
American War, and the men who died in the War of 1812. It is inseparably bound 
up with the ideals of the American flag and the ideal of American nationality….  
The patriotic impulses and the patriotic expression of “The Star-Spangled 
Banner” are the national spirit.  
You cannot have a national anthem that has not got a militant spirit. We 





But arguments over the match of the principles in “The Star-Spangled Banner” 
and those of America extended beyond a dispute over the identity of the country. In 
debating principle, many rhetors made claims about the Americanness of those who fell 
in or out of line with their position. The debate was not only about what was truly 
American, but who was truly American. Stetson, for example, opened her advertisement 
with the following: “Every American worthy of the name, who is awake to the true 
meaning and origin of the anthem entitled ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ will forever 
repudiate it, as an utterly unworthy medium for expressing one of the noblest of 
sentiments—patriotism and love for our glorious country” (4; emphasis mine). In a 1923 
Baltimore Sun editorial, “Another Shot at the Old Anthem,” we find: “‘The Star-
Spangled Banner’ survives…because there are quite a number of Americans still left in 
the United States” (6). The barely veiled implication here is that “The Star-Spangled 
Banner”’s detractors are false Americans. And, arguing that the love George Washington 
and Abraham Lincoln had for the United States is the same love invoked by “The Star-
Spangled Banner,” the author of the St. Louis Daily Globe-Democrat June 4, 1923 
editorial writes, “It is that same love that swells the breast of every true American when 
he hears the strains of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’” (qtd. in Svejda 366; emphasis mine).  
Ultimately, arguments in support of legal recognition of the song persuaded the 
necessary agents (members of Congress), and the Star-Spangled Banner became the 
country’s official national anthem in 1931. But, at least from one perspective, the debate 
that preceded this legislative move was part of a larger on-going dispute over the 






 Studying arguments and disputes in the stasis of jurisdiction reveals how the 
interpretation of texts is socially, culturally, and institutionally controlled through 
argument. We more clearly see the various kinds of conventional constraints on issuing 
interpretations of texts. Often these constraints are invisible, even when we are in the 
midst of interpreting texts ourselves. These constraints, however, become quite visible 
when they are called into question or brought to the attention to forestall an act of 
interpretation or to assure the audience that the interpreter is within his or her right to 
interpret the text at hand. Even then, the untrained observer may not realize that the 
rhetor has stepped out of the realm of interpretation and into the realm of procedure, and 
specifically the realm of procedure that governs the acceptability of an instance of textual 
interpretation. 
 Austin’s point about studying infelicitous speech acts is well taken (14). We stand 
to gain much from examining instances where constraints of textual interpretation seem 
to have been violated in some way. But we should not ignore those cases in which 
nothing has been violated, but a jurisdiction argument is used anyway. The exigence in 
these cases may be that the fulfillment of certain qualifications are silently questioned or 
doubted by the audience causing the rhetor to feel that he or she must stress that the 
interpretation has satisfied those doubted preliminary conditions to ensure that the 
interpretation’s legitimacy is not questioned. In any case, jurisdiction arguments alert us 
to constraints on textual interpretation that we may not have otherwise recognized.  
Even when there are no jurisdiction arguments made these constraints still exist. 




and be accepted in any particular context. By cataloguing the kinds of arguments that 
people make to defend or attack certain qualifications for performing an interpretive act, 
we can begin to outline what socio-cultural-institutional pieces must be in place for a 
legitimate, i.e. community-acceptable, interpretation to occur. Then, by examining which 
of those kinds of arguments are used in any one community surrounding a particular text, 
and their specific articulations, we can understand how the values of a community map 
onto various situations of interpreting texts.  
Such observations would represent true advances in our understanding of how 
textual interpretation works in the real world, that is a human world that is socially, 
culturally, politically, economically, etc., constituted. We can see what forces act on 
textual interpretation even though they have no direct bearing on the process of 
constructing the meaning of a text. But of course, these various non-textual constraints 
have innumerable consequences for the kinds of interpretations that are perpetuated, 
circulated, popularized, and ultimately legitimated. That is the point. The one who gains 












Chapter 8: Zooming Out: Interrelations, Implications, and Conclusions  
In the preceding chapters I have isolated and closely examined each of the 
interpretive stases: letter versus spirit, contradictory passages, ambiguity, definition, 
assimilation, and jurisdiction. In this concluding chapter, I “zoom out” from my more in-
depth analysis of each interpretive stasis and examine how the interpretive stases work as 
a rhetorical system for studying, understanding, analyzing, and generating interpretive 
arguments. I also consider how the interpretive stases fit within the larger theoretical 
system of the stases, in particular their relation to the more familiar situational stases. I 
then suggest how composition and literature teachers can use the interpretive stases to 
teach students how to think about and craft arguments about texts. Lastly, before some 
final concluding remarks, I discuss some promising intersections between the interpretive 
stases and contemporary language theory for further research. 
In analyzing any interpretive dispute, even ones only involving single texts, a 
more complex picture of the interpretive stases emerges as the following case illustrates. 
In her 17th century pamphlet, Women’s Speaking Justified, Proved and Allowed of by the 
Scriptures, Margaret Fell argues against the widely accepted interpretation of 1 
Corinthians 14:34-35232 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12233 that women should be silent in church. 
She states that the “ground of [this] objection is taken from the Apostle’s words [in these 
passages],” but that “how far they wrong the Apostle’s intentions in these Scriptures, we 
shall show clearly when we come to them in their course and order” (61; emphasis mine). 
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Fell’s framing of this dispute as one over the meaning of the words against the intentions 
behind them places her argument squarely within the stasis of letter versus spirit. Indeed, 
what follows in the rest of her pamphlet is an argument for God’s “will and mind 
concerning women” as opposed to a strict, literal interpretation of these two passages 
(Fell 61). 
Yet upon closer examination, we find what appear to be instances of other 
interpretive stases in the text. For example, Fell makes what look like several 
assimilation arguments throughout her pamphlet. In one place she argues, “Thus much 
may prove that the Church of Christ is a woman, and those that speak against the 
woman’s speaking speak against the Church of Christ and the seed of the woman, which 
is Christ” (62). Here Fell alludes to Genesis 3:15, where God curses the serpent for its 
deception, and a number of New Testament passages, such as 2 Corinthians 11:2, which 
many Christians believe imply that the church will in some sense be united to Christ, as 
two people are in human marriage, in the new age. Through an assimilative move of 
equivalency (see Chapter 6), Fell condemns prohibitions of women’s speaking by arguing 
that such prohibitions by extension also fall against the Church and even the prophesied 
offspring of the first woman, Christ.  
In another place in the pamphlet, Fell seems to enter the interpretive stasis of 
definition. Here Fell returns to one of the passages of contention, 1 Corinthians 14:34-
35,234 and asserts, “Here the Apostle clearly manifests his intent, for he speaks of women 
that were under the Law, and in that transgression as Eve was, and such as were to learn, 
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and not speak publicly, but they must first ask their husbands at home, and it was a shame 
for such to speak in the Church” (64; emphasis mine). In this passage Fell makes a 
definitional move concerning the scope of a word by limiting the women referred to in 
this passage by the pronoun they/them to those under the Law. These women, according 
to Fell, are the women Paul is silencing. This definitional move allows her to argue that 
women not under the Law, those whom have “had the Revelation and Spirit of God 
poured upon them,” are permitted to speak in church (64). In Chapter 2 we learned that 
defining words in a text can be a move in a letter versus spirit debate, but we also know 
from Chapter 5 that the act of defining a word itself can signal a definitional dispute.  
In yet another passage Fell appears to provoke a dispute in the stasis of 
contradictory passages. In a “Further Addition” to the pamphlet, Fell references a 
passage from Acts that records Paul’s stay with Philip, one of the “seven” leaders of the 
biblical church in Jerusalem, where it also records that Philip had four prophesying 
daughters (67; Acts 21:9). Fell points out that, although Paul stayed with them, the Bible 
does not record his disapproval of their speaking (67; Acts 21:8-10). With this example in 
mind, she continues, arguing that if Paul’s proscription applied to “all women, that no 
woman might speak, then Paul would have contradicted himself” (67). In a classic move 
of contradictory passages, Fell counters an opposing interpretation of one passage with 
another passage from the same text whose meaning seems obviously clear.  
Besides apparent instances of other interpretive stases, it seems that Fell’s 
argument is ultimately not in the interpretive stasis of letter versus spirit, but the 
situational stasis of quality: as the title states, she is justifying women’s speaking. That 




Timothy 2:11-12 seems to include the quintessential moves of other interpretive stases 
(assimilation, definition, and contradictory passages) and is enveloped by the situational 
stasis of quality raises a number of questions. How are the interpretive stases related to 
each other? And how are the interpretive stases related to the situational stases? Fell’s 
pamphlet is just one example of an interpretive argument whose classification under one 
interpretive stasis is complicated by the complexity of its moves. 
 
The Intra-relations of the Interpretive Stases  
At first glance, the interpretive stases, unlike the situational stases, appear not to 
be connected to one another by presupposition in a hierarchical order. While the 
situational stases generally follow a pattern of progression, with disputes moving from 
fact to definition to cause and effect, etc., disputes over the interpretation of texts, if they 
move from one interpretive stasis to another at all, appear to have no predictable 
progression. It appears that rhetors can simply re-construe their orientation to the text, 
thereby shifting the debate into another stasis. With the situational stases rhetors can 
work to resolve conflicts in higher stases by shifting down to lower stases, but this 
mechanism appears to be absent for interpretive disputes (Fahnestock and Secor, 
“Towards a Modern Version of Stasis” 223). 
Yet in fact a presuppositional hierarchy does seem to structure the relations 
between the interpretive stases and thus interpretive disputes. This hierarchy does not 
contain as many rungs as the situational stasis ladder, but it is a hierarchy nonetheless. In 
the presuppositional hierarchy of the interpretive stases, the first level of debate involves 




questions to be resolved at this level concern the linguistic forms that make up the text 
and the referents of the text’s terms. These questions fall under the stases of ambiguity 
and definition. Rhetors must be in agreement about what a text means at this most basic 
and fundamental level before they can settle higher order questions, such as how a text 
should be applied in a novel situation.  
Once rhetors agree on the explicit meaning of a text, its letter, such that there are 
no questions of ambiguity or definition, they may move to questions of negation, 
affirmation, application, and passage comparison. The interpretive stases of letter versus 
spirit, contradictory passages, and assimilation, which all exist on the next level of the 
presuppositional hierarchy, represent these questions in various ways. In letter versus 
spirit, rhetors agree that the text has an apparent explicit meaning, but one party believes 
that this explicit meaning is negated by the real meaning of the text (as derived from the 
author’s intention, for instance). In assimilation, all parties affirm the text’s letter, but at 
least one party wishes to go beyond the letter to apply the text in a novel way or context. 
In contradictory passages, multiple texts are reconciled to each other, with, in the classic 
and most basic case of two texts, the letter affirmed and the purported spirit negated in 
the first and the letter negated and spirit affirmed in the second. Contradictory passages 
also often arises as a result of applying the passages in question. In each of these stases, 
disagreement depends on rhetors agreeing on the meaning of the text’s letter—that is, 
rhetors agree that the text is unambiguous and that its terms are properly defined.  
As we saw in previous chapters, some of the lines of argument particular to the 
interpretive stases are eponymous with other interpretive stases. This observation is not 




share names with the stases indicating kinds of argument rather than disputes. That 
certain lines of interpretive argument in a sense “epitomize”235 larger interpretive 
disputes should not be surprising given that all of the stases involve making particular 
moves to initiate a debate.  In other words, each stasis has its key argumentative move. 
For instance, arguing for the expansion or narrowing of the scope of a term, a definitional 
argument, is the key argumentative move in every dispute in the stasis of definition. If no 
rhetor makes this move, the dispute cannot be said to have entered into this stasis.  
But, as we have also noted in previous chapters, some of these epitomizing lines 
of argument can be used in stases whose essences they do not perform. If we look back at 
the strategies catalogued for each stasis in the previous chapters, we discover that the 
only epitomizing lines of arguments that can persuasively operate outside their 
eponymous stases are those of ambiguity, definition, and jurisdiction.236 This finding 
confirms what we have just discussed about ambiguity and definition, as arguments 
concerning textual meaning at its most basic level (the letter of the text), and what we 
know about jurisdiction as concerning the preliminary conditions for issuing an 
interpretation. Thus, in every case when an epitomizing line of argument is used in a 
stasis that it does not epitomize, the interpretive premises or conditions of the larger 
dispute are called into question. These out-of-stasis epitomizing lines of argument shift 
the dispute into the more fundamental or preliminary stases they represent. Resolution of 
                                                 
235 Fahnestock argues that certain rhetorical figures “epitomize” lines of reasoning in the 
sense that they “summar[ize]” or “condense[]” the relationships between terms expressed 
by a form of argument (Rhetorical Figures 24). I use “epitomize” here in a similar sense: 
certain lines of argument perform the essence of the interpretive stases. 
236 My conclusions closely resemble the courtroom strategy laid out by Hermogenes, 




questions in the original stasis cannot take place until questions at these more 
fundamental or preliminary levels have been resolved.  
When Fell, for example, limits the women referred to in 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 to 
“women that were under the law,” she shifts the interpretive premises of her initial letter 
versus spirit argument. Fell’s initial plan to negate the letter of the text, the “Apostle’s 
words,” rests on her agreement with her opponents that 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 at the 
level of the letter prohibits all women from speaking in church. However, by redefining 
certain words in the text, she is no longer negating the letter, pitting the “Apostle’s 
intentions” against the “objection taken from [his] words,” but has in fact changed the 
letter itself (Fell 61). Thus, she and her interlocutors are no longer in agreement about the 
letter of the text. It is no longer one side on letter, one side on spirit, but each side now 
has a different interpretation of the letter, hinging on the definition of the words that refer 
to women.  
By making a move of definition, in service of explicating Paul’s intentions as part 
of an argument that begins in the stasis of letter versus spirit, Fell shifts her argument 
into the lower, more fundamental stasis of definition. From this perspective, the dispute 
cannot move forward until it is resolved in this stasis. Fell may have in fact located the 
fundamental locus of contention in this dispute concerning which women Paul’s 
prohibition applies to, in which case resolution on this point would not return the dispute 
back to the higher stasis of letter versus spirit or any other higher stasis. However, if the 
two sides reach agreement on the meaning of the letter of the text, but one side still feels 
that this meaning is insufficient, that side could argue for a more sufficient interpretation 




 The relation of ambiguity and definition to letter versus spirit, contradictory 
passages, and assimilation is one of presupposition hierarchy. Ambiguity and definition 
concern issues of meaning upon which arguments in the other stases are built. However, 
as we saw in Chapter 7, the relationship of jurisdiction to the other stases is different. 
Jurisdiction is concerned with the conditions for issuing any interpretation and is thus 
preliminary to all of the stases. Thus, when invoked, jurisdiction suspends or postpones a 
dispute in any of the other stases until it is resolved. To be clear, invoking jurisdiction in 
one of the higher-order interpretive stases does not send the dispute into a lower-order 
stasis (ambiguity or definition). Invoking jurisdiction in a higher-order stasis like letter 
versus spirit simply means that for the dispute to continue in that stasis, certain 
preliminary conditions must be satisfied.  
This is true even for jurisdiction disputes concerning texts. These kinds of 
jurisdiction disputes often look like disputes in the other five interpretive stases, for 
instance arguments over the qualification of a text based on whether it contradicts itself. 
The difference is that disputes in the other five interpretive stases happen within the 
context of admissibility—texts disputed in the other five interpretive stases are presumed 
to be admissible to the issue at hand. In jurisdiction disputes concerning texts, on the 
other hand, the admissibility of the text itself is in question. If the question of 
admissibility is resolved in the affirmative, the dispute returns to the original interpretive 
dispute, whether lower- or higher-order. There are no intermediary steps. Thus, it is best 
to see jurisdiction as existing outside the presuppositional hierarchy. It can be invoked in 




dispute is ended de facto, indefinitely suspended, or resumed, but it is not as a result 
shifted to another stasis. 
 Jurisdiction, as we have seen in previous chapters, is related to the other 
interpretive stases in another way. In some of the interpretive stases, arguments for the 
qualification of texts can work as strategies of persuasion. Such strategies become 
available means of persuasion whenever the meaning of a text is dependent on the 
inclusion or exclusion of another text or its parts. For instance, the boundaries of a text 
can play a key role in constructing the meaning of a passage as they determine the co-text 
by which the passage should be understood. Determining the boundaries of a text, which 
parts are in and which parts are out, is a matter of jurisdiction. As in other jurisdiction 
disputes, these cases represent arguments over the conditions for interpreting a text. No 
movement in the presuppositional hierarchy results from these kinds of argument. Once 
the jurisdiction question has been answered, the original dispute is ended de facto, 
indefinitely suspended, or resumed.  
With respect to the presuppositional hierarchy, rhetors can move not only from 
higher- to lower-order stases and vice versa, but also laterally within the two levels. This 
fact represents one major distinction between the interpretive and situational stases, as 
there is no logically structured lateral movement possible between the situational stases 
since their relation to one another is vertical. Lateral movement between the interpretive 
stases represents the re-construal of the textual dispute: at any point in the process of 
arguing for the meaning of a text, rhetors can change their orientation to the text and thus 




Fell makes a lateral move from letter versus spirit to contradictory passages in 
the “Further Addition” to her pamphlet. Here Fell throws into sharp relief Paul’s apparent 
prohibitions against women speaking in 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11 and 
an apparently clear instance of women’s ecclesiastical speaking (Philip’s prophesying 
daughters) without Paul’s condemnation in Acts 21:8-10. In doing so, Fell re-approaches 
the original question of the meaning of 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11. In 
her initial approach, Fell splits the letter of these contested passages from their spirit to 
make a claim about Paul’s intent. But as a result of this split, her claim about Paul’s 
intention becomes un-tethered from the biblical text. In order to make a convincing case 
about Paul’s intention, she needs to show that her claims are evidenced in the text. 
By placing the contested passages, according to their conventional meaning, in an 
apparently contradictory relationship with another biblical text, Fell presents her readers 
with an interpretive problem to be solved. A satisfying solution could persuade them to 
change their minds about the meaning of the contested passages. The solution Fell 
provides is definitional: “but they were such women that the Apostle mentions in 
Timothy, that grew wanton and were busy-bodies, and tattlers, and kicked against 
Christ” and “whereas it is said, I permit not a woman to speak as saith the Law—but 
where women are led by the Spirit of God, they are not under the Law” (67; 
emphasis in italics original; emphasis in bold mine). Fell’s definition offers her readers a 
way of maintaining the coherence, and thus the integrity, of the Bible with respect to 
these three passages. In turn, this definition works to ground Fell’s claim about Paul’s 
intention in the biblical text, specifically its letter, by changing the letter itself. By re-




contradictory passages, Fell accesses different means of persuasion not originally 
available to her.  
Each lateral move from one specific stasis to another has a different set of 
characteristics. In moves between letter versus spirit and contradictory passages, arguers 
usually go from considering the meaning of a passage in isolation (or as in the above 
example in mere comparison with other passages) to considering the meaning of multiple 
passages in relation to one another, or vice versa. In moves between assimilation on the 
one hand and letter versus spirit or contradictory passages on the other, arguers go back 
and forth between tussles over where to locate the meaning of the text or texts and how 
far the meaning of a text can be extended to novel situations. Moves between ambiguity 
and definition most smoothly occur between definition and ambiguity of reference, where 
rhetors go between semantic differences of kind to semantic differences of degree. But 
other moves at this level are also possible.  
While the text may stay the same when arguers make these lateral moves, the 
nature of the debate does not. When arguers make lateral moves across interpretive 
stases, they ask their audiences to reorient themselves to the text as well, for instance, to 
no longer negate the letter meaning of the text but to apply it to a novel situation, or to no 
longer see one text with two different readings but one text with one reading and two 
shades of meaning.  
 So far we have examined how arguers can move through the vertical and 
horizontal structures of the stases, but what about the recursive nature of the interpretive 
stases? The situational stases are recursive—a debate in one stasis can be “interrupt[ed]” 




contingencies of the situation (Fahnestock and Secor, “Toward a Modern Version of 
Stasis” 218). If this recursivity, or nesting, can occur among the situational stases, it may 
also occur among the interpretive stases. And indeed it does. Nesting occurs among the 
interpretive stases if, in a dispute about a text, a second text is brought in as support and a 
dispute arises about this second text. In order for this second text to be used as support in 
the larger dispute, the dispute surrounding it must be resolved.  
Fell brings in multiple other biblical passages into her pamphlet besides 1 
Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12, whose meaning she is contesting, and in 
multiple cases treats them with assimilation arguments. As we saw in the introduction of 
this chapter, she assimilates Genesis 3:15 and New Testament passages such as 2 
Corinthians 2:11 to argue that prohibitions of women’s speaking by extension also fall 
against the church and even Christ. In one sense these assimilation moves are simply 
lines of argument used to mold the meaning of these secondary texts to support Fell’s 
larger letter versus spirit argument. But as the key, epitomizing moves of assimilation, 
they raise that stasis’ fundamental questions with respect to those texts and open up the 
possibility for debate on those points. Thus, Fell’s assimilation arguments represent 
nested stasis arguments or at least the potential for nested stasis disputes in her larger 
letter versus spirit argument over 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12. 
Nested disputes are just that—nested. They are not presuppositionally related to 
the stases in which they occur. They are incidental in that they happen to arise when 
another text is brought in to resolve a larger interpretive dispute. But they are not 
fundamental to the resolution of the dispute. Arguers can always decide to abandon a 





The Interrelation of the Situational and Interpretive Stases 
But questions of textual interpretation often seem to arise in the context of larger 
non-textual issues, issues normally classified according to the rubric of the situational 
stases. It thus makes sense to ask, how are the situational and interpretive stases related to 
one another?  
One way to approach this question is to ask whether the interpretive stasis 
questions are in fact manifestations of the situational stases in the context of textual 
interpretation. In other words, perhaps the situational stases really do comprehensively 
classify all types of disputes that can arise in any situation and the interpretive stases 
represent their particular instantiations. Quintilian argued that this was the case. He 
claimed that “from those three basic Issues [Conjecture, Definition, and Quality] arise 
these shadows of them [the legal issues], as it were, sometimes simple, sometimes 
complex, but with their own peculiar features” (3.6.88). Specifically, Quintilian outlined 
their relationships as follows: 
Such are Letter and Spirit, which is unquestionably based either on Quality or on 
Conjecture; Inference, which generally depends on Quality; Conflict of Laws, 
which has the same structure as Letter and Spirit; and amphibolia (Ambiguity), 
which is always a matter of Conjecture. Definition also belongs to both classes—
the class concerned with the consideration of facts and that concerned with that of 
the written law. All of these variations, even if they fall under the three basic 
Issues, have (as I have said) some peculiarities of their own…[but] there is no 




Yet even though we could find important and fundamental similarities between the 
interpretive and situational stases, as Quintilian does here, we risk losing sight of the 
“peculiarities” of controversies that hinge on texts if we reduce the former to the latter 
(Quintilian 3.6.88).  
Of all the interpretive stases, the best case for joining an interpretive stasis to a 
situational stasis can be made for jurisdiction. The situational stasis of jurisdiction is 
concerned with procedural questions prior to disputes over situational elements. 
Likewise, the interpretive stasis of jurisdiction is concerned with preliminary conditions 
for issuing interpretations. Since both kinds of jurisdiction exist outside of the 
hierarchical order of their respective stases, the argument could be made that a larger 
stasis category of jurisdiction exists standing outside the rest of the stases. All 
jurisdiction disputes would then be arguably united by the same principles but have 
particular realizations depending on whether they concern arguments over situational 
elements or arguments over texts.  
The case for joining or reduction does not hold up, however, for the other 
interpretive stases. Letter versus spirit, for instance, represents a useful, functional 
category for classifying interpretive disputes in which arguers split over interpreting a 
text in regards to its explicitly understood content versus another source of meaning. If 
we are interested in understanding the kinds of arguments used in these disputes and the 
contexts in which these disputes pop up, it makes sense to group them together rather 
than splitting them up according to any situational stasis classification. Assimilation, 
likewise, represents a particular approach to textual meaning. While assimilation disputes 




analogically extending the explicit the meaning of a text. This distinction, which usefully 
sets these kinds of disputes apart from other interpretive disputes, is lost if this stasis is 
subsumed under the situational heading of quality.  In the same way, reclassifying 
disputes in the stasis of contradictory passages as either conjectural or qualitative would 
elide the major stake in these debates: the integrity of the text as grounded in its logical 
consistency. This stake motivates the kinds of arguments used in these debates, and it is 
useful for analysts to have a specific kind of classification of these kinds of disputes.  
In the same vein, ambiguity is best considered separately from other conjectural 
disputes. In the first place, unlike other questions of fact, except in cases of 
indecipherability, the number of alternative readings or senses tends to be more severely 
limited. This is not to say that the possibilities of meanings is limited, only that questions 
of ambiguity themselves are limited to the possible linguistic forms evoked by the string 
of signs present—and this is usually rather finite. (Out of this finitude of linguistic forms, 
however, arguers are able to build an indefinite number of meanings.) Interpreting non-
linguistic data, however, offers a much wider, and less constrained number of possible 
“readings.” Here, arguers are not choosing from a limited range of linguistic forms, but 
scenarios and sequences of events, which can be indefinitely varied. Another significant 
difference is that questions of ambiguity always involve texts created by people and 
therefore always involve issues of intention. Situational questions of conjecture, on the 
other hand, may or may not involve intention (Quintilian 7.2.1). Again, the variable of 
the text looms large as a distinguishing factor. 
While Quintilian outlines specific relationships between the legal/interpretive 




places in the rhetorical tradition (even in Quintilian’s own work) suggest that all of the 
interpretive stases could be tied to the single situational stasis of quality.237 Several 
authors note that there are certain kinds of qualitative questions that depend on written 
documents, especially the law. For example, Cicero writes that quality has “two 
subdivisions, equitable and legal,” and that in legal instances of quality “we examine 
what the law is according to the custom of the community and according to justice” 
(1.11.14).238 Questions of quality are concerned with the relative nature or character of a 
thing (Cicero 1.9.12). These questions can only be decided by some kind of outside or 
calibrating norm, standard, or value. Many communities use texts as a source of norms 
for determining these types of questions in certain realms (e.g. legal or moral). Using 
texts to adjudicate questions of quality always involves interpretation, and the questions 
of interpretation that arise in these instances can be classified according to the heads of 
the interpretive stases. Indeed, whenever textually grounded norms are in dispute, arguers 
can essentially change the norm by reinterpreting the text to support their positions, using 
many of the arguments outlined in this dissertation. As we observed in the beginning of 
this chapter, Fell’s letter versus spirit argument over the meaning of 1 Corinthians 14:34-
35 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12 is ultimately driven by the qualitative question of whether it is 
biblical for women to speak in church or not. While the status quo answer to this question 
                                                 
237 Arguments for tying the legal/interpretive stases to other particular rational/situational 
stases have also been made. Christian Koch, for example, argues that “the status 
legales…may be seen as subdivisions of the status of definition” (281). His reasoning for 
this connection is in fact rather similar to that for placing the interpretive stases under the 
heading of quality: “In the status of definition, we discuss how a fact can be subsumed 
under a rule or norm. The status legales are about the same kind of discussion, but they 
approach it from the other end, applying norms to facts…. [D]isputes about correlating 
facts and norms are innumerable and varied…but the four usual status legales provide a 
model for how to distinguish and specify such disputes” (Koch 281-282).  




at the time was negative, Fell’s reinterpretation of the key biblical passages represents an 
attempt to shift the norm to achieve an affirmative answer.  
Yet even though there is wide acknowledgement in the rhetorical tradition that 
certain qualitative questions turn on written documents, several treatises maintain a 
separate listing of types of disputes whose primary source of contention is textual 
meaning.239 I think this approach makes sense. Certain qualitative disputes do turn on 
written texts. Here, we might say that interpretive disputes may be nested within larger 
disputes of quality when the meaning of a text, which is used to adjudicate that particular 
issue of quality, is itself called into question. However, there is no reason to limit our 
conception of the interpretive stases as kinds of qualitative disputes. Interpretive disputes 
can arise without the exigence of a qualitative question. The process of reading itself can 
stoke questions of interpretation. For instance, a reader might find a passage in a text 
ambiguous, in the absence of a qualitative question, simply because he or she lacks the 
necessary contextual clues to choose between the senses evoked by a linguistic form. 
While the interpretive stases certainly share certain concerns with some of the 
situational stases, they cannot be reduced to them. The particulars of textual 
interpretation, deriving from attempts at understanding meaning at the direction of 
intended signs when other means of access to the original intention are severely limited, 
renders these interpretive disputes categorically different from their situational 
counterparts. Therefore, I maintain that if we are to use stasis theory for contemporary 
rhetorical and pedagogical uses, we need one set of stases that treats situational elements 
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and another that treats textual elements, neither one being demoted in status as a pseudo- 
or quasi-set of stases. 
 
Pedagogical Uses and Implications of the Interpretive Stases 
Just as teachers of rhetoric and composition have incorporated the situational 
stases into their courses as both a writing and analytical tool for students, I argue that 
teachers should also consider including the interpretive stases to work towards these ends 
as well. The interpretive stases offer students a concrete and systematic way of generating 
arguments about texts and a structured means of understanding debates over textual 
meaning. 
In the first place, those who teach rhetorical analysis might consider incorporating 
the interpretive stases as part of the training they give their students in this area. Some 
writing and rhetoric teachers already include the more familiar situation stases in their 
instruction on rhetorical analysis, as evidenced by Mark Longaker and Jeffrey Walker’s 
Rhetorical Analysis: A Brief Guide for Writers. I suggest, in addition to these stases, 
which are concerned with the contingencies of a given situation, teaching the interpretive 
stases as a specific method for analyzing arguments over textual meaning. Since so many 
contemporary disputes do involve texts—from controversies over the U.S. Constitution to 
the scrutiny paid to celebrity tweets—a method tailored for investigating these kinds of 
arguments would prove very useful for students.  
Second, we can use the interpretive stases to help teach our students how to 
engage in and make arguments about the meaning of texts—an essential skill set in 




composition teachers are already using the more familiar situational stases to help teach 
students argumentation skills as we see in Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s Ancient 
Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor’s A Rhetoric 
of Argument, Lester Faigley and Jack Selzer’s Good Reasons with Contemporary 
Arguments, and Andrea Lunsford, John Ruszkiewicz and Keith Walter’s Everything’s an 
Argument. But the interpretive stases could be used to specifically help students make 
arguments about texts. 
Let us imagine that an instructor was teaching an upper division English course 
and wanted to help his or her students practice engaging with arguments by literary critics 
or other scholars of textual meaning. The interpretive stases could give students a 
systematic guide for determining the central issue of disagreement concerning the 
interpretation of a text among a group of critics. Knowing that there are six different 
kinds of disputes can help students discern the thrusts of the critical discussions they 
encounter. Are critics primarily arguing for one reading over another based on verbal 
form? Then the stasis is ambiguity. Are critics attempting to reconcile two passages that 
seem to clash with one another in order to achieve some kind of textual harmony? Then 
the stasis is contradictory passages. Once students discern the thrust of the argument, 
they can look for the particular point of contention in the dispute they are examining. 
Having determined that a series of articles are arguing over which plays were written by 
Shakespeare in the stasis of jurisdiction, a student could pinpoint a specific contention 
over whether Shakespeare wrote Edward III or not.240 Sometimes the process may 
happen in reverse, with students discovering the specific question first and classifying the 
                                                 




kind of dispute second. Students may first recognize that critics are arguing over whether 
a certain play was written by Shakespeare and then recognize that this is a jurisdiction 
dispute. In either case, giving students a way to pinpoint the main bone of contention 
about a text could help students get their bearings in a critical discussion rather than 
becoming mired and lost in the details of an argument.  
With the central issue and question identified, students can then generate 
arguments that engage the concerns of the critic(s) they wish to respond to rather than 
generating arguments in a vacuum. They can begin by directly engaging the particular 
contention of the critic or critical discussion. Students may be best aided in this pursuit by 
reformulating the main contention as a question (cf. Fahnestock and Secor, A Rhetoric of 
Argument 83). For research projects, this question can act as students’ overarching 
research question (cf. Fahnestock and Secor, A Rhetoric of Argument 88). For example, 
suppose students were attempting to enter the critical discussion we examined in Chapter 
4 over Phillis Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa to America.” The dispute 
between could be phrased as so: Does Wheatley’s poem contain deliberate ambiguities 
that work to subvert the racist ideology of her time? Once reformulated, students can 
pose a claim answering this question: The ambiguities in Wheatley’s poem appear to be 
deliberate, but rather than simply subverting the racist ideology of her time, they seem to 
reflect her own ambivalence about the consequences of slavery. They can then see how 
their claim lines up with claims by other critics in the critical discussion and position 
their claim accordingly. Knowing the kind of dispute they are entering can also help 
students more explicitly frame the claim they are making and the discussion they are 




kinds of discussions and claims with their respective characteristics (cf. Fahnestock and 
Secor, A Rhetoric of Argument 84).  
Then, students can turn to the topics or lines of argument particular to each 
interpretive stasis to discover support for their claims in making an argument. All of these 
topics can be phrased as questions that can guide students in their own research and 
reasoning. In other words, each topic can point students to sites of inquiry leading to 
deeper research and refinement and support of their claim. For example, a student 
wishing to enter the dispute over ambiguities in Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from 
Africa to America” might turn to the topic standards of usage and investigate the 
following question: How were the ambiguous words in question generally understood or 
defined at the time of Wheatley’s writing? This question, spurred by the heuristic 
provided by the topics, could lead the student to do a philological study of certain words 
in the poem. The student could then use the research he/she unearths to refine his/her 
initial claim and eventually support the claim he/she makes in the paper he/she turns into 
the instructor. 
The interpretive stases along with their respective topics help make explicit the 
critical assumptions and persuasive moves that more seasoned critics and analysts take 
for granted. As the research presented in Laura Wilder’s Rhetorical Strategies and Genre 
Conventions in Literary Studies: Teaching and Writing in the Disciplines strongly 
suggests, teaching the specific topoi of literary criticism, and arguably textual analysis 
more generally, greatly increases students’ success in performing these tasks (Wilder 




stases to which they are tied can show students that different kinds of claims require 
different kinds of support (cf. Fahnestock and Secor, A Rhetoric of Argument 87).  
Further, the presuppositional hierarchy of the interpretive stases, as presented in 
my dissertation, shows students how certain disputes rest on prior grounds of agreement 
concerning textual meaning. For example, the hierarchy can show students that disputes 
over contradictions in texts rest on prior agreement about what critics assume the text can 
be taken to be saying. If students recognize that a critical argument or dispute occurs in a 
higher-order stasis, they might investigate whether other critics have disagreements about 
the same passages of the text at a more fundamental level in the stases of either ambiguity 
or definition. Or, students may see if they can broker arguments in these stases 
themselves. Instructors can also warn students about the benefits and costs of arguing in a 
stasis different from the one of the critics they wish to engage. For instance, such 
arguments, especially if the move is lateral, can place a student outside of a discussion 
and make his or her contribution irrelevant. Arguing in a different stasis can only be done 
with strategic, argumentative bridging.  
Specific stases can also be used to teach students about the kinds of 
considerations one can take into account when doing any kind of textual analysis. 
Ambiguity can be used to teach students the importance of linguistic form. Jurisdiction 
can be used to teach students about issues of canonization. There are few models for 
teaching students this kind of knowledge and these skills systematically and 
comprehensively, but the interpretive stases offers one means of beginning to do so. In 




conduct research for, engage with, and ultimately make persuasive arguments about the 
meaning of texts.  
 
The Cognitive Bases of the Interpretive Stases 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have consistently drawn on contemporary language 
theory to begin to investigate the cognitive and linguistic grounds of arguments for and 
over the meaning of texts. In terms of cognitive linguistic theory, this coordination of 
meaning can be explained in terms of the alignment of mental spaces, or conceptual 
constructs of elements and relations that are part and parcel of thinking and 
communicating (Fauconnier, Mappings 11). When it comes to the interpretation of texts, 
both coming to a common understanding of a text with other readers and attempting to 
understand the author’s intent represent such coordination. The stases present a 
classification of where, as readers interpret a text, this coordination breaks down. The 
stases classify grounds of disagreement that can be seen as competing means of 
constructing competing spaces invoked by operations being performed on the text. For 
instance, the interpretive operation of translating a text to a new situation can result in 
multiple possible new spaces. As we saw in Chapter 6, the famous call from Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech to judge people on their merits rather than 
their race was used by Reagan to campaign against the use of quotas in affirmative 
action—an application of the slain civil rights leader’s message that still remains 
controversial today. In terms of mental space theory, people bitterly disagree over how to 




affirmative action in a world that does not at least appear to be like the one King 
inhabited.  
But contemporary language theory not only gives us a cognitive explanation for 
people’s ultimate disagreements over the meaning of texts. It can also, in conjunction 
with the interpretive stases, help us understand the processes that lead to that 
disagreement. At their base, each interpretive stasis marks a textual hinge where 
interpreters break in their inference of what the author intended.241 Did the author intend 
this linguistic form or this one (ambiguity)? Would the author permit the passage to be 
used in these new circumstances or only in the circumstances he or she was familiar with 
(assimilation)?  
 Indeed, any claim or belief about the meaning of a text is the result of several 
inferential steps, many “almost instantaneously” and thus below the level of 
consciousness (Sperber and Wilson 65, 66). While many of these steps may be 
unconscious, they may be brought to the surface and questioned at any point either by the 
reader him or herself or by an interlocutor. When these inferences, upon which the 
interpretation is built, are questioned or provoked, the interpreter may marshal evidence 
to shore up his or her position, acquiesce to an alternative position, admit ignorance, or 
maintain his or her initial interpretation in faith (perhaps until more support is available). 
Once any of these inferential steps is brought up from beneath the surface of 
                                                 
241 Of course, authorial intention is not always at issue (especially given the number of 
schools of literary criticism that believe the author is dead). In cases where getting at 
authorial intention is not necessarily at issue, the interpretive stases mark textual hinges 






consciousness, they can be classified, described, and analyzed according to the system of 
the interpretive stases.  
Contemporary language theory also highlights the fact that interpretive 
disagreements may be largely driven by differences in assumptions and experiences 
between readers. For example, how much did listeners’ varying experiences with African 
American styles of preaching affect how they interpreted Jeremiah Wright’s “God and 
Government” sermon, in which he exclaimed “God damn America!”? While 
interpretations can certainly be motivated, the assumptions and experiences that 
interpreters bring to a text have a significant effect on how they interpret it. The kinds of 
disagreements people have, delineated by the stases, could point to kinds of differences in 
assumptions and experiences. Connecting kinds of disagreements to differences in 
assumptions and experiences could have predictive power in forecasting reader reactions 
to a text, which could be especially useful when a writer is composing a text for a diverse 
audience.    
Another interesting intersection between the interpretive stasis system and 
contemporary language theory involves the topics or lines of argument tied to each stasis. 
The lines of argument for each stasis represent specific ways that interpreters attempt to 
overcome interpretive disagreements by persuading their audience members to change or 
otherwise reorganize their minds’ conceptual structure. We have a clear example in 
Chapter 3 when L. T. Townsend argues for women’s right to preach by in part moving 
Paul’s prohibitions against women speaking in church from the category of universal 
command to the category of individual opinion (Willard 155-157). Townsend attempts to 




authority and which are not. Categorization is a widely recognized and studied 
phenomenon within cognitive studies (e.g. Rosch; Fauconnier and Turner). But how the 
work of structuring our conceptual categories is accomplished through argument deserves 
much more attention and investigation.  
While the intersection of the interpretive stases and contemporary language theory 
deserves more exploration in general, the integration of cognitive linguistics and the 
topics seems like an especially fertile ground for further research as it could link specific 
argumentative moves with potential changes in conceptual structure in readers’ minds. 
We thus may come to understand why certain rhetorical moves are more persuasive than 
others. We may also learn how changes in conceptual structure are affected through 
discourse at the level of argument. 
 
The Theory of Interpretation Underlying the Interpretive Stases 
 The methodology presented in this dissertation for analyzing how people interpret 
texts is rhetorical (in nature). It is grounded in the rhetorical tradition, with its specific 
framework being the ancient rhetorical interpretive stases. As a part of stasis theory, the 
interpretive stases frame textual interpretation as argumentation. Interpreters are cast as 
arguers who make claims about the meanings of texts, which, when questioned or 
doubted (in reality or otherwise), must be defended with various forms of support taken 
from such sources as the text or context. That claim can also be attacked with 
disconfirming support and be pitted against alternative claims of meaning. The 
framework for understanding textual interpretation arising from the interpretive stases 




Although not the only possible lens through which to see textual interpretation, the 
interpretive stases teach us that through the process of argumentation, the meaning of 
texts are forwarded, contested, rejected, and ultimately constructed.   
 Each interpretive stasis then represents a kind of conflict that people can have 
about the meaning of a text. Five of the interpretive stases denote parts of a text where 
agreement over the meaning of a text hinges and can break down. According to the 
taxonomy of interpretive stases adopted here, the meaning of a text can hinge on a 
linguistic form (ambiguity), a term (definition), the perceived intention of the author or 
some other animating principle against the explicit message of text (letter versus spirit), 
the congruity of multiple passages (contradictory passages), or the translation of a text to 
a novel situation or use (assimilation). Rhetors can also step back from the text and 
question the conditions for interpreting a text in the first place (jurisdiction). As rhetors 
argue over the meaning of a text, any one of these points of a text—its various linguistic 
forms, any of its terms, the congruity of intention and obvious meaning, coherence of 
multiple passages, how it should be applied in new situations, and the conditions for its 
interpretation—are possible sites of disagreement. Whenever rhetors disagree along one 
of these points, there are certain lines of argument, or means of support and attack, which 
they can rely on in order to support their side of the argument and oppose the other side. 
 Stasis theory is also, and first and foremost, an inventional heuristic that helps 
rhetors discover strategies for argument. The interpretive stases not only point to kinds of 
controversies over texts, but also how to formulate and support claims about texts in 
competition with other claims. A rhetor wishing to contest a forwarded or accepted 




classified by the interpretive stases. He or she could, for example argue that the 
interpretation relies on a faulty definition of a term, and offer an alternative definition 
that supports an interpretation of the text they support. To support that alternative 
definition and alternative claim, the rhetor could turn to the various lines of argument in 
the stasis of definition.  
We saw rhetors use alternative definitions of the term trick to support different 
interpretations of an email written by climatologist Phil Jones possibly revealing 
duplicitous intentions concerning a global temperature graph he published. In the cases 
examined in this dissertation, rhetors turned to some standard of usage—a strategy 
classified as early as the 1st century BCE by Cicero—to justify their definitions. It’s 
unlikely that these arguers consciously turned to the catalogues of topics in the rhetorical 
treatises, but certainly such advice could have been an aid. The inventional utility of the 
interpretive stases is a major reason why they would be an excellent addition to many 
undergraduate writing and rhetoric curricula. 
 Textual interpretation is an inherently argumentative process because it always 
involves reasoning from assumptions and the available evidence to justify a belief in a 
particular meaning of a text. When these reasons are put before an audience, including an 
audience of the self, they become means of persuading that audience to that particular 
meaning of a text. Furthermore, the reasons justifying any particular meaning of a text 
can never be conclusive because of the polysemous nature of language and the 
indeterminable nature of context. There can only be more or less persuasive reasons for 
accepting an interpretation, and therefore more or less persuasive interpretations, always 




the hermeneutical standards of a particular interpretive community, and even those 
standards can be contested by community individuals.  
The interpretive stases offer us a way to understand and analyze how people 
arrive at the interpretations of texts, or justify their interpretations of texts, given the 
evidence available to them and their own assumptions. Textual interpretation is rhetorical 
through and through. But if any interpretation of a text is rhetorical, then so is any 
analysis done under the rubric of the interpretive stases. While the interpretive stases 
offer a stance by which to analyze arguments over textual meaning, they do not offer an 
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